Mind, Volume 81Oxford University Press, 1972 A journal of philosophy covering epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. |
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Página 268
... object appears ; for what I perceive ' does not discriminate between quality and object . But I shall now try to show that the appearance neither of the object nor of the quality determines the quality in the way that Locke believes ...
... object appears ; for what I perceive ' does not discriminate between quality and object . But I shall now try to show that the appearance neither of the object nor of the quality determines the quality in the way that Locke believes ...
Página 269
... object appears ; for what I perceive ' does not discriminate between quality and object . But I shall now try to show that the appearance neither of the object nor of the quality determines the quality in the way that Locke believes ...
... object appears ; for what I perceive ' does not discriminate between quality and object . But I shall now try to show that the appearance neither of the object nor of the quality determines the quality in the way that Locke believes ...
Página 269
... object or the quality which I perceive appears ? 6 That it is seems highly doubtful . For since the term ' perceive , brings with it a reference to intentionality , it is possible for a per- ceived , quality to be different from the way ...
... object or the quality which I perceive appears ? 6 That it is seems highly doubtful . For since the term ' perceive , brings with it a reference to intentionality , it is possible for a per- ceived , quality to be different from the way ...
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accept action analysis answer argue argument Argument from Illusion assertion assumption Austin behaviour belief Bounds of Sense called claim concept conclusion consequence context definition denial deny describe Descriptivism discussion distinction entails evaluative evidence example existence experience explanation expression fact falsity follows function G. E. M. Anscombe given Hare human illocutionary acts illocutionary force imperative imperative logic implies inference intelligible interpretation involved judgement Kant Kant's kind king of France language linguistic logical London looks material implication means mind moral notion object oblique intention particular perceive person philosophical point of view possible predicate premisses principle problem properties proposition psychological purpose question R. M. Hare reason reference relation relevant sceptic scientific Searle seems sensation sense sentence someone standard statement Strawson suppose theory thesis thing true or false truth truth functionally truth-functional understand University Press utterance valid verb Wittgenstein words