good deal of interest and satisfaction. We trust Mr. Colman's labors and writings will do somewhat to awaken a taste for agricultural life. It is much better to cultivate the earth under the broad canopy of heaven, than to be cooped up in a cotton mill, or to stand behind the counter making change and measuring tape. 9. Letters on the Spanish Inquisition; a rare Work, and the best which has ever appeared on the Subject. By M. LE COMPTE JOSEPH LE MAISTRE. Translated from the French, with a Preface, Additional Notes, and Illustrations, by T. J. O'FLAHERTY, S. E. C. Boston: Donahoe. 1844. 12mo. pp. 178. WE cannot say that we exactly approve of the taste or temper of Mr. O'Flaherty's notes, but the work itself is one of very considerable value, and throws much light on the real character of the Spanish Inquisition. We commend its perusal to all those among our Protestant friends who are in the habit of adducing the Inquisition as one of their standing proofs that the Pope is Antichrist, and the Catholic Church the Scarlet Lady of Babylon. - 10. Masonic Melodies; adapted to the Ceremonies and Festivals of the Fraternity. By THOMAS POWER, Past Grand Secretary of the Grand Lodge of Massachusetts. Boston: Oliver Ditson. 1844. 8vo. pp. 105. For one man to write and adapt to music 114 melodies is no slight task, especially when undertaken with "malice aforethought"; yet Mr. Power has acquitted himself very creditably. These Melodies are all serious, and some of them have considerable poetic beauty. In sentiment they are appropriate. A brother remarked to us the other day, that they would do well for Unitarian hymns. Mr. Power deserves, however, the thanks of every member of the masonic fraternity for the very acceptable present he has made in furnishing the fraternity with a series of melodies, which, if they do not contain all the religious fervor some could wish, at least contain no sentiment offensive to piety or morality. 11. Fireside Poetical Readings, illustrative of American Scenery, rural Life, and historical Incidents, and also of religious Feelings, designed as a domestic Offering. Collected and published by DEXTER S. KING. Boston: D. S. King. 1843. 12mo. pp. 313. THIS book is evidently all the product of one and the same mind. It is a very pleasant volume. Its author is a man of a good deal of poetical sensibility, and of a sweet devotional spirit. Many of his pictures of American cottage life are exceedingly well done, and betray the hand of a master. We regret that we have no room for extracts. 12. The Antiquities of the Anglo-Saxon Church. By the REV. JOHN LINGARD. The First American, from the Second London Edition. Philadelphia: M. Fithian. 8vo. pp. 324. We notice this book, the merit of which is well established, as one of considerable interest in the Anglican controversy now going on, and as a work of exceeding interest to all of us who are not altogether ashamed of the Church of our ancestors. 13.- Coningsby, or the New Generation. By B. D'ISRAELI, Esq., M. P. Author of "Vivian Grey," "Young Duke," &c. THIS is not merely an interesting novel, but a serious work, affording matter for much thought and reflection. Mr. D'Israeli has much improved since we met him in the "Young Duke." 14.- Eva Macdonald; a Tale of the United Irishmen, and their Times. By T. D. MCGEE. Boston: Brainerd & Co. 1844. 12mo. pp. 47. THIS is a tale which indicates a good degree of talent on the part of its youthful author, and promises us in him, when his character shall have been more fully matured, a writer who will do great credit to the country, and no discredit to the "Emerald Isle," of which he writes, and from which he traces his birth. Two articles promised for this number, namely, one on Justification by Faith, and the other on Constitutional Government, we have been obliged to omit to make way for others which we have believed to be of more immediate interest to the public. We wish also to say again, in order to save ourselves from some inconveniences, that our pages are not open to contributions from others. The Review is intended to be substantially the product of one mind, and the editor is both author and editor. While, therefore, he very respectfully thanks his friends who have favored him with their communications, he must assure them, that to insert these communications would interfere with the plan of the work. BROWNSON'S QUARTERLY REVIEW. OCTOBER, 1844. Critik der reinen Vernunft; von IMMANUEL KANT's investigation, as we have several times repeated, lies wholly within the sphere of the cognitive subject. He is investigating, not knowledge, but our means of knowing. His design is, by a thorough analysis of the faculty of intelligence, to ascertain the conditions of knowing, and to obtain a canon of science, by which we may always be able to distinguish genuine knowledge from its counterfeit. This design he does not profess to have fully executed, and his Critic, he tells us, is, therefore, a