shall hereafter see, that the senses are, in themselves, no independent medium of communication between the subject and the object. The intelligence can no more. be dispensed with in the fact of sensation, than it can in the fact of cognition. M. Cousin himself, in point of fact, carried away by his admiration for Hegel out of his own poor psychology, virtually admits that the reduction in question is not psychologically obtained. He even makes this reduction the basis of his psychological classification, and attempts from it, after the example of his master, as from the point of view of ontology, to explain the history of philosophy, which, as he had elsewhere laid it down, was to be explained psychologically. Thus the predominance, in an epoch, of the idea of the Finite is given as the cause of the prevalence, in that epoch, of Sensualism; the predominance of the idea of the Infinite, as the cause of the prevalence of what he calls Idealism; the predominance of the idea of Relation, of Synthesis, as the cause of the prevalence of Eclecticism. Surely, this is to abandon the field of psychology altogether, and to enter into quite another region.

We do not forget that M. Cousin contends, that he begins in psychology, and from that attains to ontology; and that, after having through psychology arrived at ontology, he has a perfect right to use it for the explanation of his psychology. But his psychology must have been perfectly explicable, and perfectly explained, without ontology, if his ontology was obtained from it; wherefore, then, seek, by means of ontology, to explain it anew? But M. Cousin is deceived; for the ontology, he obtains by generalizing psychology, is only a logical abstraction; it never carries him out of the subject; and is, therefore, as we have seen, no genuine ontology at all. It is quite another sort of ontology from that which he borrows from his friend Hegel, and which he uses to explain his psychology, and is by no means reconcilable with it.

The doctrines of Science may also be subdivided into several classes. Here, since it concerns purely

psychological doctrines, the psychological principle of classification is not only admissible, but necessary; yet even here we cannot accept M. Cousin's classification, without some important modifications. He reckons four classes, which he names,

1. SENSUALISM;
2. IDEALISM;

3. MYSTICISM;

4. SKEPTICISM.

This classification rests for its principle on an inaccurate psychology. M. Cousin makes the basis of Idealism the reflective reason, and that of Mysticism the spontaneous reason. This presupposes a distinction, or, rather, a division, of reason into the reflective and the spontaneous, which we hold to be inadmissible. Skepticism is, indeed, a fact in history; but, as it is the negation of all science, and concerns not our powers of science, but their absence, we are hardly willing to call it a doctrine of Science. It has, moreover, no psychological principle. Even M. Cousin does not hold GOOD SENSE, which, according to him, is its principle, to be a fundamental faculty of the me. It is the name given, not to one of its original powers, but to a certain practical exercise of all its faculties in mutual support and limitation. We strike from the list of doctrines, therefore, what is termed Skepticism. Of his four systems we retain, then, but three.

Of the three we retain, only the first is rightly named. All these doctrines take their rise in the Subject, and should, therefore, all be called by the general name of EGOïsм. The principle of each respectively is, the predominance of a given faculty of the subject. The subject has three original faculties, which, so far as concerns doctrines purely psychological, and because all psychological doctrines so regard them, may be named Sensation, Sentiment, Intellect. Hence, three systems, which may be denominated,

1. SENSUALISM;

2. SENTIMENTALISM;

3. INTELLECTUALISM.

If we undertake to explain the phenomena of the subject by sensation, our doctrine of Science will be Sensualism; if by sentiment, it will be Sentimental

ism; if by intellect, that is, pure conception (Begriff), it will be Intellectualism. All doctrines of Science must be referred to one or another of these three classes;

Our classification of all possible systems is, then, first, into two orders; and, second, each order into three classes.

I. DOCTRINES OF LIFE-1. ATHEISM; 2. PANTHEISM; 3. THEISM.

II. DOCTRINES OF SCIENCE-1. SENSUALISM; 2. SENTIMENTALISM; 3. INTELLECTUALISM. Our present purpose confines us to the second order; namely,

II. DOCTRINES OF SCIENCE.

It is the common opinion among those who in our times pass for philosophers, that there was no philosophy, properly so called, in the Church, from its origin down nearly to the sixteenth century. M. Cousin is hardly willing to allow that the Scholastics were really philosophers; he sees with them only philosophy in germ, prevented by the prevailing theology from attaining to any thing like a fair or full development. Ancient philosophy was born with Socrates, and expired with the closing of the Greek schools at Athens, by order of Justinian, in the sixth century; and modern philosophy was born only with René Descartes, in the sixteenth. But we cannot accept this view. The last three centuries, in our judgment, have been by no means eminently philosophical centuries; and were we to characterize them in a word, we should do so by denominating them unphilosophical, but scientific.

