the old metaphysicians, which Kant denies and labors to overthrow, are substantially true and worthy of all acceptation. In departing from them, and seeking the foundation of the form of the thought in the subject, instead of the object, Kant has placed science on the wrong track, and caused it to retrograde instead of advancing. This is what we hope to make good in the course of what follows.

Kant, we repeat once more, is investigating the subjective faculty of intelligence. This faculty he regards as complex, and capable of being resolved into,1. Sensibility, or the Receptivity;

2. Understanding, or the power of conceiving; 3. Reason, or the faculty of Ideas.

Sensibility furnishes us with sensations, and sensations furnish us with intuitions (Anschauungen) and representations (Vorstellungen) of objects; Understanding is that power by which an object represented or presented by sensibility is thought, and it furnishes us with conceptions (Begriffen); Reason is the power by which we give unity and ideal completeness to our conceptions, and by it we are furnished with ideas, which are to conceptions, in some respects, what conceptions are to intuitions.

In accordance with this threefold division of the faculty of intelligence, Kant divides his work into three general divisions: 1. Transcendental Esthetics, in which he treats of the Intuitions; 2. Transcendental Logic, or Elementary Science, in which he discusses the Conceptions, or the Categories of the pure Understanding; 3. Transcendental Dialectics, in which he discusses the Ideas, and makes the especial Critic of the pure Reason, as distinguished from Sensibility and Understanding. We shall be obliged to confine our remarks almost exclusively to the first two of these three general divisions.

The great problem which Kant undertakes to solve, we have seen, is, How are synthetic judgments a priori formed? This question he attempts to answer by a

rigid and subtile analysis of the faculty of intelligence. He begins by analyzing the fact of experience. This fact he makes consist of two parts, the one empirical

and a posteriori, the other a priori, and supplied from the understanding itself. He then eliminates the empirical portion, and proceeds to his analysis of the a priori portion, which he terms cognition a priori. This cognition a priori is assumed to lie already in the understanding prior to any fact of actual cognition, as the ground and condition of the possibility of actual cognition, or, what is the same thing, experience. If we consider this cognition a priori in its application to some particular fact of experience, it is simply cognition a priori; but if generally, as abstracted from all particular facts of experience, and as the simple possibility of the application of the cognition a priori to the empirical fact, it is Transcendental Cognition, because it can be brought into none of the categories or predicaments, but transcends them all. A complete system of all our transcendental cognitions would be a TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY; but Kant here does not attempt a complete system, but merely a critic of pure reason, and therefore, gives us only a TRANSCENDENTAL CRITIC.

Assuming the threefold division of the faculty of intelligence stated, Kant arranges all our mental phenomena under three heads: 1. Intuitions; 2. Conceptions; 3. Ideas.

The intellectual phenomenon, or actual cognition, in its complete sense, is a complex fact, composed of intuition, conception, and idea. Without these three, no valid cognition. Intuitions without conceptions are blind; conceptions without intuitions are void, and without ideas are incomplete and incoherent; ideas without intuitions and conceptions are merely entia rationis, utterly invalid and worthless.

Ideas are always by their very nature transcendental, corresponding, if we do not blunder in regard to them, in part with the universals of the Schoolmen. But intuitions and conceptions may be both a priori and

empirical. Empirical intuition, that is, actual intuition of some determinate object, is possible only on condition of a priori intuition of object in general. This a priori intuition, considered without application to object at all, but as the simple possibility of intuition of object in general, is the Transcendental Intuition; and the science of our transcendental intuitions is, TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETICS. The conceptions are also susceptible of the same analysis. The conception a priori, that is, of object in general, considered without reference to any intuition in particular, or intuition in general, but as the possibility of its application to intuition in general, is the Transcendental Conception; and the science of our transcendental conceptions is TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC, or elementary science. Having made these explanations, and definitions, we proceed to consider,

I. TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETICS.

We remark, in the outset, that we are far from accepting Kant's analysis of the faculty of intelligence. We do not admit his distinction between intuition and conception, nor that which he contends for between conception and idea. The fact of knowing is sui generis ; but considered psychologically, it is a simple, indecomposable fact. The human soul, the human me, taken as that which it eminently is, is, as Leibnitz contends, a monad, or simple substance, and, as we proved in our former article on Kant, admits of no division into separate faculties. The distinction of faculties is a distinction merely, not a division, or a separation; and proceeds not from any defect of strict unity and simplicity of substance or essence, but from limitation of nature, in consequence of which, the soul is not pure act, but in part power, seeking to realize itself in act. In God, who is perfect essence, substance, or being, save so far as concerns our conceptions of him, there is no distinction of attributes; for he is not the power to do, but the doing, not a merely possible Creator, but an actual Creator. There is in him no distinction, no

interval, so to speak, between the power and its realization. We are created in the image of God, and therefore must needs be essentially active force (vis activa); but we are imperfect forces, because imperfect beings, that is, we are not being in its completeness; for, if we were, we should be God, and not merely created in his image. We exist in part potentially, rather than actually, and are less pure act itself, than the perpetual aspiration to it. If it were not for this fact, the distinction of faculties in human nature would be as inadmissible as the distinction of faculties in the divine nature itself.

The soul is not mere power (potentia nuda), otherwise it would have no substantial existence, and therefore could not be said to be at all; for being (esse) is not the power to act, but force acting (vis activa). So far forth as the soul is, as it is a real entity, it is force acting, or active force, which is the radical conception. of entity or substantial being. But as it is a limited being, it is in relation to its limitations only virtual being, or mere potential being. Hence the soul may be defined to be both actual being and virtual being, both active and potential force. Hence it is, and aspires to be more than it is, or to be more completely.

The distinction between the me and its faculties, so far as such distinction is conceivable, is the distinction between actual being and potential being, between vis activa and the potentia nuda of the Schoolmen. But as the power (potentia) is a defect, an imperfection, a negation of being, not something positive superadded to the soul as essence, the distinction between the me and its faculties is, as we have before shown, really inadmissible. Then again, if we shift our point of view, and consider the faculty, not as the negation of being merely, but as the positive ability of the soul to remove its limitations by realizing its essence, as the virtuality of the soul, then it becomes virtually the soul itself, and therefore virtually indistinguishable from it, as we contended in our former article. The soul and its faculty are the soul in its actuality and its virtuality, in its actual essence and its virtual essence. The faculty is

not actually the soul, because it is not actual being; it is virtually the soul, and becomes it really and identically just so far as it becomes real. Essentially, then, the faculty and the soul are one and the same.

But as the realization of the possibility of our nature, to which we tend, is effected by distinct and separate moments, a classification becomes possible. The soul, considered as the power tending to realize itself in one class, is what we term one of its faculties; considered as tending to realize itself in another class, it is what we term another of its faculties. Psychologists have arranged all the phenomena resulting from the several moments in three classes; namely, Volitions, Sentiments, and Cognitions. Man may therefore be defined, psychologically, a being that acts, feels, and knows. But he is so far forth as real being a monad, or simple substance, and therefore must enter into each class as actor with the simplicity and entireness of his nature. Consequently, he is essentially present in each and all three of the classes, as identically volitive, sensitive, and cognitive. Essentially considered, therefore, the distinction of classes would be inadmissible. But as the soul in no one, nor in all, realizes its entire virtuality, and as this virtuality is realized under distinct phases, a virtual distinction, corresponding to the one named, is unquestionably admissible. But, as the distinction of attributes is virtual, not real, it follows that the distinction between volitions, sentiments, and cognitions is virtual, not real.

At most, then, only a virtual distinction in the soul, of the three faculties of willing, feeling, and knowing, can be admitted. How, then, shall we admit a further distinction, not virtual merely, but real also, in the faculty of intelligence itself? Is to know made up of distinct and separate moments? Is it not one simple. fact, whatever its sphere, degree, or conditions? What is the evidence on which Kant grounds his division of the virtuality of the soul to know, into sensibility, understanding, and reason? He speaks of blind intuitions and of void conceptions, and presupposes that the me may act as sensibility, without at the same moment