The American Economic Review, Volume 97American Economic Association., 2007 Includes annual List of doctoral dissertations in political economy in progress in American universities and colleges; and the Hand book of the American Economic Association. |
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... auction . With multiple positions available , GSP generalizes the second - price auction ( hence the name ) . Here , each advertiser pays the next highest advertiser's bid . But as we will demon- strate , the multi - unit GSP auction is ...
... auction . With multiple positions available , GSP generalizes the second - price auction ( hence the name ) . Here , each advertiser pays the next highest advertiser's bid . But as we will demon- strate , the multi - unit GSP auction is ...
Página 271
... auction . Given sophisticated buyers who under- stand the seller's incentives , however , the seller is always worse off than in an auction . Indeed , equilibrium losses can be substantial unless the cost of soliciting another round of ...
... auction . Given sophisticated buyers who under- stand the seller's incentives , however , the seller is always worse off than in an auction . Indeed , equilibrium losses can be substantial unless the cost of soliciting another round of ...
Página 456
Price Residual Supply : Generalized Vickrey Auction Residual Supply : Discriminatory Auction A Values B Q ° αν Bid Function Quantity FIGURE 1. ALLOCATIONS AND Revenues : DISCRIMINATOry versus Generalized VickREY AUCTION a loss of , at ...
Price Residual Supply : Generalized Vickrey Auction Residual Supply : Discriminatory Auction A Values B Q ° αν Bid Function Quantity FIGURE 1. ALLOCATIONS AND Revenues : DISCRIMINATOry versus Generalized VickREY AUCTION a loss of , at ...
Índice
GIUSEPPE MOSCARINI | 37 |
ANDREW ATKESON AND PATRICK J KEHOE | 62 |
HANNO LUSTIG AND ADRIEN VERDELHAN | 89 |
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advertiser African American agents aggregate analysis asset assumption auction AUSTRALIAN OPEN average behavior benefits Besley bureaucrat buyer capital central bank cities climate change conditional cash transfers constraint consumption growth cost crime currency decision denote distribution dynamics Econometrica employment share English auction envy-free equation equilibrium estimates example expected factor Figure fixed effects function growth rate higher impact implies income increase individual industries inflation interest rate investment investors Journal liquidity trap litigation loss aversion lottery ment monetary nomic norms observed optimal output panel paper parameters payoff percent period players portfolios predicted preferences probability of arrest productivity Qmax rational expectations regression revenues Ricardian equivalence risk sample Second Industrial Revolution Section sector seller shocks specification statistical Table technologies theory tion U.S. OPEN utility v₁ variables voting wage zero Zipf's law