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The equipment box and storage battery in the cabin car are under one of the seats; the output transformer is under the cabin car about midway between the trucks; the receiving coils are about 4 inches above top of each rail between the trucks; loud speaker is in the cupola; control box with calling button, indication lamps, volume control, and handset are on a partition of the car. The removable equipment trays in the equipment boxes on locomotive and cabin car are interchangeable. The electron tubes are the same as those used for telephone, radio, and other purposes.

POWER SUPPLY AND BLOCK STATION EQUIPMENT

The block station equipment consists of a metal cabinet which houses the electron tubes, coils, condensers, rectifier, transformers, etc., for signaling, transmission and reception; a desk stand microphone with calling button and lamp indicator in base and a head-band receiver; foot switch for transmission; loud speaker with volume control for reception of calling signals and conversation. When head-band receiver is being used, the loud speaker is cut out. The set is normally in receiving condition when turned on.

The power required is about 150 watts for receiving and a maximum of about 550 watts for signaling and talking. It is furnished on the locomotive by the headlight generator, on the cabin car by storage batteries, and at the block station from commercial 110-volt 60-cycle supply.

TRACK BONDING AND TRUCK INSULATION

It was found desirable, for the most satisfactory operation, to provide one bonded rail of the main track and to install resistance shunts around all insulated joints.

Insulation of cabin car trucks essential for operation of the telephone system on cabin cars was found to present little difficulty. A design was developed employing 1-inch hard fiber to withstand moisture, so placed that no wearing or rubbing surfaces are in contact with the fiber and effectively separating all metal parts through which current could pass from the frame of the cabin car to the wheels to which the transmitting circuit was connected. Insulation of wheels of locomotives was found to present varying problems for different types of locomotives; on the mikado type used on the Belvidere branch, the front engine truck was found to be most adaptable for insulation as has been the case with other types of freight locomotives studied.

USE OF TELEPHONE SYSTEM IN REGULAR SERVICE

The map shows the portion of the Belvidere branch on which the train telephone is regularly used, namely Trenton to Phillipsburg, a distance of about 50 miles. Equipped locomotives and cabin cars entering the territory at Phillipsburg and at Trenton are tested by the engineman and conductor in conversation with each other and with the operator at Frenchtown. The telephone equipment on locomotives and cabin cars is kept turned on continuously between these two points. When the telephone is to be used, a calling signal is first sent out by means of a push button on the control panel which causes an audible signal to sound in loudspeakers of receiving sets at the wayside station and on locomotives and cabin cars within the radius of operation. The person calling, then broadcasts the name of the station or the number of the locomotive of the train, and whether locomotive or cabin car is being called, until response is received and telephone communication established. The telephone conversation between two units is simultaneously transmitted through loudspeakers of other units within the radius of operation, any one of which can break into the conversation by calling signal and voice broadcast, should necessity arise.

The range of communication between locomotive and cabin cars of one train with those of another train has been kept within relatively short distances. Good transmission is provided for distances up to about 4 miles; beyond that distance neither safety nor efficiency of operation would be served, in fact it would unnecessarily load the telephones with undesired conversations.

Communication between two trains, irrespective of distance, is always possible by relay of messages through the operator at Frenchtown who can communicate with trains anywhere within the territory.

Experience with the daily use of the system on the Belvidere branch has shown numerous advantages, in movement of trains, by reason of the close contact which is constantly available between the train employees on the front and rear of trains and between them and the operator at Frenchtown.

The operator finds out by telephone from the engineman and conductor just what is occurring in their movements, keeps the train dispatcher fully advised and thus facilitates the planning of all train movements affected. When anything unusual happens all persons interested are promptly advised and advantages are taken on the instant, reducing delays which otherwise would occur if wayside telephones had to be used for reporting the circumstances. Communication between the enginemen and conductor incidental to the movements of their train has been found to improve operations and reduce delays; starting and stopping, switching, setting off and picking up cars, testing air brakes, taking water and coal, handling equipment becoming defective en route, and many other matters affecting the prompt movement of trains are subjects of telephone conversations carried on daily by the train telephone system.

