bilities of direct action. Syndicalist ideas were in the air, and the general strike seemed the best short cut to everything.

During the years 1911-1913 strikes won some substantial victories, but there were also serious defeats. There was a general rise in wages, both in skilled and unskilled occupations. But along with these few pence or shillings, labour learned some important facts. It found that employers were now banded together in strong federations, and had behind them large fighting reserves. The constant calls for strike pay sadly depleted the union funds. Disputes in 1913 cost the chief unions £1,350,000 in strike pay, and the coal strike in 1912 cost the miners' union over £1,000,000. Hence had not the government intervened on at least one big occasion-the coal strike—it is possible that the strikers would have been defeated. Unionism realized that its strength was impaired by being dissipated among over 1,100 unions, some of which were on quite unfriendly terms with each other. Further, it was seen that whenever strikers tried to win by inconveniencing the general public to the point of protest, the general public refused to submit tamely, but set out to do the work itself, and gradually improved with practice, whilst the strikers got nearer to starvation. In short, the strike seemed to be an old blunderbuss; no matter how much polish was expended on it, no matter if the latest "sympathetic'' or general strike" brand of cartridge was used, it was still very doubtful from which end the shot would emerge.

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These lessons were driven home to the unions and their opponents, and so the war found both sides strengthening the weak spots in their armour. The unions were growing rapidly, nearly 1,000,000 new members being obtained between 1911 and 1914. Attempts were made to replenish and increase financial resources. But most important of all was the effort to reduce the number of over-lapping and competing unions, and to establish some working arrangement between the big organizations. On the railways, where unionism had been very feeble until 1897, and unrecognized till 1911, three big unions fused in 1913 into the National Union of Railwaymen. Then in April, 1914, a joint conference of miners, railwaymen, and transport workers resolved to enter into an alliance, "with a view to co-operative action and the support of each other's demands."' This Triple Alliance represented 1,350,000 unionists in the most vital industries of the country, and its formation presaged more effective action in future disputes. Meanwhile employers were also seeing to their armour. In September, 1913, an Employers' Defence Union was formed to consolidate the resources of employers, and maintain their rights and freedom to bargain individually with free workers or collectively with unions. The promoters of this plan intended to raise a guarantee fund of £50,000,000, which could be used to assist employers involved in disputes. On both sides further big struggles were felt to be near at hand; whether they would be settled by conciliation or warfare no one could say, but since the militant suffragists and Ulster were preaching force to the utmost, it was not surprising that many trade unionists accepted the same creed.

The War. The crisis which prefaced the outbreak of the Great War bewildered labour. No one wanted war; war had threatened so often that this was surely another cry of "Wolf, wolf!" Norman Angell had told us there would be no more wars because war did not pay-at least, that was what we thought he said; and of course the German Socialists would prevent hostilities. Labour leaders did their bit, first to preserve peace

and then to keep Britain out of the struggle, but the Belgian neutrality plea swept all before it, and on August 4, 1914, the government had the almost unanimous support of Labour in its action.

This support was quickly shown in many ways. On August 24 a conference of trade unionists and the Labour Party resolved "That an immediate effort be made to terminate all existing trade disputes, and whenever new points of difficulty arise during the war period a serious attempt should be made by all concerned to reach an amicable settlement before resorting to a strike or lock-out." This industrial truce, declared unconditionally, and probably without a realization of all it meant, was loyally observed for six months. In July, 98,000 workers were on strike; in December, 3,000. During the first seven months of 1914 there had been 836 stoppages, involving 423,000 workers; during the last five months the figures were 137 and 23,000. The Triple Alliance was hung up; 200,000 miners enlisted in six months, and the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress voiced the general feeling of Labour when it declared (September, 1914) that "upon the result of the struggle rests the preservation and maintenance of free and unfettered democratic government.

By early 1915 the first flush of uncomplaining loyalty had passed away. The war had ceased to be a series of thrilling events; it had become a state of affairs, and several factors were now combining to cause a revival of labour unrest. Prices were gathering speed as they rose; by February, 1915, food cost 23 per cent. more in the big cities than it had cost in the previous June; coal was "up'' at least 9/- a ton, and the influx of population to munition areas was causing a scarcity of houses and an increase of rents. To deal with this situation one of two things was necessary—either the control of prices by the government or a general increase in wages. Å vigorous labour campaign in favour of price control failed, however, to convert the government from its adherence to supply and demand theories. Not until 1917 was any attempt made by the state to take charge of supplies and prices. Labour was therefore driven to the other line of action, and demands for increased payment became universal. In February, 1915, an agreement between the railwaymen and the railway companies provided for the granting of war bonuses, and this policy of granting bonuses, which were to be regarded as temporary war-time increases, became general. In some cases they were secured only after a threatened or actual strike, and so during the first six months of 1915 the number of new disputes rose considerably. In September, 1915, the Board of Trade reported that 4,500,000 workers had received increases amounting to £40,000,000 a year, and the increases not recorded by the Board of Trade brought the total up to probably £150,000,000 a year. It is doubtful whether this additional pay compensated for the increased cost of living, for food prices alone went up 42 per cent. during the first year of war.

