to the Air Corps can be made only at the expense of other branches which are already feeling keenly the shortage in commissioned personnel.

In order to meet the need for more officers, I recommend that the strength of the commissioned personnel of the Regular Army be fixed at approximately 14,500, this number to be reached during the course of the next 4 or 5 years by annual increments of approximately 500. Our principal source of officers for the Regular Army is the United States Military Academy at West Point. The Congress recently authorized an increase in the Corps of Cadets at the Military Academy from 1,374 to 1,960. There are now approximately 1,800 cadets and by next year it is probable that the number will be close to the authorized enrollment. The number of graduates from the Military Academy each year is scarcely more than sufficient to fill vacancies in the existing strength of the officers of the Army. Hence, any additional commissioned personnel that might be authorized would come from other sources, principally from graduates of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps of our colleges.

Under authority of the Thomason Act, recently passed by Congress, the War Department called to active duty during the past year 1,000 Reserve second lieutenants and placed them on duty with the Regular Army at various posts throughout the country. Of this number, 820 completed 1 year's course of training. Fifty of these young officers were given permanent commissions in the Regular Army. They were selected as a result of competitive examinations. During the coming year about 650 officers will be trained under this authorization.

The young men undergoing training under the Thomason Act are alert, intelligent, and enthusiastic officers. However, the authority to utilize these officers on extended active duty does not relieve the shortage of commissioned personnel. In reality it only emphasizes it, since it increases the duties of experienced officers by making them responsible for the training of these young subalterns.

The spirit of men of all ranks in the Regular Army has been high. Increase in enlisted personnel has rounded out the organizations and has made it possible to carry on troop training with greater efficiency. Improved housing has contributed to increased contentment. However, there are still many posts that are sadly in need of rehabilitation and many new barracks and quarters are needed to provide adequately for the comfort of the personnel.

With returning prosperity and with the need for rigid economy somewhat less acute, consideration should be given to a revision upward of pay schedules, particularly for enlisted men and junior officers. The base pay of enlisted men of the Army is $21 per month, while that of the young men enrolled in the Civilian Conservation Corps is $30 per month. While the base pay of enlisted men in the Navy is $21, this rate pertains only to recruits of less than 3 months' service. Seamen who have completed training receive a minimum of $36 per month. With the increased necessity for soldiers of higher intelligence, more advanced education and greater skill, a better pay scale in the Army is clearly indicated. Steps should be taken to provide reasonable compensation for enlisted men injured or suffering other permanent disabilities incident to their military service. The restoration of the reenlistment allowance for career soldiers is urgently recommended.

Equipment. Marked progress has been made in modernizing the equipment of our Army. Our program contemplates over a period of years practically the complete reequipment of our troops with the latest and best in transportation, means of communication, and weapons. This program should be accelerated.

The most noticeable recent advances have been in aircraft. We now have on hand approximately 1,000 new military airplanes, nearly all of them less than 3 years old, and another 1,000 are under order. In addition, we have on hand several hundred serviceable planes, classified as obsolete. These older planes will all be replaced within the next year or two.

Our goal in airplane strength is 2,320 modern, serviceable planes, to be attained not later than June 30, 1940. This number was recommended as highly desirable by the Baker Board 3 years ago. Subsequent studies have confirmed the conclusions of the Baker Board with respect to this number. Recent aviation developments have produced military airplanes of much greater speeds, with much greater range, and much more effective than any visualized 3 years ago. Hence, an air fleet of 2,320 planes today is several times more powerful than one of a comparable numerical strength a few years ago. Foreign countries are making heavy increases in the strength of their air arms and most of the first-class powers have many more airplanes on hand or under construction than we have. However, in quality our new planes are at least the equal and probably the superior, type for type, of any military airplanes in the world. Our program of airplane procurement does not contemplate attaining the numbers possessed by other countries. With our favorable geographic position and our determination to use our military strength only for defensive purposes, we believe that 2,320 military airplanes will be sufficient for our needs. If funds are made available we hope to attain this number by 1940. Thereafter, it will be necessary to procure approximately 500 new airplanes each year to replace obsolete and unserviceable craft and to keep our equipment abreast of current developments.

