Mind, Volume 81Oxford University Press, 1972 A journal of philosophy covering epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. |
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Página 88
... given property , though it certainly does make sense to say of an individual thing that it is the standard of a given property ( length , weight , volume , specific gravity , etc. ) , and it makes sense to say that the criterion that ...
... given property , though it certainly does make sense to say of an individual thing that it is the standard of a given property ( length , weight , volume , specific gravity , etc. ) , and it makes sense to say that the criterion that ...
Página 222
... given action it commits me to all sub - actions the relative product of which constitute in a given order this same action , and if one assertion commits me to a given action , the repetition of the same assertion , its iteration ...
... given action it commits me to all sub - actions the relative product of which constitute in a given order this same action , and if one assertion commits me to a given action , the repetition of the same assertion , its iteration ...
Página 274
... given to free the context for predication in these cases and such explanation would not involve tampering with the sort or type of thing the house or Socrates is . " 1 Sommers is correct about the house example . While we do not ...
... given to free the context for predication in these cases and such explanation would not involve tampering with the sort or type of thing the house or Socrates is . " 1 Sommers is correct about the house example . While we do not ...
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Palavras e frases frequentes
accept action analysis answer argue argument Argument from Illusion assertion assumption Austin behaviour belief Bounds of Sense called claim concept conclusion consequence context definition denial deny describe Descriptivism discussion distinction entails evaluative evidence example existence experience explanation expression fact falsity follows function G. E. M. Anscombe given Hare human illocutionary acts illocutionary force imperative imperative logic implies inference intelligible interpretation involved judgement Kant Kant's kind king of France language linguistic logical London looks material implication means mind moral notion object oblique intention particular perceive person philosophical point of view possible predicate premisses principle problem properties proposition psychological purpose question R. M. Hare reason reference relation relevant sceptic scientific Searle seems sensation sense sentence someone standard statement Strawson suppose theory thesis thing true or false truth truth functionally truth-functional understand University Press utterance valid verb Wittgenstein words