PUBLIC ECONOMY,

FOR

THE UNITED STATES.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

Ir will be seen that the author of this work has had to confront authorities of no mean consideration-authorities which, strange as it may seem, have occupied the theatre of debate on the leading topic of these pages, for nearly a century, without ever having been encountered, face to face, in their main positions. It has been claimed for them, that they could not be answered; that they had settled the question; and that, henceforth, time only was required to establish the universal triumph of Free Trade.

Though facts, in abundance, had been arrayed against these pretensions, nevertheless they seemed still to command attention and respect. The doctrine of Free Trade had taken up the position, and asserted the prerogatives, of a SCIENCE, composed, in all that belonged to it properly, of uniform propositions in all places, and in all time; from the deductions of which, conceding the claim, there was no appeal. But its claim to be ranked among the sciences, was a stolen shield. So long as such a weapon of defence was

awarded to it by consent, it was impossible to reason with or against it, inasmuch as a deduction of science is justly regarded as too formidable for oppugnation. No other answer was required from them, except this: It is contrary to the theory. The theory, averred to be a science, was the charm that dissolved all arguments-the stronghold within which a retreat could always be covered. But this claim will be found to be untenable; and divested of this, there is nothing left to it but certain loose reasonings, in the shape of empirical laws nothing but the ingenious fabrications of great abilities, based on hypotheses, and forced into currency by the authority of great names.

The author of this work has no objection to the use of the term science in this application; nor does he deny, but on the contrary maintains, that the elements of public economy embody the materials of a science of a very high order and of great importance. But it is one thing to have the elements of a science in hand, and another to have constructed the science. Nor do we mean by this to admit, that the Free-Trade economists have the elements; it will appear in the next chapter that they have not. We have there marked. the distinction between empirical laws and those of a science, and shown that the doctrines of Free Trade are composed entirely of the former. By arrogating the name and authority of a science for their dogmas, the Free-Trade economists had interposed an effectual bar to investigation by scientific rules, and covered themselves with an impenetrable shield, in the presence of all who conceded the claim. It will be found, that the ejection of these pretenders from this stronghold, opens the whole field anew to fresh explorations, and that the old charts, proved to be erroneous in very important particulars, must be used with extreme circumspection. It is not denied, that the European economists of the Free-Trade school have done some service, where they were at home, in a field directly under their eye; or that they have recognised and settled principles which are common to all parts of the world, and to every state of society. But it is not allowed, that they were competent to lay down rules for countries and states of society with which they had no acquaintance, and of the peculiarities of which they had not the faintest conception.

With these views of the standard lights of a science, "falsely so called," the author has endeavored to construct a system of economy for the United States, and to show wherein the principles of European economists are entirely inapplicable here. He has not

taken up new positions, or started from new points, or said new things, merely for the sake of novelty. He has availed himself of helps, where he could find them; but he has been forced to execute his own conceptions, and to carry out his plan, independent of all authority. Yet scarcely a thought will be found within these pages which has not been common property with many minds, and which the intelligent reader will not probably recognise, though it should be the first time he ever saw it reduced to form, and adjusted in a satisfactory place. So far is the author from being ambitious to produce surprise, that he would think his labor lost, if he had done so. He that advances things entirely new, and before unthought of, on a great theme, though they be true, is probably doomed to pass from the stage before they will be appreciated. Feeling the present importance of his subject, the author has desired to be understood and appreciated Now- at first sight; and he has, therefore, studied not to make statements which would require study in others. He does not believe in the usefulness of anything on this subject, which is not, to a very great extent, common property, as the result of unavoidable experience and observation. He does not consider, that what he has done that may appear to be new, is really new in most men's minds; but only in works of this kind. The very ground of his rejection of all models and authorities coming in the way of his convictions, is that of his confidence in the common sense of mankind, above which he would not willingly soar, and beyond the range of which he would not venture, so long as he desires to be useful.

"An

The author has been forced to observe, that hypothesis is the beginning, the middle, and the end of the reasoning of Free-Trade economists; that is to say, they have no other proof of the truth of their doctrine, than its assumption. This being a very important point, it is proper here to say a few words on the nature and functions of hypothesis, in scientific investigations. hypothesis," says John Stuart Mill, in his system of logic, "is any supposition which we make, in order to deduce from it conclusions in accordance with facts which are known to be real... There are no other limits to hypothesis, than those of the human imagination. Hypotheses are invented to enable the deductive method [of reasoning] to be earlier applied to phenomena. In order to discover the cause of any phenomena, by the deductive method, the process must consist of three parts: induction, ratiocination, and verification. Now, the hypothetical method

suppresses the first of these three steps, to wit, induction, and contents itself with the other two operations, ratiocination and verification; the law which is reasoned from being assumed, instead of proved."

