The American Economic Review, Volume 95American Economic Association., 2005 |
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Página 936
... auction formats can be ranked based on the security design , and that informal auctions lead to the lowest possible revenues . ( JEL D44 , G32 , G34 ) Fairness and Redistribution By ALBERTO ALESINA AND GEORGE - MARIOS. Auction theory and ...
... auction formats can be ranked based on the security design , and that informal auctions lead to the lowest possible revenues . ( JEL D44 , G32 , G34 ) Fairness and Redistribution By ALBERTO ALESINA AND GEORGE - MARIOS. Auction theory and ...
Página 946
... auction . There are two bidders , types V , are independent and uniform on [ 0 , 1 ] , X = 0 , and the distribution ... auction it is an equilibrium strategy for agents to bid their reservation val- ues : SPA ( v ) = 2v . In a ...
... auction . There are two bidders , types V , are independent and uniform on [ 0 , 1 ] , X = 0 , and the distribution ... auction it is an equilibrium strategy for agents to bid their reservation val- ues : SPA ( v ) = 2v . In a ...
Página 952
... auctions with a fixed auction format . Under appropriate conditions there exists a unique symmetric increasing equi- librium for both the first- and the second - price auction.31 Given an efficient equilibrium , we can generalize our ...
... auctions with a fixed auction format . Under appropriate conditions there exists a unique symmetric increasing equi- librium for both the first- and the second - price auction.31 Given an efficient equilibrium , we can generalize our ...
Índice
JOHN DUFFY AND ERIC ON FISHER | 510 |
CHARLES R PLOTT AND KATHRYN ZEILER | 530 |
DARON ACEMOGLU SIMON JOHNSON AND JAMES ROBINSON | 546 |
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agent aggregate asset assume assumption Atlantic trade auction average bank behavior beliefs cash flows changes choice coefficient constraint consumer consumption growth contract correlation costs countries cycle debt denote double auction dummy effect endowment effect equation equilibrium estimates ethnic ethnic fractionalization ex ante expected payoff export firm firm's formateur function h₁ heterogeneity higher households human capital implies incentive increase intensive margin interactions interest rate investment Journal of Economics keiretsu Lemma loans marginal match measure ment monetary nomic observed output p-value panel paper percent period polarization political precautionary saving predictions preferences production profits Proposition ratio rational expectations regression reported rural second-price auction Section securities seller sessions shocks signaling games strategic play subjects sunspot sunspot equilibrium Table teams theory tion United utility variable voting weight wage workers zero