Proposed Joint Development of the FSX Fighter with Japan: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, First Session, April 18 and May 5, 1989

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Página 136 - The review process is conducted by the Generalized System of Preferences Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee, with members from the Office of the US Trade Representative and the Departments of State, the Treasury, Labor, Commerce, the Interior, and Agriculture. AID is a non-voting member.
Página 135 - He believe that State and DOD alone have too narrow a perspective to adequately address the economic, industrial, trade, and labor interests and perspectives. DOD has set up an internal task group to study US coproduction policy, but we believe that other agencies' participation, with appropriate input from industry, would better ensure that the economic implications of coproduction are adequately addressed. Consequently, there would be better balance among military, political, and economic benefits...
Página 114 - ... Co-production may be limited to the assembly of a few end-items with a small input of local country parts, or it may extend to a major manufacturing effort requiring the build-up of capital industries. § 194.4 Objectives and policies. (a) The major objectives to be attained through co-production projects are to: (1) Enable eligible countries to improve military readiness through expansion of their technical and military support capability. (2) Promote United States-Allied standardization of...
Página 225 - Embassies in the affected countries to furnish the pertinent information, and a report was transmitted to the Speaker of the House and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 21, 1974.
Página 124 - ... able to use the Lockheed drawings for the F-104J program without translation. Access to technical information was not a problem. When discussing data transfers, US aerospace officials were emphatic in saying that their co-production partners could have access to any document. One US executive flatly stated, "We were paid to put them in business, and we gave them everything we had.
Página 121 - This, of course would not preclude the use of US manufacturing technology and know-how gained through coproduction, in follow-on Japanese-developed defense equipment. As pointed out by the Task Force on Export of US technology of the Defense Science Board (a DOD advisory board with Government, industry, and academic particpants) . "* * *The release of know-how is an irreversible decision. Once released it can neither be taken back nor controlled. The receiver of know-how gains a a competence which...
Página 103 - Ford sheet glass plant in Shreveport, Louisiana. Pittsburgh Plate imports sheet glass from abroad. The service jobs of America's ships have been exported until the US home fleet carries only about five percent of the foreign trade volume, and US employment in shipping and shipyard work is low. 19,000 shoe workers in Massachusetts alone lost their jobs in the 1960s as American shoe manufacturers faced foreign competition and followed the policy of "If you can't lick them, join them.
Página 255 - AND THE UK, GERMANY, SPAIN AND ITALY WERE DEVELOPING THE EUROPEAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT (EFA). DOD ATTEMPTED TO FORESTALL THESE COSTLY AND DUPLICATIVE PROGRAMS BY OFFERING US FIGHTER AIRCRAFT TECHNOLOGY AND AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL PARTICIPATION. ALL SUCH EFFORTS FAILED, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE LAVI, WHICH WAS TO BE FUNDED BY THE AMERICAN TAXPAYER. ISRAEL WAS ULTIMATELY PERSUADED TO CANCEL THE LAVI BECAUSE OF THE HIGH COST INVOLVED. GIVEN THIS BACKGROUND. AND THE FACT THAT DOD'S ASSESSMENT AT THE TIME WAS...
Página 96 - The control of design and manufacturing know-how is absolutely vital to the maintenance of US technological superiority.
Página 266 - OFF-THE-SHELF PURCHASE OF AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT BY JAPAN, RATHER, IT IS THE REAL POSSIBILITY OF JAPAN GOING IT ALONE IN THE MILITARY AEROSPACE INDUSTRY, A PROSPECT THAT WE BELIEVE WOULD NOT BE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF EITHER THE UNITED STATES OR JAPAN. IT REMAINS IN OUR INTEREST, FOR BOTH MILITARY AND ECONOMIC REASONS, FOR THE UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE ITS LONG TRADITION AS A RELIABLE SUPPLIER OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO JAPAN. CURRENTLY, THE JAPANESE SPEND LESS THAN THREE PERCENT OF THEIR BUDGET...

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