XNothing can be correct in theor and erroplous in practice; it may appear correct, or the theory,

THE NEW POINTS OF THIS WORK.

35

starting from correct Say declares, in the most unqualified and emphatic terms: "The por

maxims of political economy are immutable."

tions,

allowed to may

applied

As there can be no doubt of the character of this claim, it is un-
necessary to go into minute proof of the fact; or, if it is allowed to
be too absurd to be credited, the pretension itself is disposed of. el
All must see, that it has not a shadow of just pretence to occupy
this position. And yet it will be found, that it was solely by its
assumption, without warrant, and without reason, that the most stu-
pendous errors have been palmed upon the world, under the sto-
len shield of SCIENCE, simply because the claim being conceded,

too

Largely

or not challenged, it was vain to oppose deductions put forward th

under such authority. They claimed that the theory was scien-
tific; nobody challenged the claim; and who would dare to oppose
science? Thus, for the greater part of a century, the Free-Trade
economists have had no inconsiderable sway, it might, perhaps,

is absart t say

that be said, a full sweep of influence, by the authority of a false pre- be coord

tension.

Observe the following remarks on this point by Napoleon, in his exile, as reported by Las Cases: "He opposed the principles of the economists, which he said were correct in theory, though

wit дальн

erroneous in their application. The political constitution of differ- practice

ent states," continued he, “must render these principles defective;
local circumstances continually call for deviation from their unifor-
mity. Duties," he said, "which were so severely condemned by
political economists, should not, it is true, be an object to the treas-
ury; they should be the guaranty and protection of a nation, and
should correspond with the nature and the objects of its trade. Hol-
land, which is destitute of productions and manufactures, and which
has a trade only of transit and commission, should be free of all
fetters and barriers. France, on the contrary, which is rich in
every sort of production and manufactures, should incessantly guard
against the importations of a rival, who might still continue supe-
rior to her, and also against the cupidity, egotism, and indifference
of mere brokers. I have not fallen into the error of modern sys-
tematizers," said the emperor, "who imagine that all the wisdom
of nations is centred in themselves. Experience is the true wis-
dom of nations. And what does all the reasoning of the econo-
mists amount to ?"

No one, probably, has lived, since public economy became a
subject of debate, who understood it better, for practical purposes,
than this extraordinary man.

It will be seen, that our definition, including a given position, given interests, and given institutions of a state, as elements of public economy, is fully justified by what Napoleon calls “the political constitutions of different states," and "local circumstances."

In denying the claim of Free Trade to a science, we do not mean, that there can not be common principles, which, in abstract forms and isolated positions, are equally true all the world over, any more than that we mean to arraign the religious and moral principles of the decalogue, which, by all Christians and Jews, are allowed to be eternal and immutable; or any more than we would question the verities of figures and mathematical demonstrations. But the question is, as to the application of the same principles, in combination or in separate form, to things, or to states of things, which are different from each other. There is not a principle in the decalogue which may not be perverted, and which, if perverted, will not lead to an unfortunate or criminal result. Figures themselves, which are commonly said not to lie, may be employed to verify the most absurd and stupendous errors, by mistakes in the premises, or by perversity of application.

It will be observed, that we have not only departed from usage, in our definition of public economy, by denominating it the application of knowledge derived from experience, instead of calling it a science; but that we require a given position, given interests, and given institutions of a state or nation, in order to know how to make the application. The very terms of our definition, therefore, take the whole subject from the determinate and immutable laws of Free Trade, and place it on what may be called a contingent basis, itself subject to a variety of contingences. In Free Trade, we have only to understand its propositions, and then we know what they prove, or pretend to prove. But in our theory of public economy, we consult facts, experience, under a given state of things, in order to form the right propositions. In Free Trade, the propositions lead; in our system, they follow. In the former, the propositions determine results, or affect to do so; in the latter, facts, by their practical operation, determine the propositions, because they determine results. In the former case, the theory, or, rather, the hypothesis, is first, and the results are hypothetical; in the latter, the theory is last, and is made to depend on the facts. Our theory, therefore, is not one of propositions, formed irrespective of facts; but a theory growing out of facts.

Our theory, instead of being a preconceived hypothesis, like that

of Free Trade, is in fact a theory, and involves an established connexion between facts that have been and facts which, in like circumstances, must necessarily follow, but which are not always found to be the same, in all circumstances, but often greatly diverse. The doctrines resulting from our theory, are subject to such modification as facts and circumstances require, in the place where they are applied, being sometimes, in some particulars, in direct opposition in one place to those of another. It is not setting up an hypothesis to beget an entity; but it assigns an adequate cause for the entity itself. The propositions of a sound system of public economy, therefore, are entirely contingent on the experience of the past and a given state of things, and not determinate, absolute, and immutable, like those of Free Trade.

