The American Economic Review, Volume 86,Edições 1-2American Economic Association, 1996 |
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Página 197
... bargaining , we need to characterize the set of reasonable outcomes from an internal wage - bargaining process . Elsewhere , in Stole and Zwiebel ( 1996 ) , we have studied a gen- eral class of bargaining games and their re- sulting ...
... bargaining , we need to characterize the set of reasonable outcomes from an internal wage - bargaining process . Elsewhere , in Stole and Zwiebel ( 1996 ) , we have studied a gen- eral class of bargaining games and their re- sulting ...
Página 217
pose that the higher tier splits the difference in pairwise bargaining sessions ( as before ) , but the lower tier has no such power.22 Given this assumption regarding bargaining power , the at - will firm will continue to overemploy ...
pose that the higher tier splits the difference in pairwise bargaining sessions ( as before ) , but the lower tier has no such power.22 Given this assumption regarding bargaining power , the at - will firm will continue to overemploy ...
Página 221
... bargaining power of the groups , however , will yield a reallocation of power within the organization . Such a conception is likely to add insight to the tension between joint pro- duction and intergroup conflict in organiza- tions ...
... bargaining power of the groups , however , will yield a reallocation of power within the organization . Such a conception is likely to add insight to the tension between joint pro- duction and intergroup conflict in organiza- tions ...
Índice
VICTOR R FUCHS Economics Values and Health Care Reform | 25 |
ANTONIO CICCONE AND ROBERT E HALL | 54 |
JULIO J ROTEMBERG AND MICHAEL WOODFORD | 71 |
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