Mind, Volume 81Oxford University Press, 1972 A journal of philosophy covering epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. |
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Página 103
... accept first the old and then the new secondary rule . But in the first situation , the new law is accepted in virtue of its passage by a legis- lature deemed legitimate , whereas in the second situation , it is accepted in the absence ...
... accept first the old and then the new secondary rule . But in the first situation , the new law is accepted in virtue of its passage by a legis- lature deemed legitimate , whereas in the second situation , it is accepted in the absence ...
Página 341
... accept these inferences as valid I find I do so because whenever I interpret ~ ( Ex ) ( Fx ) so that it is satisfied , I have to interpret ( x ) ( FxGx ) and ( x ) ( Fx ~ Gx ) so that they are satisfied . A bit of reflection shows me ...
... accept these inferences as valid I find I do so because whenever I interpret ~ ( Ex ) ( Fx ) so that it is satisfied , I have to interpret ( x ) ( FxGx ) and ( x ) ( Fx ~ Gx ) so that they are satisfied . A bit of reflection shows me ...
Página 520
... accept it . But this means , in effect , that the interpretation which a person puts on religious language , what general function he takes it to have , affects his decision whether to believe or not . The important conclusion which ...
... accept it . But this means , in effect , that the interpretation which a person puts on religious language , what general function he takes it to have , affects his decision whether to believe or not . The important conclusion which ...
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Palavras e frases frequentes
accept action analysis answer argue argument Argument from Illusion assertion assumption Austin behaviour belief Bounds of Sense called claim concept conclusion consequence context definition denial deny describe Descriptivism discussion distinction entails evaluative evidence example existence experience explanation expression fact falsity follows function G. E. M. Anscombe given Hare human illocutionary acts illocutionary force imperative imperative logic implies inference intelligible interpretation involved judgement Kant Kant's kind king of France language linguistic logical London looks material implication means mind moral notion object oblique intention particular perceive person philosophical point of view possible predicate premisses principle problem properties proposition psychological purpose question R. M. Hare reason reference relation relevant sceptic scientific Searle seems sensation sense sentence someone standard statement Strawson suppose theory thesis thing true or false truth truth functionally truth-functional understand University Press utterance valid verb Wittgenstein words