Doubtless, the hypothesis of Free Trade would be entitled to the position of a theory or science, if, by the force of its ratiocination, it had ever arrived at the end in view, or at the third step above stated by Mr. Mill, to wit, verification. But here is the point where it always fails, and, therefore, remains in statu quo, an hypothesis still; or, rather, is actually disproved by a counter verification, in the same manner as the earlier hypotheses of the laws of the solar system, and of the material universe, have been disproved, by the verification of other and more correct hypotheses. Hypothesis is worthy of no respect, except as it is verified by facts. It may be admitted, transiently, for a purpose; but when the purpose fails of verification, it falls to the ground; and when a counter verification is made out, it is disproved. Such has been the result in the trial of the hypothesis of Free Trade.

"It appears," says Mr. Mill, above cited as the latest and best logical authority, "to be a condition of a genuinely scientific hypothesis, that it be not destined always to remain an hypothesis; but be certain to be either proved or disproved by that comparison with observed facts, which is termed verification. . . . If the supposition accords with the phenomena, there needs no other evidence."

The substance of M. Comte's reasoning on this point—and he is allowed to be one of the greatest philosophers of the ageis, that "we arrive, by means of hypothesis, to conclusions not hypothetical." This is the true and only legitimate function of hypothesis in scientific investigations, and when the third step of the deductive method fails, to wit, verification, which is the only object, and the only justification of assuming the first, in the shape of hypothesis, then the hypothesis falls to the ground. "It is not destined," as Mr. Mill says above, "always to remain an hypothesis;" but must either be verified, which transforms it into a science, or part of a science; or be rejected, for want of verification, as worthy of no respect.

This is precisely the fate of the Free-Trade hypothesis, which, though it has never yet got any farther than the original assumption, to prove itself by itself, has been dignified with the name of a science. It dispenses with the syllogism altogether, without which

no result can ever be arrived at by deduction. It halts for want of a second term in the train of its reasoning, and leaps the chasm to a forced conclusion.

It is admitted, that hypothesis is a legitimate resort, as a mode of reasoning backward from effect to cause, for the purpose of ascertaining a cause; or rather, perhaps, we should say, in assuming a more or less remote antecedent as a law, in order to ascertain, by scrutiny, whether it be, in fact, a law of causation in relation to a given effect; and that, in this way, some of the most important truths in science, as in astronomy for example, have been established. One of the earliest hypotheses of the universe, was, that the earth rested on the back of a huge elephant, and that the elephant stood on the back of a great tortoise. This is an hypothesis; and if the facts observed had been found, on scrutiny, to agree with it, it would have stood. Another later hypothesis was, that the sun and heavenly bodies move around the earth every twentyfour hours. Next to that was discovered the true hypothesis, viz., that the earth turns daily on its own axis. This agrees with observation of facts; in other words, is verified, and has, therefore, been sustained. Sir Isaac Newton invented a series of hypotheses by which the laws of gravitation, and other phenomena of the universe, were verified, as now received in science. Hence a perfect and scientific theory of the material universe. Such is the use and intent of hypothesis, viz., to arrive at the cause of an effect, and at the laws by which effects are controlled. In this way hypothesis ministers to the ends of science. But to stop at hypothesis, and call it science, as the Free-Trade economists do, is precisely the same as to claim our belief, that the earth rests on the back of an elephant. To erect an hypothesis, and then to force conclusions from it, is utterly inadmissible. Above all, when the conclusions are at variance with facts, the hypothesis is falsified. This is precisely the position and fate of the Free-Trade hypothesis. It stands alone, unsupported. This is all the authority which the doctrine has, and is the very reason why it should be abandoned. It disappoints the aim of hypothesis, which is to find a position to account for facts. When that fails, the hypothesis, however ingenious and beautiful to look at, is a bubble, and is worth no more. It will be seen, in the progress of this work, that the Free-Trade doctrine is precisely of this character, not in harmony, but in conflict, with facts; and, therefore, that it is not simply good for nothing, but must prove fatal in practice.