It should be borne in mind that modern aircraft cannot be quickly improvised. The construction of airplanes necessarily takes considerable time. Hence, our peacetime strength should approximate rather closely our requirements in war. Furthermore, in a major war our air arm would probably be engaged almost immediately on the opening of hostilities. Therefore, it is desirable that it be practically on a war footing in time of peace.

While we are procuring up-to-the-minute aircraft in sufficient quantities to bring our air strength gradually up to our requirements, we are at the same time encouraging the experimental development of new types so that we may continually improve the quality of our equipment. In this way we guard against over-standardization of airplanes and we are able to take advantage of technical improvements as rapidly as they are developed.

In the procurement of other types of equipment we have not been progressing as rapidly as desirable. We lack sufficient antiaircraft artillery to provide properly for the defense of vital areas. I hope that sufficient funds may be made available to permit the orderly procurement of sufficient modern equipment for all antiaircraft regiments of the Regular Army and National Guard and for a sizeable

reserve for emergency use. A good start has been made toward modernizing our seacoast defenses, but much more is needed in armament and other equipment to provide for the effective defense of our vital harbors.

Substantial progress has been made in the modification of field guns and carriages to provide for high speed towage and for greater flexibility of fire. The Army has large amounts of horse-drawn artillery which may be towed by motor vehicles when properly equipped. By other modifications the field of fire can be greatly increased.

Interesting developments have been made in the use of tanks and other self-propelled mechanized weapons in warfare. The United States Army has evolved a fast, light tank that seems to meet our defensive requirements in this type of weapon. It is more sturdy than some of the light tanks developed in foreign countries and yet is capable of relatively high speeds both on the highway and across country. We are still far short of our requirements in these tanks but definite progress is being made, so that in a few years we hope to have a formidable number. However, to accomplish this the production of tanks should be accelerated.

Motor vehicles are being used more and more by the Army, not only to replace wagon transportation for hauling supplies but also as personnel carriers. Trucks are replacing animals in division supply trains and we hope to motorize all regimental field trains. Motors will ultimately be used in approximately 70 percent of our field artillery and elsewhere whenever their use will be tactically advantageous and practically economical. To accomplish this the Army will require about 7,500 additional motor vehicles.

Horses still have an important place in military operations. Mounted troops are of great value in certain situations and some horse-drawn light artillery can probably be advantageously used. Animal pack trains will always be required on mountain trails and elsewhere in terrain that cannot be otherwise traversed.

The procurement of semiautomatic shoulder rifles and of light and heavy machine guns is a continuing program of the War Department. However, it will probably be several years before sufficient numbers are procured to meet the needs of our organizations and to provide a reasonable war reserve. Hence, this procurement also should be accelerated.

One of the most important projects now under study by the War Department is the reorganization and modernization of the infantry division. Our present division at war strength has an aggregate personnel of about 22,000. Practically all professional opinion is in agreement that the number is much too large. After studies covering several years a tentative divisional organization was evolved with a war strength of 13,500. Field tests of this experimental division will be held late this year in the vicinity of Fort Sam Houston, Tex. It is believed that this new division will prove much more mobile than the present organization and that with the increased use of automatic weapons there will not be a great decrease in fire power. The problem of providing motor transportation for the rapid highway movement of the smaller division would be much less serious than for an organization the size of our present war strength division.

The exercises in Texas in connection with the test of the experimental division will be in addition to the maneuvers of the Fourth

Army held during the summer in different localities in the western part of the United States. These annual Army maneuvers are proving of the greatest value in testing organizations, tactical doctrines and administrative and supply functions. They have resulted in material improvements in training methods.

NATIONAL GUARD

Modest increases were made in the strength of the National Guard during the past year. On June 30, 1937, there were 13,906 commissioned officers and 178,051 enlisted men in the Guard. This was an aggregate increase of about 3,000 over the previous year.

