The American Economic Review, Volume 97American Economic Association., 2007 Includes annual List of doctoral dissertations in political economy in progress in American universities and colleges; and the Hand book of the American Economic Association. |
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Página 19
... constraint to be rare . Furthermore , they also found that those firms with the least constraint had the greatest sensitivity to cash flows.60 There is , thus , remarkable similarity between the consumption function and the investment ...
... constraint to be rare . Furthermore , they also found that those firms with the least constraint had the greatest sensitivity to cash flows.60 There is , thus , remarkable similarity between the consumption function and the investment ...
Página 498
... constraint , ( 9 ) - T− π ' ( q + t ) ≥ 0 , and the incentive - compatibility constraints of the rich ( the " downward " constraint ) and the poor ( the " upward " constraint ) , 11 ( 10 ) -- - v ( p , yh− T ) ≥ u ( yh − T + t , q ) ...
... constraint , ( 9 ) - T− π ' ( q + t ) ≥ 0 , and the incentive - compatibility constraints of the rich ( the " downward " constraint ) and the poor ( the " upward " constraint ) , 11 ( 10 ) -- - v ( p , yh− T ) ≥ u ( yh − T + t , q ) ...
Página 499
... constraint of the poor just binds ) .13 Now , as the value of q in- creases from its minimum value , the upward incentive constraint slackens and λ ' = 0. More- over , as long as the redistribution to the poor is not high enough to make ...
... constraint of the poor just binds ) .13 Now , as the value of q in- creases from its minimum value , the upward incentive constraint slackens and λ ' = 0. More- over , as long as the redistribution to the poor is not high enough to make ...
Índice
GIUSEPPE MOSCARINI | 37 |
ANDREW ATKESON AND PATRICK J KEHOE | 62 |
HANNO LUSTIG AND ADRIEN VERDELHAN | 89 |
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