the solution of the Spanish problem perhaps by the statesmen of the four powers. 15. After the Fuehrer declared that the Sudeten question was the last territorial problem in Europe, the colonial question comes to the foreground, about which the Fuehrer had already a conference with Chamberlain, and according to which it is not a matter of mobilization but of negotiations. Of course, Germany will make her colonial demands. However, the colonies are not what they originally had been expected to be and the real facts have been known in Berlin for quite a long time. As a source of raw materials they are relatively unimportant in comparison with Germany's great needs and commercial obligations to other countries in connection with payments for German exports. There are also considerable disadvantages connected with trading in reichsmarks with the colonies on account of higher prices which have to be adjusted to conditions here. Due to Germany's required foreign exchange management it would also be diffi cult for her to make financial settlements under the colonies' present financial setup, although colonies probably ought to be on a pound-sterling basis. It has to be taken into account that the British will most likely link the German currency question with the colonial question by demanding a devaluation of the mark for any colonial concessions. A devaluation of the mark means equal export prices for all countries which would eliminate the advantage of the present flexible mark, thus resulting in a very considerable reduction of export trade and limitations of her capability in the competitive field. Most cordially, Firma ADAM T. SCHILDCE, INC., New York, N. Y.: LENTZ & HIRSCHFELD, Der einzelne Mensch steht heute stets im Zusammenhang mit seiner Volksgemeins haft, weshalb auch das Geschäft des Einzelnen mit den allgemeinen wirtschaftlichen und politischen Verhältnissen eng verknüpft ist. Es ist deshalb wohl wichtig, nach diesen aufregenden Tagen zu versuchen, sich über die Auswirkungen ein Bild zu machen, das uns wie folgt erscheint: Durch das Münchener Abkommen ist eine ganz neue Lage entstanden: 1. Die Russen sind aus Europa verschwunden. Ihre Verbindung zu den westeuropäischen Staaten, die bisher über die Tschecho-Slowakei ging, ist unterbrochen und kann in Zukunft nur noch auf Umwegen laufen. 2. Die Tschecho-Slowakei hat bisher in der balance of power eine wichtige Rolle gespielt. In Zukunft wird das, was von ihr übrig bleibt, wirtschaftlich ganz erheblich auf Deutschland angewiesen sein. 3. Das Vordringen der Germanen nach Osten und Südosten ist im Gange. 4. Die wirtschaftliche Erschliessung des Donauraumes bis ans Schwarze Meer seitens Deutschlands ist jetzt sehr viel leichter. In Zukunft wird der RheinMain Donau Kanal, der auch mit der Weser Verbindung has, die Frachten über die Donau so billig transportieren können, dass andere Konkurrenz nicht mit kann. 5. U. S. A. ist aus Europa verdrangt, den Platz hat Deutschland jetzt eingen ommen. CC sent Mexno. 6. D'e kleine Entente ist aufgebrochen. Dadurch sind die einzelnen Staaten wie Jugoslawien, Rumänien, etc. mehr aui sich selbst angewiesen und kommen damit mehr unter deutschen Einfluss. 7. Die grosse Entente hat ebenfalls eine starke Gewichtsverlagerung durchgemacht. 8. Deutschlands Ansehen und Prestige hat weit über Europa hinaus zugenommen. Dasselbe ist auch auf die Persönlichkeit des Führers zu sagen. 9. Die deutsch-englische Freundschaft wirkt bestimmend auf die Vereinigten Staaten und vielleicht auch auf andere Länder. 10. Europa hat seine Probleme vorläufig gelöst, wodurch ein Friede in Aussicht ist, den die englischen Zeitungen auf mindestens zewi Jahre garantieren (!). 11. Diese allgemeine Befriedung wird einen ebenso allgemeinen Aufschwung zur Folge haben, weil die Geschäftswelt wieder auf lange Sicht planen und bestellen kann. 12. Es ist damit zu rechnen, dass in Prag eine gewisse antisemitische Bewegung ausgelöst wird, weil dort zu viel Juden durch die letzten Ereignisse zusam mengedrängt wurden und die übrig gebliebenen Möglichkeiten wohl mehr von den Tschechen in Anspruch genommen werden. Das würde in einer Belebung der Verhältnisse USA/Deutschland sich ausdrücken. 13. Sowohl wegen der europäischen Befriedung als auch wegen der bevorstehenden Paäsidentenwahl ist in USA mit einer Wirtschaftsbelebung zu rechnen, was sich in einen vielleicht erheblich grösseren Import von Deutschland trotz des Boykotts auswirken wird. 14. Nach der Bereinigung der osteuropäischen Frage folgt vielleicht für Deutschland die an sich unbedeutende Frage von Danzig, vor allem aber vielleicht die Lösung des Spanien-Problems durch die Staatsmänner der vier Mächte. 