Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic InteractionCambridge University Press, 28/08/1992 - 413 páginas In recent years there has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists, philosophers, and logicians in certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This unique volume brings together the work of some of the preeminent figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic, and epistemology in the formal models of knowledge, belief, deliberation, and learning and in the relationship between Bayesian decision theory and game theory, as well as between bounded rationality and computational complexity. |
Índice
Elicitation for games 22 | 21 |
Equilibrium common knowledge and optimal sequential | 27 |
Rational choice in the context of ideal games | 47 |
Concept and resolutions | 61 |
Equilibria and the dynamics of rational deliberation | 93 |
Noncooperative normalform games | 107 |
On consistency properties of some strongly implementable | 127 |
Algorithmic knowledge and game theory | 141 |
Epistemic logic and game theory | 197 |
Abstract notions of simultaneous equilibrium | 227 |
Introduction to metamoral | 257 |
The logic of Ulams games with lies | 275 |
Strategic behavior under | 317 |
Common knowledge and games with perfect information | 345 |
Foundations versus | 377 |
Counterfactuals and a theory of equilibrium in games | 397 |
Outras edições - Ver tudo
Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction Cristina Bicchieri,Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara Pré-visualização indisponível - 2008 |
Palavras e frases frequentes
action agenda agent analysis argument assume assumption Aumann axioms B₁ backward induction Bayesian behavior belief revision belief set Binmore C₁ choose coherence common knowledge concept condition consequences consider correlated equilibrium corresponding counterfactual decision maker decision theory defined definition DeGroot-Kadane deliberation denote dominated dynamics epistemic entrenchment epistemic logic event example expected utility extensive-form finite formula frame function game G game theory given hyperrational games hyperrational players inference information set interaction iteration method Kadane knowers Kripke Kripke semantics Lemma maximizing mixed strategy modal logic move mutual knowledge n-tuple Nash equilibrium node normal form notion optimal options outcome partition Pascalian payoff play player 2's player knows possible worlds principle Prisoner's Dilemma probabilistic problem proof proposition pure strategies R₁ random rational choice rational players reason restricted risk dominance rule satisfies Section semantics sentences situation Sobel solution space subgame subset Suppose Theorem tion true
Referências a este livro
The Logic of Strategy Cristina Bicchieri,Richard Jeffrey,Brian Skyrms Pré-visualização limitada - 1999 |
Choosing an Identity: A General Model of Preference and Belief Formation Sun-Ki Chai Pré-visualização limitada - 2001 |