concessions the Labour members gave him their support, though refraining carefully from entering into any coalition; but finally in 1899 they grew tired of Reid and transferred their support to Lyne, in return for his written promise to take up certain measures. Reid at once fell, and between September, 1899, and July, 1901, the Lyne ministry passed no less than ten measures virtually dictated by the Labour members. The tail wagged the dog, and the Labour Party, though shouldering no responsibility for the work of government, was able to secure such important reforms as the abolition of plural voting, a wider franchise including votes for women, land and income taxes, vastly improved factory and mine laws, a shops early closing act, old-age pensions, better accommodation for shearers, compulsory arbitration, etc. In administrative work demands were successfully made for a minimum wage, trade union rates and preference to unionists in government employment, an eight-hour day for railway workers, the abolition of sub-letting in government contracts, and the establishment of a government clothing factory. A creditable record for the smallest and youngest party in the House!

This state of affairs ended when the party secured more than one-third of the seats in any Lower House, and this was done in New South Wales, South Australia, Queensland, and the Commonwealth between 1904 and 1906. The growth of the party had been chiefly at the expense of the Liberal Party, and created a new situation. In South Australia a Labour-Liberal coalition held office from 1905 to 1909. In the Federal arena the Labour Party kept Mr. Deakin in office for two years, although Labour had nearly twice as many supporters as Mr. Deakin. But such a position was unsatisfactory, and was eventually ended by a fusion of Liberals and Conservatives, thus leaving Labour as the direct opposition. This was the second stage of development-a party strong enough to drive the old parties into fusion and office. As a direct opposition less influence might be exerted on legislation than during the balance-of-power stage, but at least there was the prospect of soon reaching the third stage, which came when a straight-out majority was secured, and a ministry established. Prior to this Labour had held office on sufferance for one or two brief periods, because no other party could see the way clear to securing sufficient support. But with a clear-cut two-party system a majority for Labour was possible. Labour began to get its majorities after 1910, when the New South Wales Party came in with 46 members out of a House of 90. Similar successes were soon recorded in every state except Victoria, and at the end of 1915 Labour was in power in every Australian Parliament except one. The conscription issue of 1916 cleft the party as with an axe, divided lifelong friends, and sent Official Labour into the desert in every parliament except that of Queensland. In 1920 the N.S.W. Labour Party returned to power once more, and the Queensland Party won its third successive election.

The Political Aims of Unionism. The steady growth of the political labour movement was largely due to the energy with which the trade unions flung themselves into the work. The initiative generally came from the Trades Hall; the revenue of the party was drawn from the affiliated unions; and although the professional classes were not entirely unrepresented, the great bulk of the members were drawn from the trade union ranks. Official position in a union came to be regarded as a stepping-stone to political honours, and most of the leaders of political labour climbed into prominence on the backs of the industrial bodies with which they were connected. We

may, therefore, ask, "What did unionism want out of politics? What was its political creed? What did it get?''

To answer these questions we must remember that the unions turned to political action to secure those things for which they had formerly striven by industrial means. Therefore in the early platforms proposals for improving the conditions of labour under the existing industrial system occupied the major part of the programme. Of the 16 points of the first New South Wales programme nine aimed at bettering the condition of the wage-earner; three sought to increase his political power by an extended franchise, free compulsory education, and the election of magistrates; the demand for a land tax showed the influence of Henry George's recent visit, and Australian Federation was blessed ten years before its advent. Iu only two points was there any demand for a socialistic extension of state enterprise: a national bank and a national system of water conservation were proposed, as well as "the extension of the principle of the government acting as employer through the medium of local self-governing bodies." In the minds of some there might be a vague longing for a civilization built according to specifications supplied by Bellamy or Morris; but that seemed a long way ahead, except to the Queensland optimists, who made their first platform definitely socialistic throughout; meanwhile there was pressing work to be done near at hand. Political labour, therefore, set to work and applied its trade union mind to securing all possible safeguards or privileges for the wage-earner.