With traffic density of 10 to 12 through freight trains and 4 passenger trains daily, the installation of automatic block signals has not been found necessary on this line. Since the early days of railroading trains on the Belvidere branch have always been carefully protected by the particularly restrictive form of manual block system standard on the Pennsylvania. With the inauguration of the train telephone great benefit has been derived in handling trains under this manual block system as may be found possible under other signal systems. In fact, the constant contact between trains and the block operator at Frenchtown permits of movements complying with all of the restrictions of the manual block system to be made almost as advantageously as though automatic block signals were in use. Conductors on trains entering sidings or clearing a block previously occupied, use the train telephone to advise the operator; operators use the train telephone to tell the engineman the train may enter main track from siding or enter a block and whether the block is occupied by another freight train. (Opposing trains or a passenger and a freight train, either opposing or following, are prohibited in the same block.) It frequently happens that a freight train enters a manual block under permissive signal only a short time before a train ahead clears the block at the other end; with the train telephone the operator is able to call the engineman of the following train and tell him the block is then clear, thus permitting the train to proceed safely at increased speed.

It has been said a railroad signal system is merely a means of communication; the train telephone gives promise of becoming a valuable aid generally in efficiently controlling train movements under all signal system as well as providing the many other advantages inherent in this new form of communication.

EXHIBIT No. 403

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WAR MOBILIZATION,

Mr. D. A. CRAWFORD,

JULY 27, 1944.

The Pullman Company, Chicago, Ill. DEAR MR. CRAWFORD: On Thursday, August 10, 1944, the Association of American Railroads will testify on technological developments in the railroad industry. It is my understanding that Mr. Hall, of the association's staff, has been acting as liaison with your organization in connection with the testimony which you have submitted. He informs me that you prefer not to testify personally, but to have your statement included in connection with these hearings. While this is not our normal procedure, it will be entirely satisfactory in view of the fact that we have examined this material and feel that it will amplify the association's verbal testimony. It will not be necessary for you to be questioned orally on the material you submitted. I would appreciate your confirming the understanding in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

84949-44-pt. 15-15

H. M. KILGORE, Chairman.

EXHIBIT No. 404

THE PULLMAN COMPANY,
Chicago, Ill., August 8, 1944.

Hon. H. M. KILGORE,

Chairman, Subcommittee on War Mobilization,
Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate,

Washington, D. C..
DEAR SENATOR KILGORE: I have received and thank you for your letter of July
27, concerning my statement filed with the subcommittee of the Committee on
Military Affairs, and excusing me from appearance to testify personally.

Your understanding is correct, that Mr. Hall, of the Association of American Railroads, has been acting for me with reference to the hearings. I desire to give the subcommittee full information on the subject of its investigation so far as it relates to Pullman business, and I endeavored to do so in the statement and reply to questionnaire heretofore filed and which you say the subcommittee has examined.

It is only because of pressures in meeting the time prescriptions for complying with certain provisions of the antitrust decree against the Pullman group of companies, which became effective July 7, that I suggested to Mr. Hall that he convey to your committee my preference not to testify personally.

I fully appreciate your courtesy in relieving me from this further demand upon my time and attention.

Yours very truly,

D. A. CRAWFORD, President.

EXHIBIT No. 405

STATEMENT OF D. A. CRAWFORD, PRESIDENT OF THE PULLMAN Co.

In addition to presenting the reply to the subcommittee's questionnaire, I desire to inform the subcommittee of some facts concerning the Pullman Co. which were stated in evidence at the trial of the Government's antitrust suit against the Pullman group of companies.

Mr. Wendell Berge, Assistant Attorney General, in his testimony before the subcommittee on February 10, 1944, said (p. 1366, pt. 12, printed report of hearings):

"The facts which I shall present in regard to Pullman matters are largely based upon the record developed in the trial of United States v. The Pullman Co. et al."

At the opening of the February 10 session, Chairman Kilgore, after referring to the Pullment antitrust suit, said (p. 1349):

"In his testimony today Mr. Berge will summarize a number of instances of technological repression arising from monopolistic malpractices."

Mr. Berge omitted essential facts shown in the record developed at the trial of that suit which refuted many of the allegations he presented to the subcommittee with respect to such technological repression. Some of these omissions are developed, and correct information given, in my reply to the questionnaire; others are outside of the scope of the questions.

