- They

The unbeliever, born and bred in Christian lands, professes to meet the Christian on the ground of reason, and from reason alone to disprove the Christian religion ; that is, he objects that Christianity is contrary to reason. But in order to sustain bis objection, he must prove that Christianity is contradicted, either by the pure or demonstrative reason, or by the practical or moral reason ; that is, either by reason as the principle of metaphysical certainty, or by reason as the principle of moral certainty. The first is out of the question ; for reason in the former sense, -the speculative reason of Kant, -as Kant himself

— has shown in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, cannot affirm or deny any thing on the subject. Moreover, it has been proved, over and over again, that there is nothing in Christianity which contradicts any principle of speculative reason; and all the chiefs of the modern infidel school, Bayle, Voltaire, D'Alembert, Hume, and Thomas Paine, concede that it is impossible to prove any thing, metaphysically, against Christianity. themselves,” says Benjamin Constant, an unsuspicious authority on this point, "acknowledge that reasoning can authorize only doubt."' * They can only say they do not believe it, or that there is no sufficient reason for believing it; but no one of them ventures to say that it must necessarily be false, or that, after all, it may not be true. So far as regards the speculative reason, it is certain, that, if reason cannot, as we concede it cannot, pronounce a judgment in favor of our religion, it cannot pronounce a judgment against it. It can and must concede its metaphysical possibility, and this is as far as it can go, either one way or the other.

The unbeliever, then, must leave the speculative reason, and show that our religion is condemned by the practical reason, or withdraw his objection. But the criterion of the practical reason is the consensus hominum. In speculative reason the individual needs not to go out of himself, for the speculative reason in se is as perfect in one as it is in all men ; and when I have demonstrated that the three angles of the triangle are equal to two right angles, I have no need of the assent of the race, and their assent can add nothing to the demonstration, or to the certainty of the fact. But in regard to the practical reason it is not so ; for this may be warped or perverted by individual idiosyncrasies, ignorance, education, position, passions, prejudices. Here the individual reason must be rectified or veri

* De la Religion, Tom. I. p. 7. Paris, 1824. NEW SERIES. - VOL. I. NO. IV.

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fied by the reason of the race, and that only is the reason of the race which is held always, everywhere, and by all. Hence we say the consensus hominum is the criterion of the practical reason, and the authority on which this or that is to be taken, not as divine revelation, for that is the error to be avoided, but as practical reason; for certainly that is not unreasonable, contrary to the practical reason, which the race universally assents to, but must be in accordance with it, and demanded by it ; or else the race would not and could not have universally assented to it. The consensus hominum is not the ground for believing this or that to be revealed, but simply for believing it approved by the practical reason; and if it is approved by the practical reason, we believe it on the authority of that reason, not fide divina, indeed, but fide humana, — and must do so, or prove

, ourselves unreasonable, be ourselves condemned by reason.

Now if the unbeliever fails, as he does, to show that there is something essential to the Christian religion repugned by the practical reason, he fails entirely to sustain his objection. He boasts of common sense, but common sense is only another name for what we call the practical reason. He says our religion contradicts common sense. But his assertion is worth nothing, unless he proves it by showing the contradiction ; which he never does and never can do. But if, on the other hand, we prove to him that every one of the principles of our religion has the authority of common sense, or that in believing our religion we assent to nothing not assented to in principle always and everywhere by the race, we prove that our religion in principle is reasonable, that the unbeliever cannot object that it is unreasonable, and that he, if he denies its principles, is himself unreasonable, obnoxious to the precise objection which he brings against us.

This last is what Count de Maistre has done. He proves, by admirable philosophical analysis and rare erudition, that there is in our holy religion no principle which the race has not always and everywhere assented to, and therefore, that, in refusing to believe it, in rejecting its principles, we are rejecting not merely the word of God as handed down to us by the Church, but also the practical reason or common sense of mankind, and, by doing so, placing ourselves in direct hostility to the reason we boast, and whose authority we acknowledge. He thus turns the tables upon the loud-boasting and conceited infidel, and shows him that it is he, not the Christian, who must humble himself before reason, and beg pardon for the outrages

he offers her. The unbeliever, in fact, builds never on reason, but always on unreason.

Reason disowns him, scorns him, nay, holds him, intellectually considered, in perfect derision. Poor thing! she says, he has lost his wits ; send him to the lunatic asylum.

Having established, as Count de Maistre has done, that all the principles of our religion have the consensus hominum, we have established that they are approved by reason.

We must now assume that they are principles inherent in reason itself, immediately ascertainable by reason, or that they have been derived from some other source. If we say either of the former, they are authoritative for reason, and reason must assent to them on the peril of ceasing to be reason. If we say they are not inherent in reason, nor immediately ascertainable by reason, we must attribute them— since the practical reason by approving pronounces them pure, sacred, good — to some source above reason, that is, the supernatural, and therefore either immediately or mediately to God himself. Then they are unquestionably true, and we must believe them, or again prove ourselves unreasonable ; for nothing is more reasonable than to

; believe God, and therefore what he reveals. So, on either supposition, we must assent to them or deny reason itself. Consequently, the analogies alleged against us by the enemies of our religion fully establish the reasonableness of Christianity in principle, and that reason must assent to it in principle or abdicate itself.

