own subjects without at the same time | pecially of Prussia. The kingdoms of Saxmaking the constitutional concessions they ony and Hanover, and the Grand Duchy required; and the former was resolved of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, are trembling in not to be beaten out of the ascendant in fear of annexation to their great neighbor; the old Diet by the emboldening action of for the two latter intervene between Prusthe National Verein on the small States. sia and the Danish duchies, and if they Austria and Prussia, therefore, in January were united, Prussia would then have a last, allied themselves both against Den- connected empire. We do not say that mark and the minor powers of Germany, the danger is, in our opinion, so imminent. setting the Federal body at defiance, and as the threatened States naturally hold it invading Slesvic with their own forces, to be. But the Bavarian government has while they forbade the Federal troops al- already endeavored to combine the small ready in Holstein to pass the Eyder. powers, under its own lead, in a subordinate league. Of course, if any such step were to be taken by Prussia, the signal for a civil war in Germany would be given at once. We incline to believe, however, that the flame will not burst out; but it is certain that, so far as the Federal influ ence of Austria and Prussia in the Confederation is concerned, both parties have checkmated each other. That influence is annihilated. The Danish question has also come to a dead lock; and the Germans are once more left to the consideration of domestic questions. This attitude established the alienation of the two great powers of Germany from the small ones. Austria and Prussia made a decisive stand against the minor States, while they nominally adopted the cause of the German people against Denmark; but the course they took to a certain extent served their ends. The Prussian court were no bad judges of the fickle temper of the North-German public. They foresaw that the people would barter their own political rights for fresh territóry and a sea-coast. To adopt the crusade against Denmark was, therefore, to bury the constitutional question. Thus far the policy of the Prussian government was plain enough. There are, then, at the present moment, three main internal controversies to be settled, and at each of these we shall glance in succession. We allude to the reform of the Confederation; to the recurrence of the constitutional struggle in Prussia; and to the negotiations in regard to the Zollverein. Nothing now remains to ward off their introduction again upon the political stage of Germany. It would seem that whatever is now to be done on the subject of Federal reform must spring from the minor powers; and it is probable that they will address themselves chiefly to measures for their own protection and security. The humiliation which now befel Austria in her German policy was, however, very remarkable. Only six months after she had attempted to isolate Prussia in the Confederation, she became her humble servant. The truth was, that Prussia, with an adroitness almost equal to her callous indifference between right and wrong, had contrived to identify herself with German feeling on the question of the duchies. Austria, therefore, found that she must either act with Prussia, or yield to her the lead of the whole National It is admitted on all hands that the Fedparty. She soon chose the former alter-eral constitution of Germany is extremenative. But now that the war is ended, she has been repaid as she had deserved. Prussia has made use of her for her own ends. The fate of the duchies, and the eventual profit of the campaign, rest with Prussia; while Austria has now estranged herself not less from the National party, whom she would otherwise be now in a position to lead. This rapid sketch of the shifting phases of German policy and German intrigue brings us to the state of affairs that we now witness. There is at this moment throughout the Confederation a profound distrust of both the great powers, but es ly defective, both as an external organization and as a means of working out that approximate conformity of internal gov ernment which is one condition of the progress of the nation. To a great extent, no doubt, this is the result of the political divisions of the country. The German Confederation consists of thirty-six independent States; and they together make a population of 45,000,000-or in an aver age ratio of 1,333,000 inhabitants to each State. But, in fact, their respective populations vary, from Prussia, with 14,138,000, to the little State of Liechtenstein, with no more than 7100. It is easy to -bi understand, therefore, the danger which | population, even since the cession of Lom- There is no doubt, therefore, that they are entitled to at least an equal voice in Germany with either Prussia or Austria alone. But with the single exception of the commencement of the Danish war, in which they were supported by the temporary enthusiasm of the National Verein, they have never been able to make their voices prevail in Federal matters over either great power, much less over both in combination. When Austria and Prussia have combined, the voice of the minor States has been drowned. When they have differed, some of the minor States have been attached to the side of each power; and thus these minor States either have failed to combine, or have failed to do so with success. In these circumstances, Bavaria has proposed, as we have said, to combine the 18,000,000 of the population of the small powers into an inferior or interior league, so as to make them collectively a third power in Germany, equal to either of the other two singly. This proposal, if it be only practicable, is the more important and the more just, because the two great powers have been able to intimidate them by the display of a strength which ought not to be imported into any question of Federal affairs. Prussia has more than 4,000,000 subjects, besides those within the limits of the German Confederacy; and Austria has fully 24,000,000-her total It is quite true, indeed, that during the Russian war, in 1854, the Federal Diet passed a decree incorporating into the German Confederation all the extra German possessions of Austria and Prussia; and to this decree, M. de Beust appealed in 1859, when he called upon all Germany to join in the Italian war. He argued that, in virtue of that decree, the French invasion of Austrian Lombardy was an invasion of Federal territory. Poor M. de Beust would now gladly recall his words. He was then the champion of German unity; he is now the advocate of the independence of the minor States. The object of his alarm, in other words, is now transferred from France to Prussia. But it