One of the most potent causes of discontent amongst unionists was the challenge to trade union rules and customs thrown up by the scarcity of labour. After a brief period of unemployment in 1914 the demand for labour grew rapidly. This was due to the enlistment of large numbers of skilled workers, and the growing need for largely increased supplies of munitions. Engineers, boilermakers, and other metal workers were especially in demand, and yet enlistment had made the supply below the pre-war standard. For a time employers tried to secure the necessary workers by

enticing them, by offers of higher wages, from other firms. This policy of “pilfering” failed to meet the nation's requirements, and so a cry went up for the abandonment of union rules and conditions. These rules, some of them written and some unwritten but established by tradition and custom, dealt especially with "demarcation" and "dilution."' Demarcation decided which kinds of skilled workmen should do particular jobs; it drew the line, for instance, between the duties of the bricklayer and the mason, the plumber and the coppersmith, the shipwright and the boilermaker, and so on, and said that no skilled man in one class should do skilled work belonging to another class. The dilution rules were intended to prevent untrained men from doing work which was regarded as a monopoly of skilled men. The increased demand for certain articles and the decreased demand for others could only be met by pulling down the walls of demarcation, and by allowing unskilled or semi-skilled workers to take up tasks which in normal times were maintained as a close preserve for trained men. This argument was put forward with great force by the big munition makers, and was for a time resisted most strenuously by the unions, who were especially afraid that if they once pulled down their defences they would never be permitted to re-erect them. Hence bitterness grew, and since no one grasped the magnitude or complexity of the problem, the nation groped about for a season in a thick fog, colliding with old and new landmarks, and losing its temper in consequence.

The Munitions Act, 1915. Gradually the fog cleared and it became possible to see how the land lay. The war was seen to be an engineers' war; vastly increased supplies of munitions must be forthcoming, and so more factories and more workers must be obtained, but it was foolish to appeal to labour's sense of duty unless at the same time labour's rights were safeguarded and labour organizations fully consulted. In March, 1915, Mr. Lloyd George and other members of Cabinet met the representatives o over thirty unions connected with munition work. At this conference an agreement was reached which was embodied in the Munitions Act, July, 1915. This act gave extensive powers to the new Ministry of Munitions, and its chief provisions were as follows:

(1) Compulsory arbitration was to be established, and strikes and lockouts were illegal except after three weeks' notice and failure to secure settlement by the Board of Trade.

(2) The new Ministry had power to declare any factory in which munition work was being carried on a "controlled establishment.'' In such factories any profits exceeding by one-fifth, those made before the war were to be paid into the Treasury. At the same time any trade union rules which tended to restrict production or employment" were to be suspendel for the duration of the war only. No change in wages or salaries in these firms could be made without the approval of the Ministry of Munitions. · Pilfering of employees was checkmated by providing that no controlled firm could give employment to any man who during the six preceding weeks had worked for another controlled employer, unless the man possessed a certificate of discharge from his former firm or from the munitions tribunal.

(3) Munitions tribunals, national and local, were established to give certificates of discharge to those men who could prove their case for change of employment. These tribunals consisted of a chairman, aided by representatives of capital and labour.