15. Nachdem der Führer erklärt hat, dass die Sudetenfrage für ihn die letzte territoriale Frage in Europa war, rückt die koloniale Frage näher, über die der Führer bereits mit Chamberlain gesprochen hat und zwar dahingehend, dass dies nicht eine Sache der Mobilmachung, sondern der Verhandlungen sei. Deutschland wird natürlich seine kolonialen Forderungen stellen. Die Kolonien sind aber, das hat man in Berlin längst erkannt, nicht das, was man ursprünglich von ihnen erhofft Als Rohstoffquelle sind sie verhältnismässig unbedeutend im Vergleich zu dem grossen Bedarf Deutschlands und zu den Handelsverpflichtungen mit anderen Ländern in Verbindung mit der Bezahlung des deutschen Exportes. Die Kolonien auf Reichsmark abzustellen hat auch erhebliche Nachteile wegen der damit verbundenen Teuerung in Angleichung an hiesige Verhältnisse. Die Kolonien in Devisen zu lassen, würde unter einer für Deutschland notwendigen Devisenbewirtschaftung auch schwierig sein, obgleich Kolonien wahrscheinlich auf £-Basis abgestellt sein müssten. Es ist damit zu rechnen, dass die Engländer die koloniale Frage mit der deutschen Währungsfrage verbinden werden, indem sie bei kolonialen Zugeständnissen verlangen werden, dass die Mark abwertet. Eine Abwertung der Mark bedeutet gleichmässige Exportpreise für alle Länder, wobei der Vorteil der jetzigen beweglichen Mark wegfallen würde, was für Deutschland eine ganz erhebliche Einschränkung des Exportes und der Konkurrenzfähigkeit bedeuten würde. Freundschaftlichst, EXHIBIT No. 546 [Translation of letter from Lentz & Hirschfeld, Bremen, to Schildge, von Rumohr & Co.. Inc., New York, dated April 11, 1939] LENTZ & HIRSCHFELD, SCHILDGE VON RUMOHR & CO., INC., New York. N. Y. In pursuance of our letter of today, we wish to add that the letter about political conditions was dictated on the spur of the moment and, therefore, cannot completely cover the arguments of both sides. Furthermore, there are many things about which we do not like to write in detail, of course. At any rate, we, apparently, omitted to mention the following, which, considering the entire situation, also seems to be of importance: England and France do not at all like to see Germany's success in the Near East, i. e., the Balkans, which, however, will continue irresistibly. Individual countries in the Balkans will have to depend upon a constantly larger and more important volume of trade with Germany according to her increase in might and power. These countries with large populations and low standards of living can be developed by Germany. Neither England nor France can do this. These two powers can merely offer to these Balkan countries foreign exchange credits, and all they can do with such credits is to squander them and never pay them back, exactly the same as the Central and South American countries will be doing with American credits. Neither England nor France can take from these countries agricultural products in large volume, which Germany is in a position to do on account of her consumptive capacity. These countries do not want foreign currencies but work in the form of exports. Neither England nor France and much less America can understand this and act accordingly. Nothing can be saved in this regard, particularly for America. Perhaps 95 percent of the American people do not even know where Albania is situated or that there is such a country actually in existence. The Balkan territory represents for Germany an 84949-44-pt. 16-23 additional 50 to 100 million people with a consumptive capacity for German industrial products for which they pay with their agricultural products. Furthermore, it has to be stated that the exceedingly successful trading system of unilateral settlement will have to be copied more and more by all other countries. When the United States of America today proudly boasts of its dollars, these are not going to help it at all because those countries can only purchase American goods to the extent that the United States of America buys from them. Whether they like it or not, the other countries with foreign currencies will gradually have to get accustomed to the system which Schacht introduced under the motto "New plan" if they wish to attain any success in export trade. A great deal of fighting is going on against Germany and Italy by using the argument that these countries are employing cruel and uncivilized methods. Not much can be accomplished by using kid gloves in politics. On this side the argument is frequently being heard lately that England acquired her colonial riches, almost without exception, by brutal means. Unusual times require unusual