We have included in our definition given institutions, as well as a given position and given interests of a state or nation, notwithstanding that M. Say has said, that "wealth is essentially independent of political organization," or of the structure of society. We shall have abundant occasion to show that "political organization," or the structure of society, is an "essential" element of public economy. This untenable position of M. Say, originated in a forced effort to divorce what he called "political economy," from "politics," and to maintain it in the rank of the sciences, as if a statesman had nothing to do with the elements of legislation. The very purpose of public economy is for the guidance of legislators. It was quite unnecessary to take up this false position, to keep the teachings of public economy apart from the agitations of politics." There is no necessary connexion between these two spheres of action or of duty; though it is impossible to destroy the connexion between the things taught and their practical use. The doctrines are promulgated from the closet; they are reduced to practice in the high places of the nation. The teachers are necessarily recluses, buried in the profound retreats of philosophy, as an indispensable incident of their vocation. Although they may desire that what they regard as truth may prevail, it is not their business to give it currency. But the main object of M. Say in asserting that "wealth is essentially independent of political organization," or of the structure of society, was to guard his system as a science, and to put forward its prerogatives.

We trust, therefore, it will be seen, that the new point we have made, in our definition of the general subject, is one of fundamental, pervading, supreme importance. Its very terms, once made out as

This

have

heard in a

correct, are a complete refutation of the pretensions of Free Trade. If the public economy of a country is to be based upon its own experience, and if all the propositions constituting the system, are to arise out of the peculiar position, interests, and institutions of that country, it is not possible that Free Trade should have anything to do with it.

It will also be seen, that, from our definition, as a starting point, the field of public economy opened by it, is entirely new. It is not the world, it is not all nations, it is not any two nations; but it is one nation in particular. The law of the definition necessarily brings the subject within these limits. This imparts an entirely new character to the argument. With general propositions we have nothing to do; it is a particular case. It is a system of public economy for the United States alone, which we are required to frame. It has been shown above, that it is not possible to construct one for all nations, nor even for two. All pretensions of this kind are utterly baseless, and can do nothing but evil, so far as they are influential.

imes.

2. The next new point of this work we propose to consider, is, that public economy has never yet been reduced to a science, and that all the propositions of which it is composed, down to this time, are empirical laws. That it has not been reduced to a science, has already been shown. That all its propositions are properly subjects of science, we do not deny; on the contrary, we maintain it; but we aver is, they have never yet been adjusted in a scientific and reliable form. Many of them are true and many are false; but it is impossible to know which are true and which false, until they are brought under the severe test of scientific induction. We have done enough already to bring under suspicion, and in some cases, to falsify, all general propositions on this subject, such as those of Free Trade. The invincible rules of logic, such as we have cited above from Mr. Mill, put this question out of debate. We have yet to show that it is possible to reduce public economy to a science, by confining its propositions to a single case, or a single nation, and only in that way; and also, that this work, by adhering to that rule, is constructed on the most rigid principles of scientific induction.

But what is meant by empirical laws? We do not mean by this imputation what is commonly understood by empiricism or quackery; but we refer to a class of propositions, so denominated by logicians, to distinguish them from those which have not found their

place in science. "Experimental philosophers," says Mr. Mill, "usually give the name of empirical laws to those uniformities which observation or experiment has shown to exist, but upon which they hesitate to rely in cases varying much from those which have been actually observed, for want of seeing any reason why such a law should exist. It is implied, therefore, in the notion of an empirical law, that it is not an ultimate law; that if true at all, its truth is capable of being, or requires to be accounted for. It is a derivative law, the derivation of which is not yet known. To state the explanation, the why of the empirical law, would be to state the laws from which it is derived, the ultimate causes upon which it is contingent. And if we knew these, we should also know what are its limits, under what conditions it would cease to be fulfilled. . . Now it is the very nature of a derivative law, which has not yet been resolved into its elements, in other words, an empirical law, that we do not know whether it results from the different effects of one cause, or from effects of different causes. We can not tell whether it depends wholly upon laws, or partly upon laws and partly upon collocation. . . Empirical laws, until explained, and connected with the ultimate laws from which they result, have not attained the highest degree of certainty of which laws are susceptible." But the following is, as we think, what more particularly applies to the present subject: "The property which philosophers usually consider as characteristic of empirical laws, is that of being unfit to be relied on beyond the limits of time, place, and circumstances, in which the observations have been made. These are empirical laws in a more emphatic sense. Until a uniformity can be taken out of the class of empirical laws, and brought either into that of causation, or of the demonstrated [scientific] results of the laws of causation, it can not with any assurance be pronounced true beyond the local and other limits within which it has been found so by actual observation."

Both the novelty and importance of the position here taken, demand some exposition. If it be well authorized, true in fact, for the purpose we have in view, it can not be too well understood. When Free-Trade economists have arrogated the high and dignified title of a science for their theme, one naturally asks, what sort of a science is it? In what is its artificial structure apparent? Where are the principles and rules by which we arrive at infallible conclusions? A science, well and truly formed, can predict results with certainty; it is the very nature of science to do this, and any