These safeguards can be put under five headings: (1) The extension of mine, maritime, shop, and factory legislation, so as to secure a maximum length of working day, decent, healthy, safe conditions in which to work, and workmen's compensation, with a Ministry of Labour and an adequate staff of inspectors to see the laws were obeyed. (2) The securing of adequate remuneration for labour, based on the suppression of sweating and the acceptance of the living-wage principle. (3) The protection of the unionist and his standard of living from the competition of the immigrant. The old fear of the coloured races had not disappeared, especially in Queensland, and the fight was therefore continued until the Federal Parliament established the White Australia policy. While admitting the right of those Chinamen who had already settled to stay in the country, unionist policy was either to reduce the difference between the white and yellow standards of production by declaring every Chinese workshop to be a factory and so subject to the factory acts, or to demand that all furniture made there should be branded as such. Added to this fear of the coloured worker was a dread of the effect of European immigration. In its crude form, it was tinged by ideas of republicanism and "cutting the painter," and expressed itself in the opposition to free and assisted immigration" clause of the South Australian platform of 1892; but since that time the establishment of legal safeguards has removed the danger, the antipathy towards the Old Country has died down, and the only open opposition to-day is against immigration of contract labour. (4) The protection of the unionist against the non-unionist was one of the issues of the 1890 strike. Failing to get the closed shop, the less ambitious idea of "preference to unionists''was gradually evolved, and made a political demand. First admitted in the New South Wales Arbitration Act of 1901, the principle was subsequently embodied in the federal arbitration laws. (5) The events of the strike era had taught the unions the need for more liberal trade union laws. The need

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was once more emphasized when the Taff Vale Decision began to be applied to Australia. Hence a demand arose for the repeal of the old laws which made possible fine and imprisonment for participation in industrial disputes, and the enactment of new measures which would give unionism an assured freedom of action. The position to-day is that unions can sue members for arrears of fees; they can make levies for political purposes or the support of Labour newspapers, but must exempt members who object to such levies; their right to strike is abolished (except conditionally in N.S.W.) under the provisions of the wages regulation laws.

Within twenty years of its birth political labour had gained, or was almost within reach of, most of these essentially trade union aims. The economic planks of the early platforms had been nailed to the national shanty, but still the rain leaked in, the draughts blew through the crevices, and in spite of all the added timber some of the inhabitants still complained that the whole building was wrong. Let it, therefore, be replaced by another, built on a new foundation-collectivism. Hence during the last decade the aim of labour has been extended; it is now claimed that the state should not merely regulate the conditions under which private enterprise is carried on, but should embark on productive enterprise itself. With this collectivism, its rise and achievements, we shall deal in a later chapter. Books Recommended. As in last chapter; Clark, "Labour Movement in Australia''; Anderson, "The One Big Union' (pamphlet); "Platforms of labour parties since 1891," Atkinson (ed.); "Trade Unionism in Australia," Atkinson (ed.); "Australia: Economic and Political Studies,' chap. 4.

THE STATE REGULATION OF INDUSTRY AND WAGES IN AUSTRALIA.

THE struggle of 1890 cames as a great shock to many Australians. This was the first really big strike which the continent had experienced, and it seemed to open up a fearful prospect of a new undeveloped country torn with incessant industrial strife. People felt that no further progress could be made in these circumstances; capital would fight shy of the land, and governments would find their credit shaken when they went into the loan market. August bodies like the Royal Society of Tasmania turned aside from the study of butterflies and rocks to consider the character of the new economic portent, and discussion about the best road to industrial peace became general. The New South Wales Government shared the general disquietude, and in November, 1890, appointed a royal commission "to investigate and report upon the causes of conflicts between capital and labour known as 'strikes,' and the best means of preventing or mitigating the disastrous consequences of such occurrences, by examining the work

of boards of conciliation and similar bodies in other lands. The commission sat for six months, examined nearly 80 witnesses, and then issued two huge volumes, containing, among other things, digests of George, Marx, Hobson, Sydney Webb, and Brentano, reports on municipalization, sweating and conciliation boards, and the Papal Encyclical on the condition of labour. Yet out of this mountain of information emerged only a mouse.

