But it is free labor, chiefly, that has created all the superiority of the United States over other countries, in its general capacities of wealth. There are, indeed, vast resources and treasures of nature here. But it is the free labor and free spirit of the country which have turned them to profitable account. It is free labor which, while unembarrassed with vicious and favored with wise legislation, rolls up wealth in heaps. But for this, and but for the fact, that European and other foreign powers, which wrest from labor so large a portion of its reward, can not afford to employ all the power thus wrongfully acquired in commercial competition with us; but for these facts, we say, the measure of protection for American labor, naturally required, would be the difference in the cost of money and labor in these two quarters, not less than an average of one hundred per cent. But the average protection which experience has dictated as necessary, as for example in the tariff of 1842, is about 40 per cent. The reasons why protection is required to be distributed so variously in its degrees, on different articles of domestic production, are, first, because the power of foreign competition, as seen above, is brought to bear more on some articles than on others; and next, because some domestic productions have acquired a stronger position than others, and do not need so much help. Hence, in a well-digested tariff, we find Protection varying from a very low up to a very high rate; and nothing could be a stronger evidence of the correctness of the principle involved in the rule laid down, to wit, that the necessity of Protection arises from the difference in the cost of money and labor in this country and others, than the facts above noticed.

Although, therefore, as above recognised, this difference between the cost of money and labor in Europe and their cost in the United States, can not be laid down as an exact rule by which protection is, in all cases, to be graduated, it is, nevertheless, the foundation of the rule. It is remarkable, that a principle, like this, so potent and overruling, should not have been more influential with American statesmen, as one from which there is no escape in the current of public affairs. There is no law in the everlasting code of nature, that is more certain than this, and none the penalty of which must more certainly be paid, if violated.

It is due, however, to the instincts of the common mind, to observe, that the people of this country have not been altogether insensible of a natural hostility between their labor and what is commonly called "the pauper labor of Europe." The whole of

the truth lies in this instinctive apprehension. It has been in their mouths as long as the oldest man can remember. It was in the minds and hearts of the revolutionary fathers, and stimulated them to all their mighty efforts, to their stupendous sacrifices, and to those strifes of arms which achieved so great a victory. The American people have generally felt, that Europe is a great prisonhouse of labor, the products of which, if brought in direct and open competition with their own, would drag them down to the same level, and subject them to the same disadvantages-ultimately to the same poverty, wretchedness, and slavery.

Nor can it be said, that some of the public men of this country, politicians, statesmen, and others, have not apprehended this great truth, preached it eloquently, set forth its operations and results, and warned the people.

But hitherto the field of debate has been wide, the materials of argument disjunct and scattered, and foreign authorities, based on fallacious and unsound principles, have been forced upon public attention, to distract, divide, and conquer. American schools and colleges, having nothing else to lay before their pupils-the tutors of which may without offence be supposed better skilled in teaching boys than statesmen, and not perhaps thinking that they were educating statesmen-have been forced to rely on Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Jean Baptiste Say, and such like, for lessons on public economy!

It would be strange, however, after so much debate, and where such vast interests are at stake, if the argument could never be brought to a point, on which all could see that the truth of the matter hinges. That point, it is believed, is indicated by the difference in the cost of money and labor in the United States and in foreign parts. It is a commercial principle, determined with all the certainty of arithmetical results, about which, therefore, there can be no ground of controversy among reasonable minds. The rule is derived from the fact, that the producing powers of Europe and other foreign parts, that is, money and labor, cost only half as much as in the United States-in truth less than half as much. It will follow, therefore, that American labor, which in fact is the chief thing concerned, can never stand against such odds without protection.

But a better rule than all, perhaps, for the graduation of duties for Protection, is the application and advice of parties who desire it. It is the experience of the people that teaches what they want,

and they are the best judges. They never ask for protection, unless they want it. Why should they? It would be absurd. And the fact that they ask, is proof that they want.

The following argument of Adam Smith, made for Free Trade, is so pertinent and forcible here, that we can not resist the temptation of using it for our own purpose: "The annual revenue of every society is always precisely equal to the exchangeable value of the whole annual produce of its industry, or rather, is precisely the same thing with that exchangeable value. As every individual, therefore, endeavors, as much as he can, both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry, that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labors to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner that its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain; and he is in that, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand, to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always worse for the society, that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affect to trade for the public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words need be employed in dissuading them from it. What is the species of industry which his capital can best employ, and of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, every individual, it is evident, can, in his local situation, judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver can do for him. The statesman who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but to no council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it."

