show that the client has not acted or intended to act in good faith in making the condition, and has never intended to accept the sketches under any circumstances.

Where a client specifies that a certain style of architecture shall be followed, care should be taken that the style which he has in mind is clearly understood. If, for instance, he states that he wishes the work done in accordance with Gothic style, it may well be that his idea of "Gothic" is entirely different from the true interpretation of that word as used in this connection. While, under these circumstances, the architect, if he did the work in Gothic style, and thus complied with the terms of his contract, would be able to sustain a recovery, yet his right to do so might easily be endangered if it were shown that, from the conversation with the client, or other circumstances, he should have known or should have suspected that the meaning of the word Gothic, as interpreted by the client, was not the same as the ordinary meaning and interpretation of that term as used in the architectural profession.

Again, in the preparation of the plans, many difficult situations and probable losses will be avoided if care be taken to advise the client of the cost of the extra work which changes ordered by him will entail. Where the client makes such changes, thereby increasing the cost of the building, his act in itself would, where it has been agreed that the building shall not cost more than a definite sum, tend to relieve the architect of a

part, at least, of the liability imposed by that condition. The latter's position, however, will be infinitely stronger if he is able to state that he has warned the owner that the changes proposed will necessitate an increase in price over the amount contemplated, and that the client has made the changes notwithstanding.

So, too, the client should be warned that there may well be a variance between the working drawings as finally prepared and the preliminary sketches submitted. If there be a substantial variance in this respect, that is, to such an extent that the plans call for a building entirely or radically different from the scheme shown by the sketches, or a building so varied in treatment or in plan that there is a real and substantial difference between the preliminary suggestions upon which the owner acted, and the plans as finally submitted to him, the owner may well claim that, having ordered plans to be prepared for a building to accord with the sketches submitted, he cannot be called upon to make payment for plans which call for a building of a distinctly different type.

The mere fact, however, that the plans show some slight modification in unimportant details of the original scheme as shown by the sketches, will not, especially where the client has been warned, as suggested, that some variance will probably be inevitable, preclude a recovery by the architect for the full amount of his services in the preparation of the plans and drawings.

The same rules upon which the right of the architect to compensation for preliminary sketches and drawings is based will naturally apply to his right to compensation for the preparation of specifications and the supervision of the work. Where the amount or rate of compensation is definitely specified in the contract, the terms of the latter will be controlling, and where the amount or rate is not so specified, the recovery by the architect will be upon the theory of quantum meruit, viz., the reasonable value of the work performed. In determining this reasonable value, evidence of custom, of the schedule of charges of the American Institute, or of other similar facts and circumstances will be competent, just as they are competent in the case of proof of the reasonable value of services performed in the preparation of preliminary sketches or plans.

As the architect owes the utmost good faith to the owner in his dealings with him, so the owner must be entirely honest and above-board in his dealings with the architect. For any conspiracy between the owner and the builder, the result or purpose of which is to injure the architect, the latter can hold the owner liable in damages.

If it can be shown that an owner's refusal to comply with the contract and proceed with the building is pursuant to, or the result of, an improper agreement between the owner and the builder, having for its object the prevention of a recovery by the architect of the amount which he

would be entitled to recover if the contract were completed, proof of such facts will be competent as tending to show malice or improper conduct on the part of the owner, thus increasing proportionately the damages recoverable from him by the architect for the breach of contract in question.

In a word, the more definitely all conditions touching the right of the architect to compensation are determined upon and made clear in advance the more care that is exercised by the architect in determining what is the owner's understanding on all points, and that his understanding of the character and expense of contemplated changes or extra work done is clear-the more surely will misunderstandings and controversies and losses, on the part of each, be avoided, and the less opportunity will there be presented for the entry into the situation of conditions adversely affecting the right of the architect to proper compensation for the time and thought which he has expended, the expenses which he has incurred, and the services which he has rendered.

CHAPTER IV

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THE

ARCHITECT

§ 39. In General.-In holding himself out to the public as a practicing member of the architectural profession the architect assumes the same responsibility, for reasonable skill and care in the public service, as that which rests upon a lawyer or a physician.1 Under the rule that one who publicly professes to possess skill in a given art thereby represents or intimates to all the world. that he possesses the ability and skill requisite to practice that art,2 he who holds himself out to the public as an architect is presumed to possess the skill and ability requisite and necessary for the proper practice of the architectural profession.3

The broad general duty of an architect to act in the utmost good faith in his employer's inter

1 Coombs v. Beede, 89 Me. 187.

2 Harmer v. Cornelius, 5 C. B. (N. S.) 236, and see opinion of Jervis C. J. in Jenkins v. Betham, 15 C. B., at p. 189.

3 Trunk v. Clark, 163 Iowa 620; Chapel v. Clark, 117 Michigan 638; Cauchon v. MacCoshan, 19 Dominion Law Reports 708; Johnson v. Wana

maker, 17 Penn. Sup. 301; Nave v. McGrane, 19 Idaho III; Hubert v. Aitken, 15 Daly (N. Y.) 237, aff'd 123 N. Y. 655; Bay Shore Development Co. v. Bonfoey, 78 Southern 507; Henon v. Vernon, 68 Penns. Sup. 608; Bayne v. Everham (Michigan), 163 Northwestern 1002.