pretension of this kind that fails in its predictions, is thereby proved
false. Have the laws of public economy ever yet been so adjusted
as to produce this result?-Manifestly not. If they had, all the
world would have known it, and there would be no controversy.
The truth is, the whole subject still remains a wide field of empirical
laws, not entirely useless, but yet unadjusted as to scientific order
and relations, having not the slightest claim to the dignity of a
science. If any should think we have failed in our classification.
of the laws of public economy, in their historical condition down
to this time, as being empirical, let them tell us under what category
of dogmas they should be ranked; or let them say, if they choose,
that they do not all belong to this class. We are not tenacious on
that point. We only say, they have never yet been reduced to a
science. That is evident, because there is no certainty of science
in them. There is no uncertainty in figures, in mathematics, in
geometry, in astronomy, or in the physical sciences generally, so
far as their respective domains have been explored; nor is there
uncertainty in any science, the elements of which have been ascer-
tained and adjusted in scientific order and relations. There can
be none. It is the very nature of science to realize its predictions.
We do not affirm confidently, that all the dogmas which ever have
been uttered on public economy, will fall within the logician's defi-
nition of empirical laws; but we think they will generally be found
there; nor can we conceive how a more respectable rank could
fairly be assigned to them. It is not simply for the convenience of
classification, that we have put them there; but because we could
not find a more legitimate place.

Now, let us consider what the characteristic of an empirical law
is, as presented in the above citation: "The property of being
unfit to be relied on beyond the limits of time, place, and circum-
stance, in which the observations have been made." It may not
always be so good as this; but it can not be better. It must be
seen, therefore, that it entirely cuts off the generalizations of Free
Trade, and falls directly in the line of our definition. No law of
public economy can be safely trusted except for "the time, place,
and circumstance, in which the observations have been made;"
that is, the observations which have established the law. The
principle necessarily restricts every system of public economy to
one nation to that nation where the observations that have dic-
tated its laws, have been made. Within these limits empirical laws
may be serviceable, and by proper attention may be reduced to

X Surely that man is little short of crazy!. Does he mean the identical love, time & circumstance? of 10

law, but in isolated pent; an

a science. For a wider range, it is not possible that a science should be made of them on this subject. In the language of Mr. Mill, in a citation under the former head, it is not simply "absurd, but abstractedly impossible."

The effect of this new position, if it shall be allowed to be well sustained, is obvious. Dislodged from the platform of the sciences, on which they have always claimed to stand, and which was their sole authority, the Free-Trade economists are utterly discomfited. None, we think, can fail to see, after what has been proved above, that the pretensions of Free Trade to the rights and authority of a science, are perfectly absurd.

3. We now propose to notice, as another new feature of this work, that we have endeavored to subject its propositions, so far as they relate to the main question in debate, to the most rigid test of the recognised canons of experimental induction, as laid down by logicians; and consequently, that, in this particular, and so far as we may be allowed to have succeeded, the subject will, perhaps, have some claim to be regarded as rescued from the field of empirical laws, and installed in the position of a science.

We cite the canons, thus employed, from Mr. Mill, as follow:1. "If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause or effect of the given phenomenon.

2. "If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance save one in common, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phe

nomenon.

3. "If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance; the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ, is the effect or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon.

4. "Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known, by previous inductions, to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents.

5. "Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever an

if not, it is generalizatio.

X possibility of error, yet Mr Mill himself the dictor of the canons is a Ironson 27. Frader, so that he whose canons are adopted

42

THE NEW POINTS OF THIS WORK.

other phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation.”

"These methods," says Mr. Mill, "are the only possible modes of experimental inquiry, of direct induction a posteriori, as distinguished from deduction. At least, I know not, nor am I able to conceive, any others. These, then, with such assistance as can be obtained from deduction, compose the available resources of the human mind for ascertaining the laws of the succession of phenomena."

Mr. Mill has demonstrated at large the truth of these canons. Any one who chooses to refer to the demonstration, will find it complete and satisfactory, beyond the possibility of error. X

We have not introduced these canons here because we expect to find room to make and explain their application along with the current of the argument where they apply; but merely to suggest a recognised test, the authority of which will not be questioned, and which can be employed as such by those who are already versed in these rules, or who will take the trouble to make themselves acquainted with their application. Having already shown that public economy has never yet been reduced to a science, and as that object would turn us entirely aside from the specific design of this work, except as an incidental effect which may possibly in some degree be achieved, we are forced to decline a task which would of itself occupy the sole attention of a properly-endowed and properly-qualified mind, in a work not less extensive, perhaps, than that to which we are limited in an endeavor to develop the practical parts of this science. We conceive that the construction of this science is unoccupied ground, a field yet to be entered by some one, whose talents may qualify, and whose ambition may prompt, him to so laudable an undertaking. All that we profess is, that we have taken these canons as our rule in the construction of the main argument of this work, and that we have been essen tially aided by their light shining on our path.

