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We first show that these results no longer hold when buyers are final consumers who can breach these contracts and pay expectation damages . We then show , however , that exclusive contracts can inefficiently deter entry if buyers are ...
We first show that these results no longer hold when buyers are final consumers who can breach these contracts and pay expectation damages . We then show , however , that exclusive contracts can inefficiently deter entry if buyers are ...
Página 1306
Based on this , FM conclude it is unlikely that an upstream incumbent could use exclusive contracts to foreclose the entry of a more effi- cient competitor when buyers compete intensely . Combining this conclusion with the RRW - SW ...
Based on this , FM conclude it is unlikely that an upstream incumbent could use exclusive contracts to foreclose the entry of a more effi- cient competitor when buyers compete intensely . Combining this conclusion with the RRW - SW ...
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Now consider the subgame in which all buy- ers sign the exclusive contract in period 1. ... each buyer more than " to sign an exclusive con- tract , it is not an equilibrium for buyers to sign exclusive contracts if they expect pf > č .
Now consider the subgame in which all buy- ers sign the exclusive contract in period 1. ... each buyer more than " to sign an exclusive con- tract , it is not an equilibrium for buyers to sign exclusive contracts if they expect pf > č .
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EDMUND S PHELPS | 541 |
O 2 0 2007 | 713 |
ALMA COHEN AND LIRAN EINAV | 745 |
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