Mind, Volume 81Oxford University Press, 1972 A journal of philosophy covering epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. |
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Página 69
... particular virtues , for instance , headache powders in terms of their efficacy and safety , and pillows in terms of their comfort- ableness . When someone describes a headache powder or a pillow as a good one , we take it that he is ...
... particular virtues , for instance , headache powders in terms of their efficacy and safety , and pillows in terms of their comfort- ableness . When someone describes a headache powder or a pillow as a good one , we take it that he is ...
Página 200
... particular subject of that ascription are invalid with intentional verbs . That a sloop is wanted does not imply that one in particular is wanted . Anscombe gives examples of statements of perception in which the verb is purportedly ...
... particular subject of that ascription are invalid with intentional verbs . That a sloop is wanted does not imply that one in particular is wanted . Anscombe gives examples of statements of perception in which the verb is purportedly ...
Página 593
... particular under some determinate description . This means that there is no essential difference between judgements of the form " This a is good ' and ' This a is a good X ' . Further , because these judgements , when made sincerely ...
... particular under some determinate description . This means that there is no essential difference between judgements of the form " This a is good ' and ' This a is a good X ' . Further , because these judgements , when made sincerely ...
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accept action analysis answer argue argument Argument from Illusion assertion assumption Austin behaviour belief Bounds of Sense called claim concept conclusion consequence context definition denial deny describe Descriptivism discussion distinction entails evaluative evidence example existence experience explanation expression fact falsity follows function G. E. M. Anscombe given Hare human illocutionary acts illocutionary force imperative imperative logic implies inference intelligible interpretation involved judgement Kant Kant's kind king of France language linguistic logical London looks material implication means mind moral notion object oblique intention particular perceive person philosophical point of view possible predicate premisses principle problem properties proposition psychological purpose question R. M. Hare reason reference relation relevant sceptic scientific Searle seems sensation sense sentence someone standard statement Strawson suppose theory thesis thing true or false truth truth functionally truth-functional understand University Press utterance valid verb Wittgenstein words