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strictly static view of the interaction between firms . In contrast , in this paper we investigate the impact of vertical mergers in a dynamic game of repeated interaction between upstream and downstream firms .
strictly static view of the interaction between firms . In contrast , in this paper we investigate the impact of vertical mergers in a dynamic game of repeated interaction between upstream and downstream firms .
Página 1324
For the same reason , when the integrated upstream firm cheats in the upstream market , unintegrated downstream firms anticipate that it will follow this deviation by reducing its own downstream price . ( This is a myopic best response ...
For the same reason , when the integrated upstream firm cheats in the upstream market , unintegrated downstream firms anticipate that it will follow this deviation by reducing its own downstream price . ( This is a myopic best response ...
Página 1332
Summing up the incentive constraints for the unintegrated and integrated upstream firms , ( 7 ) and ( 8 ) , we obtain the critical discount factor with K vertically integrated firms : dev int int is in prices , and so 7NC = 0 and Tom ...
Summing up the incentive constraints for the unintegrated and integrated upstream firms , ( 7 ) and ( 8 ) , we obtain the critical discount factor with K vertically integrated firms : dev int int is in prices , and so 7NC = 0 and Tom ...
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TOM KREBS | 664 |
BERTIL TUNGODDEN | 818 |
ALVIN E ROTH TAYFUN SÖNMEZ AND M UTKU ÜNVER | 828 |
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activities additional agents aggregate allow analysis assume assumption average behavior business cycles capital changes choice choose coefficient compared condition consider consumer consumption contracts correlation cost countries decision depends discuss distribution durables Economic effect empirical equal equation equilibrium estimated evidence example exchange expected Figure final firms fixed function given growth higher households implies important income increase individuals inflation interest inventory investment Journal labor less losses lower matching mean measure monetary nodes Note observed output pairs parameters patients percent period positive preferences present probability procyclical production random relative reported requires response Review risk risk aversion sample shocks side specification standard structural suggests Table theory tion units University utility variables vouchers wage workers