For example, Mr. Berge states, on page 1367, that under the exclusive-right contracts between the Pullman Co. and railroad companies, Pullman "becomes the arbiter of the types of equipment and the standards of construction used in sleeping-car service." On page 1372 he returns to the same subject, quoting the letter I wrote to Mr. Bledsoe, president of the Santa Fe, December 14, 1936, discussing the subject of the length of berths in sleeping cars, following that quotation with the statement that at the recent antitrust trial I testified that the 6-feet-5-inch-berth length became standard for Pullman lightweight sleepers. In my testimony on the subject of the length of berths (exhibit G-176 in the Antitrust case) I said (record 2685-2693) that when the letter to Mr. Bledsoe was written in 1936 there were not more than three or four sleeper streamliner trains in existence; that prior to the writing of that letter we had built berths 6 feet 8 inches long, and had registered carefully how many people used them, and what the public need and reaction was with respect to their use. My attention was called to the fact that the berths in the five stainlesssteel cars ordered by the Santa Fe were to be longer than those lengths we

had considered adequate through many years of experience with Pullman cars having berths of standard length (six feet, two and a fraction inches). So I wrote my letter of December 14, 1936, to Mr. Bledsoe, which Mr. Berge partially quoted on page 1372 of the printed hearings before this subcommittee, and which is printed in full as the subcommittee's exhibit No. 337, on pages 1489-1490 of the printed hearings, but is there incorrectly shown as a letter from Budd Manufacturing Co. instead of from me. In that letter, and in my testimony in the antitrust case (record 2687) I mentioned some of the physical disadvantages of berths longer than we considered necessary, saying that the construction of a Pullman car is a matter in which the use of each inch of space must be carefully considered-mentioning that making berths longer resulted in sacrifice of space needed for washrooms and lockers in the car, because a modern sleeping car is just 84 feet long, and it cannot be made longer, so it is just a process of cut-and-fit within a given length, as to how many revenue accommodaions, and as to how much of the nonrevenue space, can be provided. I stated in my testimony that the cars of today, built subsequent to 1936, all contain beds of at least 6 feet 5 inches-both for longitudinal berths and for the cross-berths in bedrooms, drawing rooms, and compartments. The walls of lightweight cars are thinner, so there is more space in the transverse direction to work with. On page 2692 of the antitrust record I said that this was all part of a normal discussion between people interested in this service as to the detail dimensions of the then incoming new-type care; that I was unaware of any existing controls of the questions discussed in my letter to Mr. Bledsoe. This matter of the length of berths was simply one of multitudinous questions that arose in the development of the new types of light-weight equipment,

The length of berths in Pullman cars and changes in that particular are illustrative of the point regarding control of standards of construction to which Mr. Berge directed the subcommittee's attention. It arose at the trial through presentation of evidence under the Government's trial brief topic, "In order to consolidate their exclusive control, defendants have uniformly required the railroads to accept types and standards of equipment and service dictated by the Pullman Co." The circumstances covered by the letter to Mr. Bledsoe, and many other matters, were fully explained in my testimony regarding exhibits introduced by the Government under the above-quoted topic-beginning on page 2680 of the record and extending to page 2708. There had been prior brief discussion of improvements in cars, on pages 2558-2560. The exhibits introduced by the Government (of which the quoted letter to Mr. Bledsoe was one) covered questions relating to the many kinds of improvements in cars that were constantly under way, embracing the remodeling of cars, the installation of roomettes, high-speed betterments, and the installation of bedroom accommodations. In the stipulation of facts agreed to by the Government and the defendants in the antitrust suit, there is set forth in paragraph 76, beginning on page 182 and continuing to page 209, a list of improvements and innovations in Pullman cars from the year 1858 to 1941. Extensive testimony (record 2398-2438, and 4348-4433) by the defendants relating to those improvements was uncontroverted by the Government at the trial.

This profuse and substantial evidence completely destroys Mr. Berge's charge before this subcommittee that facts set forth in the record in the antitrust case showed there was technological repression with respect to improvements in Pullman cars. The evidence relating to types of equipment and standards of construction, to which he referred on pages 1367 and 1372 of these hearings, controverts his statement that Pullman becomes the arbiter in those matters. The testimony shows, as I stated on page 2560 of the antitrust record, that the railroads have had much to say in all such matters, and that Pullman has worked in close cooperation with them, making many changes and improvements to meet railroad suggestions.

On page 1369 Mr. Berge stated that Pullman was able to pursue a restrictive policy with respect to the introduction of lightweight cars only because of its monopoly position. The absence of any such restrictive policy and the positive contrary policy on the part of both the Pullman Co. and Pullman-Standard Car Manufacturing Co. is shown in the answers to questions 8 and 10 of the subcommittee's questionnaire.