cathartic for purging the understanding of errors hitherto imbibed, rather than a canon universally applicable. The first great positive doctrine, which Kant teaches, is, so far as we can comprehend it, that we never attain to a knowledge of things as they may be assumed to exist independently of our cognition of them, that is, as things in themselves; but merely as objects mentally apprehended. Subject and object are correlatives, and one, therefore, cannot be without the other. A tree, for instance, is a certain determinate object which exists in our intuition as the correlative of the subject of the intuition. But does not the tree exist independently 53 VOL. I. NO. IV. of the intuition? Is it not there before my window all the same when I see it and when I see it not? On the Kantian philosophy, this question is absurd; for it presupposes that I may conceive of somewhat of which I have no intuition. But conceptions without intuitions are void. Then I cannot ask whether the tree does or does not exist independently of my beholding it; for, independently of my beholding it, that is, of my intuition of it, it is to me no object of conception. But what has the universe no existence, save as the object of my intuition? So, in very deed, it would seem, if, as Kant alleges, we can apprehend it only as the correlative of the subject apprehending. Yet Kant does not deny the existence of the object as thing existing apart from the subject; for, apart from the subject, it can be no object of conception, and therefore can neither be denied nor affirmed. It may, for aught we know, exist really independently of us, but not formally; for it exists formally only in the intuition. Hence his second great positive doctrine, that on which he founds his claims to originality, namely, that the form of the thought (intuition and conception), or the form under which the object is cognized, is derived from the subject; never, as metaphysicians had hitherto fancied, from the object. The formal existence of the tree is, therefore, purely subjective. But the tree is cognized only as object, never as thing in itself; consequently, its real existence, practically, if not absolutely, is also purely subjective. That the formal existence of some objects of knowledge may be said to be subjective, we are not disposed to deny; but then the formal conceptions, to be of any validity, must have a virtual, if not an actual, objective foundation in re. This is the case with the attributes of God, such as wisdom, justice, goodness, &c. In our conceptions, these attributes are formally distinct, but in God they are identical; for the divine essence is simple, and admits of no distinction. The attribute is identical with the subject regarded as pure essence, and pure essence is identical with pure act. God is not Creator in potentiâ, for that which exists only in potentiâ is imperfect, and needs for its perfection to be realized in act, but Creator in actû. He is not wise, just, and good, when we speak strictly, but wisdom, justice, goodness; and wisdom, justice, and goodness are in him not distinct attributes, but essentially one and the same. Yet, by reason of his infinity, is there a real foundation in him for what, in our conceptions of him, are distinct attributes. Consequently, our conceptions of distinct attributes are formally subjective, yet virtually objective; for they have their foundation in reality; that is to say, in the infinity of God, which answers to what, owing to our limited faculties, are in us distinct conceptions. There is, then, no objection to admitting that the form of some objects of knowledge is imposed by the subject, in case the object is conceded to exist really, and the forms of the intuition to have a virtual foundation in reality. But Kant assumes that the forms, under which all objects are mentally apprehended, are without any foundation, actual or virtual, in the thing apprehended; both the forms and the object are then reduced to mere empty conceptions, or mere modes of the subject, from which, if formally, they are nevertheless really, indistinguishable. But Kant goes still further, and demonstrates very conclusively that we can have intuition of ourselves only in the intuition of the diverse; that is, that the synthetic judgment I think is possible only on condition of the synthetic judgment I think somewhat (aliquid), and somewhat diverse from myself. But this somewhat is merely a mode or affection of myself, and is only formally, not really, actually or virtually, distinguishable from me. Consequently, I can have only a formal, not a real, intuition of myself. Consequently, again, with the knowledge of the not me falls the knowledge of the me itself; I cease to be able to know any thing, and all science is an illusion. To this conclusion, as we have heretofore proved, we are inevitably driven, if we adopt Kant's premises. But these premises are false, and the doctrines of |