Nothing, surely, could be more delightful than this to those Americans who only ask to be protected in their own chosen ways -a protection to which they are justly entitled. Adam Smith entirely misrepresents the case, when he assumes, that Protection is

an "attempt to direct private people in what way they ought to employ their capital." It only encourages and shields them from harm, in ways in which they themselves choose to " employ their capital." In no case does Protection control the direction and employment of capital; it only invites it into a field where it could not otherwise go, and defends its position there. Its function is to do that which is solicited, not to impose that which is not desired; and when it is shown, as we have done, that no parties can possibly be injured by the protection of others-except by a partiality in the distribution of its benefits, in helping one more than another, since all are benefited in some degree by protection afforded in any cases whatever-this reasoning of Adam Smith all goes for a protective system. When the people desire and obtain protection in this, that, or the other pursuit, for their "own gain," they are, as Adam Smith justly says, "led by an invisible hand, to promote an end which was no part of their intention," to wit, the common good of "the society." Nothing is more true, than that" every individual can, in his local situation, judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver can for him, what is the species of industry which his capital can best employ, and of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value;" and therefore he asks protection in it, if he needs it. This is the opposite of directing and controlling his capital. The objection, that it indirectly controls other parties, to their injury, we have answered in another place, by showing that it controls only the importing merchant, to prevent his trading at the expense of the country, the very thing which ought to be done.

It is only when the government interferes with and dictates to the pursuits of the people, as, for example, forcing them back to agriculture, by refusing to protect manufactures, that mischief, and untold mischief, is done. Let the people choose their own pursuits, and protect them when they ask it, and they will be sure to promote the public, by securing their own private wealth.

Adam Smith still farther concedes all that can be asked: "What is prudent in every private family, can scarcely be folly in that of a great kingdom." And what does the prudence of a private family require? To take care of its own interests, to be sure—to protect them. If this be not done, things will surely come to bad; and it must take care of those interests, too, in relation to the conflicting agencies with which it is for ever invested and assailed. This is precisely the doctrine of Protection.

It is singular that, in addition to all this, Adam Smith, while

pleading the cause of Free Trade, not only concedes, but justifies, the principle of Protection in all its length and breadth of application, as follows: "There seem, however, to be two cases, in which it will generally be advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign, for the encouragement of domestic industry. The first is, when some particular sort of industry is necessary for the defence of the country. The defence of Great Britain, for example, depends very much upon its sailors and shipping. The act of navigation, therefore very properly, endeavors to give the sailors and shipping of Great Britain the monopoly of the trade of their own country, in some cases by absolute prohibitions, and in others by heavy burdens upon the shippping of foreign countries."

Let any one judge whether the principle here conceded can have any stopping-place, so long as, in the judgment of any people or government, "any particular sort of industry," as Adam Smith calls it, requires protection for the defence of the country, alias, for its interests; for, if its interests, in which its strength and power consist, are suffered to go to wreck, it is folly to talk about defence. There can be no defence short of maintaining that physical power of a country, which consists in maintaining its interests.

"The second case," says Adam Smith, "in which it will generally be advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign for the encouragement of domestic industry, is, when some tax is imposed at home upon the produce of the latter. In this case, it seems reasonable, that an equal tax should be imposed upon the like produce of the former." This on the principle of retaliation. So we have Adam Smith a protectionist on two points, which, as will be seen, is having him on all points: first, when "it will be advantageous for the encouragement of domestic industry;" and next, when the lex talionis, or law of retaliation, requires it. Who ever asked for more than this?

Let the following facts, the list of which might be greatly enlarged, show how far the United States would be entitled to go, on this principle of retaliation, laid down by Adam Smith. American flour in Cuba pays a duty of about $10 a barrel; in Rio Janeiro, $5 to $6; and in many other foreign parts, the duties on this article range from 50 to 150 per cent. In return, we take coffee without duty. We have reciprocity treaties with several foreign powers, the effect of which has already been to take away about one third of our carrying-trade. When Americans began to export their goods to British dependencies, the British government im