included in the amount financed but which are not part of the finance charge, and the finance charge, and to describe that sum as the "deferred payment price" as required by Section 226.8(c)(8)(ii) of Regulation Z.

2. Failing to disclose the annual percentage rate, computed in accordance with Section 226.5 of Regulation Z, as required by Section 226.8(b)(2) of Regulation Z.

3. Failing to disclose the annual percentage rate accurately to the nearest quarter of one percent in accordance with Section 226.5 of Regulation Z, as required by Section 226.8(b)(2) of Regulation Z.

4. Stating, utilizing or placing any additional information in conjunction with the disclosures required by Regulation Z to be made, which information misleads or detracts attention from the information required by Regulation Z to be disclosed.

5. Failing to make all disclosures required by Regulation Z clearly, conspicuously, and in meaningful sequence, as required by Section 226.6(a) of Regulation Z.

6. Failing in any consumer credit transaction or advertisement to make all disclosures determined in accordance with Sections 226.4 and 226.5 of Regulation Z at the time and in the manner, form and amount required by Sections 226.6, 226.8 and 226.10 of Regulation Z.

It is further ordered, That respondents deliver a copy of this order to all present and future personnel of respondents now or hereafter engaged in the consummation of any extension of consumer credit or in any aspect of the preparation, creation or placing of advertising, and that respondents secure a signed statement acknowledging receipt of said order from each such person.

It is further ordered, That respondents notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any proposed change in the corporate respondent such as dissolution, assignment or sale resulting in the emergence of a successor corporation, the creation or dissolution of subsidiaries or any other change in the corporation which may affect compliance obligations arising out of the order.

It is further ordered, That the individual respondent named herein promptly notify the Commission of the discontinuance of his present business or employment. Such notice shall include respondent's current business address and a statement as to the nature of the business or employment in which he is engaged as well as a description of his duties and responsibilities.

It is further ordered, That the respondents herein shall within sixty (60) days after service upon them of this order, file with the Commission a report, in writing, setting forth in detail the manner and form in which they have complied with this order.

19

Order

IN THE MATTER OF

KOSCOT INTERPLANETARY, INC., ET AL.

Docket 8888. Order, Jan. 7, 1975

Order directing general counsel to take necessary and appropriate action to preserve restitutionary or any other consumer redress claim.

Appearances

For the Commission: Quentin P. McColgin and David C. Keehn.
For the respondents: Leonard & Cohen, Wash., D. C.

ORDER DIRECTING GENERAL COUNSEL TO TAKE NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE ACTION TO PRESERVE POSSIBLE RESTITUTIONARY

CLAIM

This matter is before us on the administrative law judge's order of Dec. 23, 1974, certifying complaint counsel's "Motion that the General Counsel be Directed to Take Action to Preserve the Commission's Claim Against Respondent Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., " which motion respondents have not answered. Specifically complaint counsel report that respondent Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. is in bankruptcy proceedings wherein a settlement is pending which could foreclose any claim in restitution which might arise out of this action. Such a foreclosure would be contrary to the public interest. Accordingly,

It is ordered, That the General Counsel take such action as is necessary and appropriate for the protection of the public interest in any restitutionary claim or any other claim for consumer redress which may arise out of the above-captioned proceeding.

IN THE MATTER OF

HOLIDAY MAGIC, INC., ET AL.

Docket 8834. Order, Jan. 8, 1975

Denial of respondent Olivo's motion for reconsideration and motion for modification of final order; denial without prejudice to resubmission at appropriate time, of respondent's petition to reopen proceedings concerning adequacy of funds; and denial of respondent's motion for extension of time to file briefs in support of aforementioned motions and petition.

Appearances

For the Commission: Joseph S. Brownman and D. Stuart Cameron.

For the respondents: Shearer, Lanctot, Thomas & Knorp, San Francisco, Calif.

ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, ET AL.

On Oct. 15, 1974 84 F.T.C. 347, the Commission issued its decision and order in this matter. Respondent Olivo has timely filed for reconsideration and modification of the order as it affects him, pursuant to Section 3.55 of the rules of practice, and has petitioned that the matter be reopened for consideration of the ability of respondent Olivo, as executor for the estate of William Penn Patrick, to make restitution as required by the order of the Commission.' An extension of time is also sought within which to file briefs in support of the motions for reconsideration and reopening. Complaint counsel have filed an Answer opposing the motions. For the reasons stated below, the motion for reconsideration and modification must be denied with prejudice, while the motion for reopening will be denied but without prejudice to renewal at such time as the order herein (pursuant to which the motion for reopening would appropriately be made) becomes final.

Section 3.55 requires in part that:

Any petition filed under this subsection must be confined to new questions raised by the decision or final order and upon which the petitioner had no opportunity to argue before the Commission.

