but could have escaped all punishment by taking an oath of allegiance to the existing government, and giving moderate bonds to keep the peace. We are sure no government was ever more moderate in its demands, or showed itself more ready to forget and forgive the past.

The case of Mr. Dorr is, we own, one of considerable hardship. Mr. Dorr had, we believe, no private ambition to gratify; we know, personally, that he very reluctantly became involved in the proceedings of the Suffrage Party, and we have no doubt that he himself believed that he was engaged in a great and holy cause, and perfectly justifiable in the course he took. It may be said that he ought to have known better, lawyer as he was, and this cannot be denied; but when we find such men as Mr. Van Buren, Senators Benton and Allen, Governors Hubbard and Morton, and Messrs. Bancroft, M'Neil, Rantoul, and Hallett, supporting him, and maintaining the strict justice and legality of his proceedings, we may, perhaps, find some palliation of his offence. We can easily believe him free from moral guilt. His party is so completely prostrated, and public opinion, notwithstanding appearances, is so decidedly against his proceedings, that we do not believe that considerations of public safety require his incarceration. Personally he has been at least sufficiently punished. The government of Rhode Island is as firmly established as that of any other State in the Union. Let it permit one, whose good intentions it has no reason to distrust, to tell it that it is strong enough to be generous. We own, the insane proceedings of individuals out of the State must be offensive, and that no government that respects itself can yield to their demands. They are wrong. They are cruel to Mr. Dorr, whose friends they pretend they are. They are really his worst enemies. And yet the government can disregard them, and be generous without fear of misconstruction. An act of clemency is sometimes worth more to a government than the infliction of a merited punishment. The government has done itself honor in imposing the heaviest penalty on the chief

instead of the subalterns. It has vindicated the majesty of the law; it has shown its justice; now let it show its mercy, and blot out the memory of the past.

We have been assured that the authorities of Rhode Island are ready to liberate Mr. Dorr the moment he testifies his willingness to submit to the existing government, and to take the oath of allegiance. That he should be reluctant to do this is not strange. He holds that he has committed no offence; that the acts for which he is punished were done by him as the rightful governor of the State, in the conscientious discharge of his constitutional functions. His failure to maintain his authority before superior force did not and could. not vitiate his title, or render his acts criminal. Shall he now yield, acknowledge himself guilty, and sue for pardon? No; better die on the scaffold, or rot in the dungeon. This is the view which he takes.

Of

We hope we are able to reverence the martyr spirit wherever we see it displayed; and we frankly own, that, if we took Mr. Dorr's own view of his case, we should look upon him as a sublime example of moral heroism. But he himself must be aware that there is something to be said on the other side. Even his acceptance of the office of governor under the People's constitution was treason by the law of the State. this he cannot doubt. Then he was not the rightful governor of the State; and if not the rightful governor of the State, there can be no question that the acts he performed rendered him guilty of treason. The Act of the General Assembly, April 6, 1842, entitled "An Act in relation to offences against the sovereign power of the State," declared his attempt to exercise the office of governor to be treason; and that law was valid, because the General Assembly was still in the full exercise of all its legislative functions, had been superseded by no law paramount to its own, and was, in fact, the only known legislative authority in Rhode It is idle to pretend, that, on the 6th of April, 1842, the General Assembly had ceased to exist, or in any sense been superseded. An association, unrecog

nized by any public law or any public authority, had, it is true, framed an instrument which was called a constitution, had sent it out, and a number of persons in Rhode Island, said to be a majority of all the adult males in the State, recorded their names in its favor, and certain individuals, equally unknown to all existing public authority, declared it to be the paramount law of the land. But this could not make it so. Every body knows that it was not the paramount law of the land de facto. Was it the paramount law de jure? Its advocates say now, indeed, that it was, because a majority of the people of Rhode Island had voted for it. But to this we may reply, 1. That the fact, that a majority did vote for it, has never been legally ascertained, and is more than questionable; 2. That it is well known that the intent of large numbers who did vote for it was, not to establish it as the constitution of the State, but simply to record their opinion in favor of an extension of suffrage; and 3. That, even if a majority had voted for it with the intent to adopt it as a constitution, it would not have been the paramount law of the land, because there was no law in Rhode Island, written or unwritten, which declared the will of the majority of the adult male population the supreme law.

