Investigation Into Apollo 204 Accident: Hearings, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, Parte 1U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967 Committee Serial No. 3. Investigates causes of Jan. 27, 1967 Apollo 204 accident when three astronauts lost their lives. Includes testimony by Thomas R. Baron, author of a report highly critical of spacecraft management at Kennedy Space Center; volume2,pt.1: Contains text of accident investigation report to NASA by the Apollo 204 Review Board; volume 2, part 2: Contains Appendix C (continuation) and part of Appendix D to Final Report of Apollo 204 Review Board, which investigated the Jan. 27, 1967 Apollo 204 accident at Kennedy Space Center, in which three astronauts died; volume 2, part 3: Contains Appendices D (continuation), E, F, and G to the formal report of investigation by the Apollo 204 Review Board of the Apollo 204 accident at Kennedy Space Center on Jan. 27, 1967, when three astronauts perished; volume 3: Describes corrective modifications performed on Apollo spacecraft to prevent a repetition of the Apollo 204 accident, during which 3 astronauts perished at Kennedy Space Center on Jan. 27, 1967. |
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Palavras e frases frequentes
accident answer Apollo program Apollo spacecraft arcing astronauts atmosphere ATWOOD BARON cabin Cape Kennedy capsule Chairman changes checkout Colonel BORMAN command module committee complete configuration CONGRESS THE LIBRARY contractor correct crew DADDARIO DAVIS DOLAH electrical engineering equipment evaluation extinguishment FAGET fire flammable flight FULTON Gemini GURNEY hatch hazardous HECHLER ignition inspection installation insulation investigation KARTH Kennedy Space Center KSC Safety launch lithium hydroxide ment mission MUELLER MYERS NASA North American Aviation operations oxygen panel personnel PETRONE Phillips possible pounds per square pressure prior problem procedures protection pure oxygen quality control question reactor recommendations record requirements responsibility Review Board ROUDEBUSH RUMSFELD RYAN Safety Office safety review SEAMANS Servicing System Test SLAYTON spacecraft 012 specific square inch TEAGUE Teflon things THOMPSON tion VANDER JAGT Velcro vibration WEBB wire harnesses WYDLER zero-g
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Página 565 - Commission may determine to be inimical to the common defense and security, and (3) to govern any activity authorized pursuant to this Act, including standards and restrictions governing the design, location, and operation of facilities used in the conduct of such activity, in order to protect health and to minimize danger to life or property; j.
Página 339 - Timely distribution of test procedures and major changes be made a constraint to the beginning of any test. 8. FINDING: The fire in Command Module 012 was subsequently simulated closely by a test fire in a full-scale mock-up. DETERMINATION: Full-scale mock-up fire tests can be used to give a realistic appraisal of fire risks in flight-configured spacecraft. RECOMMENDATION: Full-scale mock-ups in flight configuration be tested to determine the risk of fire. 9. FINDING: The...
Página 31 - ... both safety and mission success. Once the Command Module has left the earth's environment the occupants are totally dependent upon it for their safety. It follows that protection from fire as a hazard involves much more than quick egress. The latter has merit only during test periods on earth when the Command Module is being readied for its mission and not during the mission itself. The risk of fire must be faced; however, that risk is only one factor pertaining to the reliability of the Command...
Página 511 - All emergency equipment (breathing apparatus, protective clothing, deluge systems, access arm, etc.) be reviewed for adequacy c. Personnel training and practice for emergency procedures be given on a regular basis and reviewed prior to the conduct of a hazardous operation. d. Service structures and umbilical towers be modified to facilitate emergency operations.
Página 80 - Evidence of several arcs was found in the post fire investigation. c. No single ignition source of the fire was conclusively identified. DETERMINATION: The most probable initiator was an electrical arc in the sector between the —Y and +Z spacecraft axes. The exact location best fitting the total available information is near the floor in the lower forward section of the left-hand equipment bay where Environmental Control System (ECS) instrumentation power wiring leads into the area between the...
Página 109 - ... b. Timely distribution of test procedures and major changes be made a constraint to the beginning of any test. 8. FINDING: The fire in Command Module 012 was subsequently simulated closely by a test fire in a full-scale mock-up. DETERMINATION: Full-scale mock-up fire tests can be used to give a realistic appraisal of fire risks in flight-configured spacecraft.
Página 114 - Coolant leakage at solder joints has been a chronic problem. (c) The coolant is both corrosive and combustible. (d) Deficiencies in design, manufacture, installation, rework and quality control existed in the electrical wiring. (e) No vibration test was made of a complete flight-configured spacecraft.
Página 6 - Congress, to employ such clerical and other assistants, to require by subpena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, and to make such expenditures, as it deems advisable.
Página 567 - The materials used in pipeline installations are produced in accordance with national standards promulgated by such organizations as the United States of America Standards Institute (formerly the American Standards Association), the American Petroleum Institute, the American Society of Testing Materials and others.
Página 177 - ... the Command Module is being readied for its mission and not during the mission itself. The risk of fire must be faced; however, that risk is only one factor pertaining to the reliability of the Command Module that must receive adequate consideration. Design features and operating procedures that are intended to reduce the fire risk must not introduce other serious risks to mission success and safety.