The American Economic Review, Volume 97American Economic Association., 2007 Includes annual List of doctoral dissertations in political economy in progress in American universities and colleges; and the Hand book of the American Economic Association. |
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Página 135
... equilibrium and this equilibrium is a Type I equilibrium . ( ii ) If A > A there is a unique equilibrium and this equilibrium is a Type II equilibrium . ( iii ) If A Є ( A , A ) there are three equilibria , one of each type . Thus ...
... equilibrium and this equilibrium is a Type I equilibrium . ( ii ) If A > A there is a unique equilibrium and this equilibrium is a Type II equilibrium . ( iii ) If A Є ( A , A ) there are three equilibria , one of each type . Thus ...
Página 136
... equilibrium ) , the picture differs from the conventional one because government is below its efficient scale , although revenues are still misallocated to pork . We know from Proposition 2 , that for the Type II equilibrium , the ...
... equilibrium ) , the picture differs from the conventional one because government is below its efficient scale , although revenues are still misallocated to pork . We know from Proposition 2 , that for the Type II equilibrium , the ...
Página 250
... equilibrium , for any i ≤ min { N + 1 , K } , ( 1 ) -- - - α¡Sg ( i ) - P ≥ α¡- 18g ( i ) — p ( i − 1 ) ̧ Of course , it is possible that bids change over time , depending on the players ' strategies and information structure ...
... equilibrium , for any i ≤ min { N + 1 , K } , ( 1 ) -- - - α¡Sg ( i ) - P ≥ α¡- 18g ( i ) — p ( i − 1 ) ̧ Of course , it is possible that bids change over time , depending on the players ' strategies and information structure ...
Índice
GIUSEPPE MOSCARINI | 37 |
ANDREW ATKESON AND PATRICK J KEHOE | 62 |
HANNO LUSTIG AND ADRIEN VERDELHAN | 89 |
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