The evidence given by employers and employees alike showed that neither side had any proposal to make for effecting a radical readjustment of industrial relationships. They were asked for an opinion on the value of a board of conciliation or arbitration set up by the state. A squatter declared it would be no use; a shipowner said such a board would be useful if the men "would be reasonable"; a colliery-owner stated that he would rather deal with his men singly, and settle grievances in that way. If agreements were to be made, they must be enforced by the levy of heavy fines on any person or organization that broke them. The representatives of labour were favourable to conciliation; some of them objected to any board composed of government nominees, and all were opposed to the introduction of any element of compulsion. Both sides clung to the old order. The employer wanted freedom of contract, and having once tasted the fruits of victory was quite ready to fight labour again. The employees had no desire to see their freedom of industrial action limited; they were willing to confer, but agreements reached at such conferences were not to be completely binding. Spence and others quite frankly asserted that should any dispute arise on a matter of trade union principle no agreement could be allowed to stand in the way of a strike. 'Anything is fair in war,' said Spence. "If the principle (at stake) is important enough, you may call on trade unionists to break their agreement solemnly and legally made.'' This statement, which was made to justify the calling out of the shearers in September, 1890, was supported by Mr. Brennan, president of the Sydney

Trades and Labour Council, who declared, "There is a certain value on the labour side in sticking to agreements, but when any fundamental principle is attacked, then I say the agreements must go. Smash up all agreements. Labour was looking to political action for the realization of some of its aims, but even here there was no idea that the state should be used as an intermediary to settle industrial troubles.

In view of this absence of any new ideas from the minds of capital and labour alike, the commission's recommendations were very tame. It was suggested that the state should establish conciliation and arbitration machinery; a small nucleus of three permanent members (one employer, one employee, and a neutral) was to add to its number by drawing upon representatives of the trade in which a dispute might arise. These men would then act as a board of conciliation, but should they fail to reach agreement the three permanent members would act as a board of arbitration and give judgment. But there was to be no compulsion. The board was to have no power to conciliate unless invited to do so by one of the parties, and its judgments could not be enforced except with the consent of oth sides. The whole success of the scheme depended upon the voluntary acceptance of agreements or awards, and the influence of public opinion in preventing the dissatisfied party from repudiating the settlement. Voluntary systems worked well in England; why not in Australia?

These recommendations were embodied in an act of 1892.

In Victoria a similar bill had been before Parliament in 1890, actually before the strike broke out, and had been passed in 1891. But neither in New South Wales nor Victoria did the legislation meet with any success; it lay unused, ignored, and was eventually replaced by laws based on different principles. The reason for failure is probably to be found in the temper of the time. Capital wanted freedom from union interference, and was in no mood for conference with the enemy. Labour, smarting under defeat, had no general desire to make agreements, since by reason of its weakness it could not expect to secure terms favourable to itself. Conciliation implied "recognition"; it needed a willingness to compromise, and since neither side would accept the irreducible minimum of the other no good could come from any conciliatory machinery erected by the state.

The Coming of Compulsion. Capital and labour had nothing new to say, and it was, left to onlookers to draw from the troubles of th period those lessons which vitally influenced the subsequent development of our industrial legislation. In his evidence before the New South Wales Commission, Mr. A. Oliver, registrar of friendly societies, suggested compulsory conciliation and arbitration before any strike or lock-out took place. If this was enforced by law, heavy penalties should be imposed upon any party which began fighting before the provisions for peaceful settlement had been exhausted. Neither side need accept the arbitrator's verdict, and once that verdict had been given either party would be free to stop work; but Mr. Oliver hoped that the discussion of the case, and the support given by public opinion to the side favoured by the arbitrators, would result in reducing strife to a minimum. Sir Samuel Griffith, then Premier of Queensland, went down to fundamentals, and declared that so long as "labour is a thing to be bought and sold, so long would there be industrial strife. He therefore urged the establishment of new economic relationships, in which labour, whilst receiving a "natural minimum wage, "' would also have its share of the net profit after land and capital had received their fair rate

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