This act, drawn up in a hurry, conferring vastly increased powers on the state, and implying big sacrifices by labour, achieved its main purpose, but caused so much friction that it had to be amended on several occasions. By November, 1915, 1,700 factories were controlled, and this number increased steadily, until eventually the whole field of mining, industry, and transport came directly or indirectly under the management of the state. This control did not, however, eliminate friction. Prices still rose, and as they soared the hatred against the capitalist-now usually described as a profiteer-became bitter and widespread. Readjustment of wages could not be made without the approval of the Ministry of Munitions, and such changes were frequently delayed indefinitely. In the munitions tribunals the labour representation was at first unsatisfactory, but in December, 1915, it was agreed that representatives should be appointed by local unions. These tribunals frequently appeared to act unjustly in withholding discharge certificates from men who wished to change their place of employment-so unjustly that the Munitions Act became known to many people as the "Workers' Slavery Act." Dilution brought its difficulties, for as women and unskilled workers were brought into industry and placed in charge of machinery, the skilled men looked askance at the new arrivals, especially as the piece-rate earnings of some new workers were far above the time-rate earnings of the old skilled men. When conscription was introduced a strong suspicion arose that some workers were allowed to be taken into the army without any protest by their employers, on the ground that they were active members of trade unions. Add to these grievances the fact of nerves racked by overtime, deficient housing, insufficient food, war sorrows and bereavements, a sense of unequal sacrifice, with labour giving much and capital taking much, and a knowledge that the government would not or could not keep its pledges concerning the restoration of union rules; add finally the disturbing effect of the Russian revolutions, and a growing uncertainty as to the real character of allied war aims; then the industrial unrest of 1916-18 can be understood.

New War-Time Developments. To meet the changing conditions of the war period old developments were accelerated and new devices adopted. (1) Industrial unionism grew in popularity. This was due not merely to the preaching of theorists and propagandists, but to the blurring of the old distinctions between skilled and unskilled in the big industries. Work once done only by skilled engineers was now done-thanks to standardization of products, automatic machinery, and the suspension of union rules-by persons who learnt their little specialized task in a few days or weeks. To meet these new conditions organization by industry was better than organization by craft. Hence the Trades Union Congress of 1918 welcomed the growing tendency towards industrial unionism, and during 1917 and 1918 many important federations or amalgamations of kindred unions took the movement further away from the narrow craft basis. In 1920 the A.S.E. and other leading metal-working unions merged themselves in a powerful Amalgamated Engineering Union.

(2) The most significant development of the war period was the appointment of shop stewards and shop committees. Shop stewards were not unknown before the war, but they were unimportant. The rapidly changing workshop conditions and the coming of dilution raised many difficult points during 1915 and the following years. These points would in normal times have been referred to the district or central union officials, but now there

was need for rapid decision, and the central office seemed far away and very sleepy. Hence unionists at work in the shops felt the need to have some representative on the spot to whom they could refer knotty problems, and through whom they could deal with the employer. In various firms, especially on the Clyde, members of a union in a shop got together and elected one of their number to represent them. This man was the shop steward, and in a firm containing members of many unions the number of shop stewards thus chosen might be great. In such cases these men formed themselves into a works committee, and the works committees in a district formed a district works committee. This whole movement was largely unofficial, and obviously took out of the hands of the union officers the handling of important trade union affairs. Some unions accepted the inevitable, and officially recognized the shop steward. Some employers did the same, and in many large factories the works committee and the employer's representatives met, when necessary, to deal with dilution and possibly also wages and other matters. Some unions, however, refused to recognize this new development, and repudiated vehemently a number of strikes authorized and organized by the shop stewards.

(3) During the last two years of the war discussion, official and unofficial, on "Reconstruction" was a most popular hobby. In 1916 the government appointed a committee, under the chairmanship of the Rt. Hon. J. H. Whitley, M.P., to make recommendations concerning the future relations between employers and employed. This committee proposed a scheme for the establishment of general standing industrial councils, supplemented by district committees and works committees, for each industry. On these bodies there was to be equal representation of the two sides, and where possible the members should be chosen by the employers' associations on the one side and the trade unions concerned on the other. These trade parliaments were to deal not merely with questions of hours and wages, but were to devise means for the "better utilization of the practical knowledge and experience of the workpeople," the improvement of conciliation machinery, technical education and training, industrial research, improvements on industrial technique, and the consideration of any proposed legislation affecting the industry. The committee was opposed to compulsory arbitration, and believed that industrial harmony, efficiency, and prosperity could best be obtained by the voluntary co-operation of organized capital and organized labour. The Whitley plan was adopted by the government as an official part of its plan of reconstruction, but neither employers nor employed hailed the proposals with any great outburst of enthusiasm. Some employers resented the idea of workers' participation in discussions of the policy of industry, and many trade unionists felt that the joint councils would bring labour leaders into too intimate and demoralizing contact with employers. Still a number of joint industrial councils were established, and in 1919 there were about 50 in all, dealing with industries employing over 4,000,000 workers; in addition to these, the British government was compelled in 1919 to drink its own medicine and institute councils throughout the public service. Events since the Armistice do not, however, offer much hope that the plan will revolutionize industrial relationships in any large field of employment; the leading well-organized industries prefer either to stick to old methods of conciliation and strike, or to achieve more ambitious aims through political action.