Yet we pretend not that by these analogies and ities we prove the absolute truth of Christianity as a positive revealed religion. We simply remove all objections a priori which can be conceived against it, and establish the reasonableness, the truth, for the practical reason, of its principles ; but we leave the fact of Christianity as a supernaturally revealed religion to be proved or not proved by the testimony in the case. The argument thus far shows the possible truth of the religion, the actual truth for the reason of its principles, and places it as a positive religion in the category of facts which may be proved by testimony. If the actual testimony appropriate in the case be equal to what satisfies the reason in the case of ordinary historical facts, to what is sufficient in the ordinary affairs of life to render assent prudent, it is proved as a positive revealed religion to the full extent that reason does or can demand ; and he who does not assent and act accordingly abdicates bis title to be considered a reasonable being. The

pagan authorappropriate testimony in the case is unquestionably equal to this, – is all that reason, unless it ceases to be reason, requires or can require. Whoever, then, withholds his assent from the Christian religion, unless through sheer ignorance, denies reason.

. True, the assent thus yielded or warranted is only the assent of reason, and by no means the assent of faith, in the proper Christian sense ; something more is undoubtedly demanded for faith ; but that, whatever it be, is to be sought, not from reason, but from divine grace, which is freely given to all who do not voluntarily resist it.

The Count's method of argument, properly understood, is therefore triumphant against the unbeliever, as the neologists themselves bave proved over and over again. The objection of the neologists which we have stated is met, - 1. by the fact that the analogies adduced extend to the principles, not to the positive doctrines, of Christianity; and consequently, before the neologists can be entitled to their conclusion, they must rebut the positive testimony in favor of Christianity as a supernaturally revealed religion, and also prove that the principles without the doctrines are sufficient, neither of which they do or can do ; and, 2. by the fact that the principles in question, between which and Christianity there is the relation of analogy or identity, are not themselves originally derived from simple natural reason, or from an interior subjective revelation made immediately to each man in particular, but from the primitive revelation made to our first parents, and preserved and diffused by tradition. We, as well as they, find Christian elements in the old heathen poets and philosophers; and perhaps in general the heathen world, under each of its various religions, retained more of Christian principle — we say not of Christian doctrine — than is retained by our modern sects. Under veils and symbols more or less transparent, we find not seldom, not only Christian principles, but a very near approach to some one or more of the Christian Mysteries themselves. Indeed, the type after which all religions have been fashioned is evidently the Christian religion, and there is scarcely a single Christian idea, if we may use the term, which is not to be found out of the Christian Church. This, however, presents no difficulty to the Christian ;- not, indeed, because he supposes all has been derived from the Holy Scriptures and intercourse with the Jews, as some have thought, - though more may have been derived from this source than many in our days are willing to acknowledge, - but because it was contained in the primitive

revelation to our first parents, and formed the common patrimony of the race. What we thus find is revealed truth, truth

pertaining to the Christian revelation, pure in its source, but in the lapse of time corrupted and mixed up with fables by the nations, as they multiplied and spread themselves over the face of the earth. The fountain was pure and supernatural, but the streams which flowed from it became gradually corrupt by receiving waters flowing from other fountains. Thus, what we find in consonance with our religion as supernatural we attribute to the primitive revelation preserved by tradition; what we find repugnant to it we attribute to men speaking from themselves, their own darkened understandings and corrupt hearts.

The Christian revelation is not, strictly speaking, a new revelation ; Judaism as such, though a divine institution for a special purpose, was not a dogmatic revelation, and contained no revealed truths not contained in the primitive revelation. The primitive revelation contained in substance the whole Christian revelation, and the only difference between the faith of the Fathers from the beginning, before Christ, and that of the Fathers since, is, that those before believed in a Christ to come, and those since believe in a Christ that has come, and that in many things our faith is clearer and more explicit than was theirs.' From the beginning till now, the revelation believed has been ever one and the same revelation, the faith has always been one and the same faith. Our Lord and his Apostles introduced no new religion, no new faith, made no new revelation, except to clear up and render more explicit what had been revealed and believed by the faithful from the first. It is not the true view to look upon our Lord as coming into the world to found a new religion, or to reveal even new dogmas, as do many of our modern sects. He came to make the Atonement, to perform the act of redemption, to open the door for the admission of the just into heaven, and to establish a new order, the order of grace, in place of the Law, that we might have life, and have it more abundantly.

Due consideration of this fact would correct the errors of our Liberal Christians, and enable them to get over some of the difficulties they now find, or imagine they find. They read the New Testament, and find in it no creed formally drawn out, and therefore conclude that none is enjoined or necessary. They find some one asking what he shall do to be saved, and an Apostle in his answer requiring him simply to believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, and therefore they conclude only the sim