The American Economic Review, Volume 97American Economic Association., 2007 |
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... agents . We have two cases to consider : Case 1. Neither of these receiving agents is matched with the donating agent of the other pair under exchange E. n Without loss of generality , suppose these re- ceiving agents are P , and P ...
... agents . We have two cases to consider : Case 1. Neither of these receiving agents is matched with the donating agent of the other pair under exchange E. n Without loss of generality , suppose these re- ceiving agents are P , and P ...
Página 1002
... agent : The principal is always better off when the agent acts fairly . The second captures the idea that the essence of control is to protect against an agent's shirking behavior : the returns to controlling are larger when agents are ...
... agent : The principal is always better off when the agent acts fairly . The second captures the idea that the essence of control is to protect against an agent's shirking behavior : the returns to controlling are larger when agents are ...
Página 1005
... agents work less but these costs are smaller when the principal is optimistic and this may make signaling possible ... agents did not meet . Hence , a principal choosing a restric- tion did not distrust this agent in person , as agents ...
... agents work less but these costs are smaller when the principal is optimistic and this may make signaling possible ... agents did not meet . Hence , a principal choosing a restric- tion did not distrust this agent in person , as agents ...
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EDMUND S PHELPS | 541 |
O 2 0 2007 | 713 |
ALMA COHEN AND LIRAN EINAV | 745 |
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agents aggregate American Economic Review analysis assets assume assumption average behavior benchmark Beveridge curve business cycles candidates capital changes choice coefficient cointegration consumer consumption contracts correlation cost of business countercyclical deductible degree distributions distribution durables effect empirical equation equilibrium estimated exchange expected Figure firms function given growth HIP model households implies impulse responses income increase individuals inflation inventory investment investment rate Journal of Economics labor market loss aversion marginal likelihood matching Matthew Rabin ment Michael Woodford monetary policy nodes nomic observed optimal output pairs paper parameters patients percent policy shock post.com preferences procyclical production Proposition random regime relative response risk aversion sample Section sector Shapley value side payments simulations sticky prices stochastic Table theory tion tradable unemployment utility variables variance volatility vouchers wage workers Yangzi Delta