To say that there was no philosophy in the Church prior to what we call the Revival of Letters in the fifteenth century, is to take a very false view either of the Church or of philosophy itself. What were all the great questions debated by the theologians of the Church, against the Gentiles, the Gnostics, the Manichæans, the Sabellians, the Monosophytes, the Arians, the Donatists, the Pelagians, the Predestinarians, represented in the ninth century by the monk Gotteschalk,

the Berengarians, concerning the Real Presence, which last provoked the whole scholastic philosophy, but so many profound ontological questions? Was the question between the Arians and Athanasians nothing but a question of a mere dogma enjoined by authority? Was it for a single diphthong that men disputed and cut one another's throats for some three hundred years? Do not so libel humanity. The difference expressed by that diphthong was all the difference between Paganism and Christianity, between Atheism and Theism. In asserting that the Son was made of a like substance with the Father, what did the Homoiousian attempt, but to introduce two kindred substances as the basis of his theory of the universe, and thus to explain Life from the point of view of plurality, which is Polytheism or Atheism? What was, at bottom, the Pelagian controversy? Pelagius asserts the power of the human soul to place itself in a salvable state. Press this assertion, push it to its last consequences, and it annihilates God, and proclaims the supremacy of man. It transfers the creative power to the creature, and makes the universe live by its own inherent life, independent of a supermundane Creator. What, again, was the real doctrine involved in the controversy provoked in the ninth century by Gotteschalk ? Gotteschalk is the antipodes of Pelagius. He is the precursor of Calvin. He asserts the Divine sovereignty in a sense which leaves man no freedom. Just so far as you deny man's freedom, you deny man himself. To deny man, to deny the active force of the creature, is to deny the reality of the creature, to make him merely a mode or affection of the Creator, is, in fact, to deny creation, and to fall into Pantheism. Was here no philosophical question? Does it not become so in the hands of John Erigena, who has been wrongly accused of being himself a Pantheist? Was there no profound ontological question raised up by Berengarius, in the eleventh century, touching the Eucharist, and which engaged in its discussion such men as Lanfranc, St. Anselm of Canterbury, and involved the whole dispute of the

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Schoolmen about genera and species? Understand the matter better, and you will find that it is always in the Church a question of ontology.

The reason why men of no mean capacity fall into this mistake concerning the theologians of the Church is, that they separate in their own minds, fundamentally, philosophy and theology. Philosophy they regard as the work of the human mind, as resting for its authority on human reason alone. They will allow nothing to be philosophy, therefore, which is not entirely emancipated from all theological envelope, and which does not assert the absolute independence and sufficiency of the human reason. If human reason is independent, if it is fully competent, of itself, to attain to the true doctrine of Life, then Revelation, then Divine Communication through the agency of prophets and apostles, is superfluous; and hence nothing is properly philosophy, that does not proclaim the whole teachings of the Church as to the origin and grounds of our religious faith, either false or superfluous. Philosophy, with the moderns, is profoundly infidel; and hence whatever finds its support in the Christian Revelation is denied to be philosophy at all. What with them passes for philosophy, or rather the principle of what passes with them for philosophy, is profoundly hostile to the Church. This both they and the Church have always felt and asserted; hence the condemnation of the one by the other.

We insist on this point. The modern philosopher begins by putting Christianity on trial, and claims for the human reason the right to sit in judgment on Revelation. At one period, its aim is to overthrow the Church; at another, it is to reconcile, as it is called, reason and faith. How often in these very days of ours, have we heard it said, that the problem of philosophy is to reconcile faith and reason! Have not we ourselves begun our philosophical course by so affirming? Do not those who were associates and fellow-laborers with us in the outset continue still so to affirm? Faith is questioned; men doubt; and they