and diligence to discover defects in the work which has been already done. 25 It is not necessary that the architect give to the matter of supervision more than reasonable and ordinary care, or exercise therein more than reasonable and ordinary diligence. Ordinary care and diligence do not require that he supervise the work so closely as to follow every movement of every workman, and be able to discover all variations of every character from the contract provisions and all defects in execution, including such defects as can only be detected by the exercise on his part of extraordinary diligence. 26 To avoid the charge of negligence it is not essential that the architect prove the exercise of "the utmost skill such as only a few members of any profession attain to," but he must show what "other architects will generally consider to be a reasonable degree of professional knowledge and skill." 27 In this connection it should be noted that what might perhaps be a reasonable degree of skill in one locality, would not be such in another. For instance, the degree of attention which an archi 25 Strauss v. Buchman, 96 N. Y. A. D. 270. 26 Petersen v. Rawson, 34 N. Y. 370, reversing 2 Boswell, N. Y. 234; Hubert v. Aitken, 15 Daly, N. Y. 237; Stewart v. Boehme, 53 Ill. App. Court 463; Vigeant v. Scully, 20 Ill. App. Court 437; Cowles v. Minneapolis, 128 Minn. 452; Bayne v. Everham, 163 N. W. 1002. 28. 27 Clark on Architecture, p. tect may properly give to country work, unhampered by city ordinances, would not be at all sufficient for work done in a large city, under local rules, regulations and building ordinances, which must be given strict attention by the architect, if he is to secure the rights of his client and the proper conduct of the work. It may happen that the supervision of a building will be in the hands of an architect who did not prepare, and had no part in the preparation of, the plans. The fact that the plans were made by another architect, and before the supervising architect took charge, will not relieve the latter of responsibility for defects in the building as erected under his supervision.28 While the architect is not held to the necessity of preventing every slightest shade of variation from the plans and specifications, he must, nevertheless, bestow such care and attention as may be necessary to detect variations or faults which are of real importance and materiality.29 Furthermore, the negligence of the architect as supervisor will not be excused by the fact that the owner was on the premises, while the work was in progress, and must necessarily have noted the imperfect work. 30 The architect and the builder may be jointly and severally liable to the owner in the case of 28 Scott v. Christ's Church Cathedral, L. C. L. J. 63. 29 Peterson v. Rawson, 34 N. Y. 370; Wait, Eng. & Arch. Jur. $839, p. 759; Avent v. 30 Lotholz v. Fiedler, 59 Ill. App. 379. neglect attributable to them jointly. In New Jersey this doctrine has been applied to the extent of holding that, where a joint neglect by the builder and architect is proven, a suit may be maintained against the architect alone, and that the fact that the owner has, at the same time, held back from the contractor a part of the money due to the latter, upon the ground that the contractor is equally liable with the architect, will be no bar to the action against the architect himself.31 So where a floor has sunk on account of the insufficiency of timber used, the architect and the builder have been held jointly and severally liable for the resultant damages.32 In New York, in a somewhat similar case, decided in July, 1904, where it was proven that the architect visited the building as supervisor on an average, substantially, of at least once a day, but, between his visits, important floor timbers were placed, and in such a manner as to be in direct violation of law, and this occurred after the owner had taken possession, and necessitated the making of important repairs, the Court, stating the rule that reasonable care and diligence must be exercised by the architect in the supervision of the work, and that the question whether or not the architect is negligent is a question of fact to be passed upon by the jury, held that: 31 Newman v. Fowler, 37 N. J. L. 89. 32 David v. McDonald, 8 L. C. (Lower Canada) Jurist 44, 14 L. C. Rep. 31. "It was the duty of the defendants under their contract with plaintiff, not only to see that the beams were properly placed, but especially to see that the placing of them conformed to the requirements of the statute. This they failed to do. . . . The evidence . . . established the fact that numerous and extensive repairs were made necessary by reason of the defective work, the cost of which and other work necessary for putting the building in the condition in which it would have been had the defendants performed their contract, would have justified a larger verdict. The plaintiff was entitled to recover a sum which would leave him as well off as he would have been had the defendants fully performed their contract." 33 34 The duty of the architect in regard to the material used applies, of course, to the character of the material itself, as well as to the manner in which it is used in the work of construction. The measure of damages for neglect in permitting the use of inferior material or labor is a sum equal to that which will be required properly to repair, and make a good job of, the work in question. Where by the contract the superintendent, as a part of his duties, is required to furnish monthly estimates of the work done, this provision is not necessarily, it seems, to be taken as meaning that "he must furnish correct and accurate estimates," the monthly estimates referred to being in their nature and of necessity, mere approximations.35 On the broad general question of the degree of 33 Straus v. Buchman et al., 96 N. Y. App. Div. 270, at 273274, citing 8 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 2d ed. 634. 34 Gilman V. Stevens, 54 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 197. 35 Shipman v. State, 43 Wis. 381, and see I Redfield on R. R., 6th ed. § 116. care and diligence required of an architect in the performance of his duties as superintendent and supervisor of construction, one of the leading cases, if not the leading case, in the American courts, is a case which came before the Court of Common Pleas of the City and County of New York, in 1889. Following the first decision in this case a re-argument was held and the judgment affirmed and later the same judgment was again affirmed in all ways by the Court of Appeals. The plaintiffs were the architects who prepared the plans for, and supervised the construction of, the building. After the completion of the building it was discovered that the flues, which connected with the boiler flues, were not sufficiently large to meet the purposes for which they had been designed. The defendant claimed that no recovery could be had for the reason that the contract was entire and that the plaintiffs had not performed their contract, in that they were negligent in the designing and construction of the flues. The flues were not omitted from the plans, but were set down with the same detail as were the other parts of the building. The Court held that it could not be said that the plaintiffs had not entirely performed their contract as to the plans; that they had performed it completely, but that they had performed it negligently, and that while the defendant was entitled to deduct the amount of the damage caused by the faulty design of the chimney from the amount due under the contract, for the draw |