We for a long time thought that public economy never could be made a science in the strict sense of the term. But that position can hardly be maintained, if it be allowed that everything is a subject of science, and capable of being brought into its place as such; and if, moreover, it be considered, that it is a part of science to adapt itself to the nature of the subject. A science of contingent propositions, for aught that can be seen, is as supposable as one of

as infallible, is proved in the same instance as to be a fool

This is true of every practical science. See: Because date change, therefore, no rules can be actextarnes: What be comes of political Who trophy, agri

THE NEW POINTS OF THIS WORK.

uniform and immutable propositions. The propositions of public cul-
economy, as we hold, must necessarily change with a change of fure
data; and it can not be denied, that such changes are constantly
transpiring in every commonwealth. It will be found that this
principle of a liability to a change of data, presents itself on the
threshold, and that it lies at the foundation of the science of public
economy. It is impossible to cast it aside, or turn the back upon
it, with any hope of a successful investigation, or useful result. A
public measure required at one time, may, by events, or even by
its own operation in the complete fulfilment of its purpose, require
to be modified, or suspended, or superseded, at a subsequent pe-
riod; and the same measure may be of the greatest importance to
one nation, which would be injurious to another, possibly to all x
others. Nothing can be more contingent than the propositions of
public economy.

If it should be said that a science must be of universal use, to
establish its claim as such, it will be observed that we do not insist
on the admission of this branch of knowledge to that rank, if it
can not fairly be established in that place. We do, however, main-
tain, that it has never yet arrived at that position. We also think
that it may be brought there; and we beg leave to suggest, in an-
swer to the requirement of the attribute of universal application in
a science, that it is not yet concluded to be wanting in this case.
One of the conditions of this science, as already demonstrated, is,
that every nation wishing to avail itself of its benefits, must look for
its elements in the facts of its own history, and nowhere else. In
that way it becomes of universal use, when every nation, for itself,
shall have constructed its own system of public economy on the
basis of its own experience. So far, therefore, is the abovenamed
objection from proving that public economy can not be a science,
as a contingent structure, or as a system composed of contingent
propositions, it may be seen, that its very nature is of this precise
description; in other words, it is a science adapted to the nature
of the subject. It would be absurd to require that one science
should prove another. It is sufficient if each one proves itself, and
vindicates its own position.

It must be admitted, that nothing is more desirable, in public economy, than that the certainties of science should be brought to bear upon it; and nothing is more evident than that, hitherto, they have never been so directed. The reasons are obvious, as shown in our citations, here and there, from Mr. Mill. It was impossible

!!

why

in one nation? All reaSourne is so far as it goes generali-. gation and specially at io

44

THE NEW POINTS OF THIS WORK.

that a science on this subject should be constructed out of the common experience of nations for common use, or out of the experience of one nation for the use of another. It is a subject on which generalizations are, as Mr. Mill justly observes, even "abstractedly impossible." It is only in the line of the experience of one nation that the rigid principles of such a science can be applied, and for that nation only. All beyond this field is a region of empirical laws, as before shown; and of that precise category of empirical laws, which are utterly incapable of being reduced to a science.

While, therefore, we do not claim to have formed a science on this subject, having had other work to do, we trust it will be allowed, that we have demonstrated the want of it, in establishing the fact that all pretensions of this kind hitherto put forward, are without foundation. If we have been so fortunate as to indicate the path, and open the door to the field where alone can be found the elements of this science, it will, perhaps, be of some account in the future efforts of those who may find it convenient to undertake the task of reducing it to form.

It can not be denied, that some study and close thinking are required for the use and application of the canons of induction, above cited, to so intricate and complicated a subject as that of public economy. Fortunately, this is not necessary to be able to appreciate the argument that is based upon them. The facts and reasoning may be perfectly apprehended by one who may never have heard of these rules, and who may have but little or no acquaintance with the processes of scientific induction. He who is instructed by experience and observation, is capable of reasoning as correctly as he who is instructed by science, and often does so with more unerring certainty of a true result. Experience never leads to error, and science itself is verified by experience. The canons cited above grow out of experience, and enforce respect and credit only as they are conformed to it. A man may be totally ignorant of the canons, when his experience, or the experience of others verified by facts, leads him to the same result. When science accords with experience, it settles all controversy. Science is for those who occupy the higher, and who are capable of penetrating into the more profound, regions of human scrutiny, while experience is for the common walks of life.

As there is in fact but one great argument in this work, composed of various branches of what is commonly called argumentation, each one of which in itself is an argument on some one point,

and pray what is experience? The mere questaposition of observations, Their generalization and receine upon them. If I burn my finger