is scarcely necessary to point out that the Federal decree of 1854 was illegal. The German Confederation had been a creation of Europe, and its extent had been delimited by an ecumenical compact (to borrow ecclesiastical language) between the princes of the territory which had constituted the extinct German empire, and the eight powers in Congress at Vienna. The great difficulty of such a Federal reform as Bavaria desires for the protection of the minor States is that of combining with it an effective organization in time of external war. The Federal government must be prompt and simple.in order to be efficient. If the minor powers would be content to lodge their authority in one of the four kings by turn, perhaps the Federal government would be less complex than it is now. But we greatly fear that these propositions are chimerical. Any attempt to resist Austria and Prussia by means of a constitutional change would probably be defeated by their combination against it. A reform in the German Confederation may, however, be initiated with advantage for other objects than that of giving protection to the minor States. It may be directed either towards rendering the Federal executive more efficient in war, or towards the progress of liberalism in the interests of peace. We may glance at these two objects of a Federal reform as being more likely to be realized than the proposals of Bavaria. The German Confederation has never yet experienced the shock of any other war than that which has just been con cluded with Denmark. Its military and executive organization has never, therefore, been put to the test of a great emergency, although it has now subsisted for nearly half a century. But there is a general disbelief in its efficiency. War between Germany and France would be war at its very gates. There would be three distinct German armies called into the field, with three distinct commanders, each irresponsible to the others. There would be a Federal army, a Prussian army, and an Austrian army. The Diet, too, would probably be paralyzed by the conflicting views, interests, or ambition of its members, and by the interminable routine such as the reference of every question that may be raised to committees and sub-committees which marked its military deliberations in the crisis of the Italian war quite as much as in the tardy discussion of domestic measures. It is of little use for the Germans to spend their money by millions on fortifications and artillery, if, when the emergency arises, they are so disunited as to be in danger of being shattered at the first touch of the perfect military organization of the French empire. The Federal executive, in time or during menace of war, ought, therefore, to be much more simple, in order to be effective. Perhaps the most obvious suggestion is, that it should be placed in the hands of three personagesa representative of Prussia, of Austria, and of the minor States. the decision of two out of the three to be binding. To such an extent, indeed, the Bavarian proposition might possibly be accepted. But the reform which arrests more attention among the Germans relates to the ordinary structure of the Federal body in time of peace. The question is, in a word, whether, since it must bear a representative character in some shape, the representation is to be diplomatic or popular. This alternative was vehemently disputed on the formation of the Confederacy in 1815. At that time Stein and Metternich were the leading exponents of opposite views. The latter, who took the despotic or court side of the question, urged that the Federal government should consist simply of the representatives of the governments of the component States, that is to say, that it should be a tribunal of ambassadors. Stein, on the contrary, insisted that it should at least comprehend a popular representation, even if it were not to be wholly composed of the popular element. But Metternich prevailed; and it must be admitted that, however repressive his system may have been, the proposals of Stein, then at the head of the German liberals, pre-supposed a change in the internal government of each German State which it was impossible to wring out of the sovereigns. If these separate governments had been then constitutional-if, in other words, they had consisted of kings, nobles, and commons-the same mixed system might have been reflected into the Federal diet. There might then have been a Federal popular legislature as well as a Federal executive. But when the sovereigns refused to adopt constitutional principles in their own States, to have established a German parliament would have been equivalent to depriving them of their separate sovereignty, and to degrading them into mere registrars of the decrees of a supreme national assembly. This plan, originally suggested by Stein in 1815, was carried out with even greater comprehension in the memorable Frankfort parliament of 1848. The sovereigns combined to crush that parliament from an instinct of self-preservation, for it practically amounted to a declaration of a German republic. But the Emperor of Austria; as we have already said, professed a year ago to revise the principle of popular representation in the Federal body, in a moderated form; and however suspicious we may be of his own sincerity, it is worth inquiry how far such a measure would be practicable. There are now facilities for such a change as did not exist in the days of Stein. Constitutional government more or less developed generally prevails in Germany. The Reichsrath at Vienna is a conspicuous example. Most of the small States have their representative bodies also. But the great difficulty concerns Prussia. She has a Constitution only in name, and now that her people, with a fickleness that would have seemed incredible, have allowed the king and M. Bismark to trample their rights under foot in their vanity for an inglorious conquest, it is hard to say when the struggle for constitutional government will be revived among them. Until the king assents to the action of the Constitution it is certain he will not submit to a Federal reform based upon principles which he repudiates in his own dominions. It is possible that the question of a Federal popular representation may be revived in Germany before Constitutional government shall prevail in Prussia, and the one cause may lend assistance to the other; but the submission of King William at Berlin must precede his submission at Frankfort. many for the last thirty years is mainly to be referred. But the merits of the Zollverein must be fully stated without being overstated. It is common to imagine that this Customs' League has been a free-trading convention, or at least a convention approximating upon the principles of free trade. It is only