Furthermore, the existing public authorities ignored it, and its warmest and most influential friends did not hesitate to acknowledge the legality of the existing authorities, by holding seats in the General Assembly, and participating in its doings. Mr. Atwill, a legal gentleman of respectable attainments, and subsequently Mr. Dorr's attorney-general, when the question came up in the Assembly, was unwilling to give it as his opinion that the People's constitution was the paramount law of the land, and even expressed a doubt to the contrary. The whole conduct of the Suffrage Party at the time shows that they entertained the same doubt. The propositions made respectively by Messrs. Burgess and Keech, two of Mr. Dorr's friends, to the Assembly, propositions to abandon, on certain conditions, the People's constitution, showed that it was not

-

regarded by them as having any legal force; for, if they had so regarded it, they could not have made propositions for setting it aside, for they would have regarded such propositions as treasonable.

But if this constitution was not at that time the paramount law of the land, as it was not, either in fact or in right, or even in the estimation of its friends, the General Assembly was in full force as the supreme legislative authority of the State. Consequently, its legal acts were binding on all the citizens. of the State. They were, then, binding on Mr. Dorr, and, by doing what it declared to be treason, he incurred the political guilt of treason, and therefore became obnoxious to the penalty annexed. Now, since nothing can be clearer than that he is guilty of treason according to the laws of his State, there can be no real self-abasement, or want of manliness, in admitting the fact, by submitting to the existing authorities, and consenting to receive a pardon.

We say further, that, setting all this reasoning aside, Mr. Dorr is bound by his own principles to submit to the existing government, and to take the oath of allegiance. Mr. Dorr contends that the majority of the people have the inherent right to rule. This, with him, is a natural right, at least recognized as such by the American system of government. We, of course, do not admit this; but he does, and that is enough for him. The will of the majority, therefore, however expressed, is the supreme law. The People's constitution was adopted by the majority of the people; therefore it was the supreme law. He was elected governor under that constitution, and therefore he was legally elected, and therefore was the rightful governor of the State. Be it so. But, subsequently to the adoption of the People's constitution, a majority of the people of Rhode Island adopted another constitution. This subsequent constitution necessarily overrides the preceding one. Now, if the will of the majority has a right to rule, it has the right to rule through this subsequent constitution; for this is the latest expression of their

will. Consequently, Mr. Dorr is bound by his own principles to recognize it as the legitimate government, and may therefore take the oath of allegiance without abandoning in the least the principles for which he has contended. We are surprised that he did not see this, and avail himself of this argument, before his trial; for we presume, that, if he had so done, and taken the oath, he would not have been brought to a trial at all.

But we have no room to extend our remarks. We have merely wished, while expressing our sympathy with Mr. Dorr, and our earnest desire for his liberation and restoration to his social and civil rights, to say a word in defence of the authorities of Rhode Island. We believe the government of Rhode Island is much. calumniated, and that, if the American people fairly understood the case, they would by no means tolerate the abuse so liberally heaped upon it. For ourselves, we believe that the interests of humanity and social progress are fully as likely to be promoted by siding. with the public authorities in the legal discharge of their legal functions, as with those who resist them. It is not the part of good citizens to take it for granted that the government is always in the wrong, and that they who resist it are always in the right. As a general rule, the interests of social and individual progress and well-being require us to sustain the constituted authorities, and always when these authorities keep within the sphere of their constitutional powers.

For the book which we have introduced, we have not much to say. It is ably, in some passages eloquently, and even powerfully, written. It is not always correct in its details, and is very far from possessing the true character of a historical work. The most we can say of it is, that it is an able, an eloquent, apology for Mr. Dorr and his friends, as able as any thing we have seen written on the subject. But it is so erroneous in its premises, so false in its conclusions, so dangerous in its doctrines, so well calculated to mislead, and to undermine the foundations of all proper respect for authority, for law, that we dare not recommend it to our readers.