The responsibilities of the National Guard are such that it should be strong enough to provide an effective force for immediate service in case of emergency. At its present strength of 192,000 the National Guard is short of the number required to make it well balanced in all of the arms and services necessary for immediate field duty. It is recommended that its strength be increased to a total of 210,000 officers and enlisted men by annual increments of approximately 5,000. There has been a steady improvement in the efficiency of the troops of the National Guard. Organizations are gradually being reequipped, and training methods are improving. The soldiers of National Guard units have demonstrated in annual field exercises the value of the armory training they have received during the year. The showing made in the field has been a great credit to the officers and men of these organizations.

National Guard troops are now making wide use of motor transportation. In many instances motor trucks have been used to transport organizations to and from summer training camps. This has not only resulted in a considerable saving in time and expense but also has afforded the units valuable experience in moving long distances over highways.

Joint field exercises of Regular Army and National Guard troops have been mutually profitable to both elements and have imparted a realism to troop training. Considerable concentration of troops in strategic areas has made it possible to advance the knowledge of officers and men in the tactical employment of larger units. It has likewise tended to unify and standardize methods of instruction in all elements of the United States Army.

ORGANIZED RESERVES

Based on the experience in past wars, the National Defense Act wisely makes provision for the availability of a Reserve component designed to bring the Army toward the strength necessary to meet emergency conditions.

Commendable progress has been made in the development of the Officers' Reserve Corps, which on April 6, 1917, had a strength of approximately 2,900, and which on June 30, 1937, consisted of 96,545 assignable officers, an increase of nearly 1,000 in the past year. Thus we are moving toward our objective of 120,000 assignable Reserve officers for mobilization purposes in a logical way, replacing the older officers and expanding our Reserve Corps by annual accretions of college-trained junior officers.

The professional standards of the corps of officers of our Army must be maintained at the highest practicable level, and to do this, provision

should be made for training at least 30,000 of our assignable Reserve officers annually. Having in mind the lessons of our past wars and the marked advance in the technical aspects of military science, this number of 14-day trainees should be considered a minimum.

During the past year available funds permitted the training of approximately 22,000 for 14-day periods. In addition, there were approximately 820 Reserve lieutenants on active duty for 1 year with the Regular Army under the terms of the Thomason Act; 375 on extended active duty as pilots in the Air Corps; and 6,621 on duty with the Civilian Conservation Corps. While those on C. C. C. duty received no military training they had valuable experience in administration and leadership and in the technique of supply which will greatly enhance their worth as Army officers.

The enlisted reserve of the United States Army has only a nominal strength at present of 3,189. The necessity of a sizeable reserve of trained enlisted specialists is self-evident. We will be at a distinct disadvantage during the mobilization period of a major war if we lack trained men to fill key positions in the ranks. I strongly recommend that a start be made toward an ultimate strength of 150,000 in the enlisted reserve.

At present our Reserve officers are recruited largely from the Reserve Officers' Training Corps of our colleges and from the graduates of citizens' military training camps. The R.O.T.C. courses of our schools and colleges are very popular and there are many applications in the War Department for the establishment of additional R.O.T.C. units. Lack of funds and of commissioned personnel to act as instructors has prevented the approval of many applications. I hope that in the coming year it will be possible to meet the wishes of some of the school authorities who desire to have such units.

The citizens' military training camps held each summer continue to attract large numbers of our young men. The results have met with universal acclaim. As funds become available I hope that it will be possible to enlarge these camps to provide for an increasing number of qualified applicants.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As measures by which the strength and efficiency of our military establishment may be enhanced during the next few years I wish to submit the following recommendations:

The number of commissioned officers of the Regular Army should be increased by about 2,300 to approximately 14,500. This should be done by adding about 500 officers each year for 4 or 5 years. These new officers should be selected from qualified junior officers of the Reserve Corps as the number commissioned annually from the Military Academy will be required to fill normal vacancies.

The enlisted strength of the Regular Army should be recruited up to the authorized strength of 165,000, and maintained at that strength during the next year. Additional enlisted men are required principally in the Air Corps and to fill antiaircraft regiments of the Coast Artillery Corps.

Consideration should be given to the upward revision of pay schedules of junior officers and enlisted men. The pay of our enlisted men is far below that of comparable occupations in civil life and well below that of enlisted men of the Navy and of youths enrolled in the Civilian Conservation Corps.