Transfer of Technology to the Soviet Bloc: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-sixth Congress, Second Session, February 20, 1980U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980 - 156 páginas |
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Palavras e frases frequentes
Acting Director action alleged allies approved asked Brady Brady's BRYAN Chairman NUNN COCOM Commerce Department committee commodities Congress Control List decision Defense Department deleted Department of Commerce Department of Defense Deputy Director détente diversion end-use engines equipment Exhibit export control system export license fact foreign availability going industry invasion of Afghanistan investigation issue Kama plant Kama River truck Klutznick Knowles Marcuss matter memorandum ment Moscow MOYER national security nology Office of Export PERRY personnel position President problem question recommendation Report requested Research responsibilities revoked River truck plant Russians safeguards Senator COHEN Senator HUMPHREY Senator JACKSON Senator Nunn significant sources Soviet Bloc Soviet military Soviet Union staff statement strategic Subcommittee tech technical technology assessment technology transfer tion trade U.S. export U.S. Government U.S. technology United USSR validated license violation VORONA Western
Passagens conhecidas
Página 126 - where we stand" on administrative deadlines, front door licensing, and other measures announced in the Department's testimony before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Página 105 - The right of employees, individually or collectively, to petition Congress or a Member of Congress, or to furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or Member thereof, may not be interfered with or denied.".
Página 111 - AMA appreciates this opportunity to appear before the Research and Development Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.
Página 8 - West this new policy was welcomed as a sign of moderation and a move toward "peaceful coexistence," but Lenin, as it turned out, had not ceased to be a Bolshevik. "Concessions — ," he told a meeting of the Soviet Communist party in 1920, "these do not mean peace with capitalism, but war on a new plane." Lenin's sole objective was to revive Soviet industry, and, as subsequent events revealed, he had every intention of expropriating the concessions after production had been organized and sufficient...
Página 3 - Russia, always wrote and said that the western capitalists would do anything to strengthen the economy of the USSR. They will compete with each other to sell us goods cheaper and sell them quicker, so that the Soviets will buy from one rather than from the other. He said: They will bring it themselves without thinking about their future.
Página 3 - I must say that Lenin foretold this whole process. Lenin, who spent most of his life in the West and not in Russia, who knew the West much better than Russia, always wrote and said that the western capitalists would do anything to strengthen the economy of the USSR. They will compete with each other to sell us goods cheaper and sell them quicker, so that the Soviets will buy from one rather than from the other.
Página 15 - They will supply us with the materials and technology which we lack and will restore our military industry, which we need for our future victorious attacks upon our suppliers.
Página 115 - Brady's rieht and opportunity were not interfered with and that he did in fact communicate with Congress on several occasions. It flatly disregards Mr. Marcuss
Página 103 - ... (0 During any investigation initiated under this subchapter, no disciplinary action shall be taken against any employee for any alleged prohibited activity under investigation or for any related activity without the approval of the Special Counsel.
Página 17 - ... adversary is not likely to be given serious consideration. The argument heard most often— that controls cannot work since other nations will export what we embargo— is a rationalization for having no policy at all. In the Dresser case, for instance, there was no foreign producer the Russians could have turned to if we had denied the sale, but we approved it nonetheless. It is hard to see how the US can expect to gain the cooperation of its allies in denying strategic technology to the Soviet...