measures, and in this regard no exceptional degree of delicate feelings should be expected. The fact is that strong people, rich in ideas but not having a great amount of wealth, expand by using their own faculties, and nobody can actually stop this process but can only be theoretically against it. We are stating these ideas briefly in order to prove the necessity of the present historical events. Most cordially, EXHIBIT No. 547 LENTZ & HIRSCHFELD [Letter from C. A. von Rumohr, vice president, Adam T. Schildge, Inc., New York, to Lentz & Hirschfeld, Bremen, dated October 13, 1938] OCTOBER 13, 1938. Re G. Schuerfeld & Co.'s letter to you of October 1 advising about our commission of 2 percent. LENTZ & HIRSCHFELD, Bremen. GENTLEMEN: We see from Schuerfeld's letter that he has been trying, and still is trying, to get a commission for us between 4 to 5 percent. Frankly, this seems to be the least that could be expected. A 2 percent commission is not even enough to pay for the lunches that we have had to buy for Mr. Riley. The credit advices for 2 percent from Schuerfeld have been received. We have not booked them insofar as we do not know whether the money in question can be transferred and whether Schuerfeld will succeed in getting a 4 to 5 percent commission for us. It seems to us rather queer that Schuerfeld should not be able to get permission to pay an agent of his, who works for him and has expenses in dollars, a dollar commission. We know of many instances where different firms who are selling merchandise in this country obtained permits for a salesman of theirs to pay his traveling expenses in dollars. We are in this case referring to Mr. Lamm, of Gebr. Martin. It may be possible that Schuerfeld will be able to get a permit to pay us a percentage of the orders for traveling expenses. In other words, have the permit made on a traveling-expense basis rather than on a commission basis. After all, our expenses for Schuerfeld are only entertaining expenses, which to our mind would fall into the same category as traveling expenses. The German Government cannot expect us to work for the interest of Germany and for the exports of Germany and then after we have had success advise us that they grant a ridiculously low commission which cannot even be paid in the currency of the country in which we are living. It certainly is not particularly gratifying to work against the obstacles that we representatives of Germany have in this country, as the treatment accorded is so unbelievably narrow minded. Yours very sincerely, ADAM T. SCHILDGE, INC. EXHIBIT NO. 548 [Letter from Adam T. Schildge, president, Adam T. Schildge, Inc., New York, to George W. Hirschfeld, Bremen, dated November 25, 1938] LENTZ & HIRSCHFELD, Bremen. NOVEMBER 25, 1938. GENTLEMEN: We refer to your letter of November 10, GH/K, regarding copper barter system. The reasons why we wrote you on October 26 are as follows: 1. We spoke to some small importers who told us that they have difficulties in buying, from the Continental Export & Import Corporation, copper in small amounts of about 1 to 3 tons. At the beginning of the copper system, you will remember that the Continental Export & Import only wanted orders of 10 tons or more. Later on the Continental Export & Import was ready to accept smaller orders also. From what we hear, the Continental Export & Import discourages small orders, which, of course, is not always in the interest of the importers. 2. Recently we spoke to a vice president of the Tradesmen's National Bank in Philadelphia and were told that the bank advised their clients for quite some time not to import and make payment through the sale of copper in Germany. The vice president told us that he was forced into this position as the Conti. nental Export & Import had refused to pay the bank any commission for copper barter which importers who are clients of the bank transact. After about 1 months the Continental Export & Import finally agreed to pay the Tradesmen's National Bank a commission for copper barter, and only thereafter did the bank suggest to their customers to make use of these facilities. Since that time the Tradesmen's National Bank has developed quite some business in copper barter. We were sorry to hear about the incident with the Tradesmen's National Bank, as we think it is a good policy to cooperate with the banks to the fullest extent and let the banks make a commission, as only thereby will the banks be interested to work for the German cause. Yours sincerely, EXHIBIT No. 549 ADAM T. SCHILDGE, INC. [Letter from Christian A. von Rumohr, vice president, Adam T. Schildge, Inc., to Lentz & Hirschfeld, Bremen, dated June 9, 1938] LENTZ & HIRSCHFELD, Bremen, Germany. JUNE 9, 1938. GENTLEMEN: We have your different notices on your discussions with Dr. Harnack, Dr. Reimann, and Mr. Mattenklott, which we read with the greatest of interest. We are all very anxious to know what the eventual outcome of the cotton situation as compared to the copper situation is going to be. The fight has been waged quite strongly on both sides and we believe that the weapons which were used by the cotton people were entirely justifiable. On this side it was always pointed out that there was no antagonism against the Continental Export & Import and that whatever differences of opinion there are, these differences are based on facts that cannot be overlooked. We see from your reports that on your side the matter was handled in exactly the same manner and that also with you all questions of personal animosity were kept out of the picture. We hope that the results coming from these discussions will be such that not only the cotton people but also Germany and Germany's relationship as concerns exports to this country will be helped. This was the basis on which we sincerely waged our fight and if the Continental Export & Import at some time or other insinuated that the cotton group was prejudiced in their attacks, this was mainly due to the cotton people having to use arguments which were based on facts but which did not fit into the program of the Continental Export & Import. We also hope that the question of the leather permit, as well as the questions which mainly concern Mr. Jaffe, will be solved to our mutual satisfaction. Very sincerely yours, ADAM T. SCHILDGE, INC., Vice President. EXHIBIT No. 550 [Translation of letter from Lentz & Hirschfeld, Bremen, to Willy Hentze, Compania Mexicana de Exportacion S. A., Mexico, D. F., dated March 28, 1938. Copy for Adam T. Schildge, Inc.] Copy for Adam T. Schildge, Inc., New York. Mr. WILLI HENTZE, LENTZ & HIRSCHFELD, Bremen, March 28, 1938. Mexico, D. F. Compania Mexicana de Exportacion, S. A., The firm of Johann Budelmann, Hamburg, writes us under date of March 26 regarding G. Schuerfeld & Co. as follows: "Upon receipt of Volnie's last letter, we spoke here about Rekowsky, that he apparently has good contact in Mexico with the various German authorities. We assume that Mr. Hentze calls at the German Embassy and consulate general regularly, and also has connections with a German-American chamber of commerce, if such is established there. We do not wish to omit suggesting that Mr. Hentze also establish a certain contact with the foreign organization of the N. S. D. A. P., since it may be very useful in certain situations and for further certain inquiries from this side." Likewise, we would consider it very appropriate for you to make contact with the foreign organization of the N. S. D. A. P. in order to obtain its services before they are being used by Rekowsky. With German greeting! EXHIBIT Nos. 551 AND 552 [Letter from Adam T. Schildge, president, Adam T. Schildge, Inc.. New York, to Willy Hentze, manager, Cia. Mexicana, Mexico, dated April 12, 1938] Mr. WILLY HENTZE, Cia. Mexicana. APRIL 12, 1938. DEAR MR. HENTZE: We notice that on March 28 Lentz & Hirschfeld wrote you suggesting that you make contact with the N.S.D.A.P., Mexico City. On his first trip to Mexico, Mr. Schildge attended a meeting of the N.S.D.A.P. in Orizaba. The German consul, Mr. Otto Weiser, Apartado 12, Orizaba, is the head of the N.S.D.A.P. in Orizaba. You may get in touch with Mr. Weiser and ask him to recommend you to the respective leader of the N.S.D.A.P. in Mexico City. Another method of approach is to get in touch with Burand who, no doubt, could introduce you just as well to the N.S.D.A.P. in Mexico City. We regard this contact with the N.S.D.A.P. as quite important. Yours sincerely, EXHIBIT No. 553 ADAM T. SCHILDGE, INC. President. [Translation of letter from Lentz & Hirschfeld. Bremen, to Willy Hentze. Compania Mexicana de Exportation S. A., Mexico D. F., dated February 21, 1939] Mr. WILLY HENTZE, LENTZ & HIRSCHFELD, Bremen, February 21, 1939. Compania Mexicana de Exportacion S. A., Calle 16 de Septiembre 39, Mexico D. F. We refer to your letter of December 2, 1938. We postponed answering it because we first wanted to see how things would develop until the new year. And we have also had an opportunity to discuss the whole problem in detail and the prospects of Mexpo with Mr. Schildge during the last few days. After you have received the payment from Schildge, Inc., amounting to more than $575.99, it is in order that we have credited 250 marks for May and June of 1938 for you. |