On the same page 1369, Mr. Berge states that such lightweight equipment as was furnished under certain contracts was under excess-cost agreements which he described. The Government devoted much attention in the presentation of its case to those excess-cost agreements, which were only a temporary expedient

worked out in cooperation with certain transcontinental railroads in adjusting contracts to fit the conditions that were developing in equipment transition where lightweight cars were brought into operation alongside of the heavyweight cars under old contracts whose terms and conditions had contemplated only the heavyweight equipment types in use when the contracts were made. The necessity of these interim contract arrangements at that time and their later replacement with the new form of principal agreement, developed and placed in use as the old contracts expired, were fully explained at record pages 2900, 2909, 2949-2950, and 2953-2954. Such excess-cost-sharing agreements long ago ran out and have no bearing upon any of the questions presently under consideration by this subcommittee.

On pages 1370, 1371, 1372, 1373, and 1374 of the report of these hearings, Mr. Berge tells of the work of the Edward G. Budd Manufacturing Co. in developing lightweight passenger equipment. He declares (p. 1370) that throughout the period 1933 to 1942 the Pullman Co. exercised its full power with the railroads to exclude the Budd Co. from the manufacture of sleeping cars. He says (p. 1373) that Pullman was able to exclude the Budd Co. from the manufacture of sleeping cars by refusing to operate equipment purchased by the railroads from the Budd Co., except for the 10 sleeping cars purchased by the Burlington and the 5 purchased by the Santa Fe, and operated by Pullman (pp. 1371-1372). On page 1373, Mr. Berge says the details of that suppression of competition were developed at length in the record of the Pullman antitrust case. Since he discussed this subject at such length, the subcommittee will desire information about some of those details not mentioned by Mr. Berge which throw a different light on his charge of suppression of competition.

As stated in our answer to question 10 in the subcommittee's questionnnaire, the absence of standard specifications for the construction of lightweight equipment caused both Pullman and the railroads to exercise caution in the use of such equipment until service tests had proved its satisfactory performance; and the matter finally was satisfactorily settled in 1939 by the Association of American Railroads specifications for the construction of new passenger equipment cars adopted by the Association of American Railroads, which properly specified the strength of such cars regardless of the materials of which they were constructed. The record in the antitrust case made it clear that until the Association of American Railroads specifications were adopted, there existed no adequate official construction standards, and there was reluctance to operate cars that Pullman considered to be of questionable design (antitrust record 1415, 1692, 1698-1700, 3200). Nevertheless, upon request of the railroads and in the interest of experimentation under railroad assumption of liability for design failures, Pullman agreed to operate cars purchased by the Burlington and by the Santa Fe (record 1755, 4041-4044). It is noteworthy that the questioned design employed in these Burlington and Santa Fe Budd-built sleepers is now barred, by the official Association of American Railroads specifications adopted in 1939, for passengertrain cars hereafter tendered for use in interchange service on the railroads of this country.

Out of the foregoing situation grew the controversy (record 1694) concerning construction materials used and the type of construction employed by the Budd Co. Pullman had good reason to know, from analyses and tests conducted by its own engineers, that the structural members of the cars purchased from Budd by the Burlington and the Santa Fe were of insufficient strength to meet the commonly accepted safety requirements for passenger train cars (record 2498), and Pullman knew that a similar car of even heavier construction failed to stand the so-called Altoona test (admitted in testimony by on officer of the Budd Co., record 4717, 4725). Pullman also knew, and the evidence clearly established the fact, that more than half of the Budd production of lightweight cars of the design adopted and used by the Budd Co. for several years prior to the Philadelphia trial had broken down, or were progressively breaking down, in operation, due to defects in the structure of the cars (admitted in testimony by the same witness, record 4744, 4770).

In my testimony I stated that after the Association of American Railroads specifications were promulgated in 1939 and adopted by the railroads, Pullman was willing to service sleeping cars complying with those specifications for railroads who might desire to buy and own them (record 1698-1702, 3203–3204, 3990– 3991, 4007, 4013, 4062).

The testimony in the antitrust case on the foregoing subject of construction specifications and materials applicable to lightweight cars embraced more than 200 pages of the record.

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