Respondent's motion for reconsideration and modification entirely fails to meet the requirements of the pertinent rule, inasmuch as respondent Olivo was given ample opportunity subsequent to his substitution as a party in this case to brief the issues now raised. The withdrawal of counsel to which reference is made in the motion apparently occurred well after the time allotted for such briefing.

In addition, the Commission has fully considered in reaching its final decision the arguments raised by counsel in the motion to reconsider. The Commission does not see any conflict or inconsistency between a consent settlement which permits the estate of a wrongdoer to escape primary liability for the violation of one law, and a litigated order which requires the estate to make restitution based on violation of a different law. The reasons for differing treatment of the corporation and executor with respect to restitution are stated in the Commission's decision, and relate to the differing obligations imposed on the two by prior consent settlements. The motion for reconsideration simply confirms the propriety of the distinction that was made. Nor, we

"Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Modification of Final Order; and Petition to Reopen Proceedings Concerning Adequacy of Funds," filed Dec. 11, 1974. Respondent received an extension of seven days, beyond the 20 allowed by the rules, within which to file a motion for reconsideration, and said motion has been filed within 27 days of the date of service of the final order upon him.

believe, does the fact that the estate is subject for certain purposes to the jurisdiction of the Marin Superior Court in any way affect the authority and duty of the Commission to adjudicate the obligations of the executor under Section 5.

Those points raised by respondent concerning the difficulty of compliance with the order, and the lack of funds with which to comply, may properly be addressed at the compliance stage. Paragraph V(3)(e) of the final order provides that respondent may petition to reopen within 60 days of the effective date of the order upon a claim that respondent lacks sufficient funds to make restitution. If, as respondent implies, he lacks access to the names of distributors which the order provides shall accompany an application for reopening, that fact should be indicated clearly in the petition and this will not be a bar to the reopening. The petition to reopen this matter is at this stage, however, premature, and will therefore be rejected without prejudice to renewal at such time as the order in this matter becomes final. The motion for an extension of time within which to file briefs relating to respondent's motions and petition will also be denied as no valid reason has been given to warrant the delay. Therefore,

It is ordered, That respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Modification of Final Order be denied, and that respondent's Petition to Reopen Proceedings Concerning Adequacy of Funds be denied without prejudice to resubmission at an appropriate time; and It is further ordered, That respondent's Motion for Extension of Time to File Briefs in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Modification and Petition to Reopen Proceedings Concerning Adequacy of Funds be denied.

Commissioner Nye not participating.

IN THE MATTER OF

RELIABLE MORTGAGE CORPORATION, ET AL.

ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND TRUTH IN LENDING ACTS

Docket 8956. Complaint, Mar. 5, 1974 - Decision, Jan. 8, 1975

Order requiring a Los Angeles, Calif., loan company, among other things to cease violating the Truth in Lending Act by failing to disclose to consumers, in connection with the extension of consumer credit, such information as required by Regulation Z of the said Act.

For the Commission: David G. Cameron and Kendall H. MacVey. For the respondents: Alvin F. Howard, Horowitz, Howard and Bloom, Los Angeles, Calif.

COMPLAINT

Pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and of the Truth in Lending Act and the implementing regulation promulgated thereunder, and by virtue of the authority vested in it by said Acts, the Federal Trade Commission having reason to believe that Reliable Mortgage Corporation, a corporation, and Edward Siegel, individually and as an officer of said corporation, hereinafter sometimes referred to as respondents, have violated the provisions of said Acts and implementing regulation and it appearing to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be in the public interest, hereby issues its complaint stating its charges as follows:

PARAGRAPH 1. Respondent Reliable Mortgage Corporation is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California with its principal office and place of business located at 320 N. Vermont Ave., Los Angeles, Calif.

Respondent Edward Siegel is an individual and is the principal corporate officer of Reliable Mortgage Corporation. He formulates, directs and controls the policies, acts and practices of said corporation and his address is the same as that of the corporate respondent.

PAR. 2. Respondents are now, and for many years have been, engaged in the business of arranging loans secured by real property for a fee.

PAR. 3. In the ordinary course and conduct of their business as aforesaid, respondents regularly arrange for the extension of consumer credit, as "arrange for the extension of credit" and "consumer credit" are defined in Section 226.2 of Regulation Z, the implementing regulation of the Truth in Lending Act, duly promulgated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

PAR. 4. Subsequent to July 1, 1969, respondents, in the ordinary course and conduct of their business as aforesaid, have caused to be published, advertisements, as "advertisement" is defined in Section 226.2 of Regulation Z, which advertisements aided, promoted, or assisted, directly or indirectly, the extension of other than open end credit. Respondents, in certain of these advertisements, have stated the rate of a finance charge, as "finance charge" is defined in Section 226.2 of Regulation Z, and have not expressed said rate as an annual percentage rate, using the term "annual percentage rate," as "annual