in the most limited sense that so much can be said of it. The duties levied by the Zollverein itself are eminently protective. Indeed, they are, we believe, higher than the duties of Prussia were before its institution. What the Zollverein did was to make a common country, so far as tariffs and custom dues are concerned, of the several German States which successively joined this League. Indeed, in order to secure an immediate average of common receipts equal to the aggregate receipts of each State before the formation of the Zollverein, it was found So long, however, as the Danish question still impends upon Germany, we are led to think that Constitutional Reform will probably be one of the last measures to be dealt with. With an armistice extending until December, and difficulties of all kinds, both as to territory and succession, and springing at once from the German States and from the three other great powers, few can expect the Danish question to be settled in 1864; and it is possible that the next spring may develop complications of a magnitude that will still further postpone the principles of free gov-necessary to raise the duties on the exterernment in the Confederation. nal frontiers of the Zollverein. Thus, it would cost more to import goods into Prussia direct, through Memel or Dantzic, under the system of the Zollverein, than it would have cost before. But the cost of importing goods from England into Saxony or Bavaria might have been no greater under the Zollverein than before it, or it might have been less; for in such a case there was but one toll to be paid instead of two or three. This raising of the duties on the external frontiers of the Zollvereinish States was probably a revenue necessity. But there are reforming measures of another kind for which there is apparently no abatement of zeal. We turn more cheerfully to the efforts which Germany has it in its power to make for an assimilation of those differential laws and usages which have been the chief obstacles to the social and national union of the people. The Zollverein, to which we shall presently allude, is a leading instance of the progress that has been made in this respect. Previously to 1830 every German State, large or small, had its separate custom-houses, and more often distinct tariffs into the bargain. Those who recollect the old posting days thirty years ago, before there were German railways, remember how their baggage was often hauled out and examined by the road-side three or four times a day, as they jogged on at six English miles an hour from the frontier of one petty State to another. What was an intolerable annoyance to travellers was at the same time a fatal impediment to the internal commerce of Germany. The Zollverein was an association of States, with Prussia at their head, to abolish the custom-houses on their common frontiers, and to establish a common system of custom-houses on their external frontiers; that is, on the external frontiers of the Zollverein itself. Now, however, the opinion of Prussia By degrees it has extended itself until it has undergone an entire change. What has for some time absorbed all Germany, we began to do for free trade in its true with the exception of Austria. It is to acceptation in 1842, in 1846, and in the this that the growing prosperity of Ger-enactments of subsequent years, has been The Zollverein did not, therefore, properly speaking, represent a free-trade movement. It did so even less than the abolition of duties between England and Ireland towards the close of last century. The conditions of produce in England and Ireland were to a certain extent different, but in the North German States they were for the most part identical. There was very little apprehension for Prussian trade injuriously competing with Saxon or Hanoverian trade, or vice versa. But whenever German produce was threatened with competition with British, French, Belgian, or Dutch, the authors of the Zollverein were ready to protect it by the most restrictive enactments. gradually accepted as sound policy by continental nations. They were quite content that we should be the practical as well as the theoretical pioneers of the new policy; and now that we have become rich instead of being poor by its adoption, they are naturally ready to fellow our example. The Emperor of the French, surrounded by the few members of his Cabinet who understood political economy, led the way of imitation. Belgium, under the sound financial policy of M. Frère Orban, her invaluable Minister of Finance, took the same course about the same time, though in a less conspicuous manner. And the Prussian government has since negotiated a free trading treaty with France, which is still the subject of the most lively political controversy in Germany. The King of Prussia, with much of the parasitical following of Napoleon III. that has distinguished his conduct to the Chambers of Berlin, resolved on a coup d'état with the Zollverein. The political economists and practical men of commerce around his cabinet supported the proposal of France for a commercial treaty similar to that which France had already made with England. But there was the important difference that, while England was independent, Prussia had merged her freedom of action in the compact of the Zollverein, and could conclude a commercial treaty only on the condition of its subsequent adoption by the Zollverein. Prussia trusted to her luck, much as the Emperor of the French trusted to his ability to force the obnoxious English treaty in 1861 down the throat of his hostile Chambers. But while Napoleon succeeded, King William woefully failed. A storm of opposition followed in the more protectionist States of the Zollverein. Bavaria, in particular, resolved rather to break up the Customs League_than fall in with the French treaty. It is in very much this state that the question still remains. But the Zollverein itself has not much longer to run. It expires at the end of 1865; and the question already arises, On what terms is it to be renewed? The policy of Austria intervenes at this point, and forms an essential element in an answer to the question. The Austrian tariffs were long even higher than those of the Zollverein; but they might probably, at least in recent years, have been assimilated to them, if there had not been a difficulty in regard to the foreign possessions of the House of Hapsburg. It would only have been possible to have admitted German Austria into the Zollverein. As things stand, the Austrian empire is a Zollverein in itself; that is to say, a common customs system comprehends the whole territory, from the frontiers of Bavaria and Switzerland to those of Turkey and Russia. To have abolished the line of custom-duties on its Bohemian frontier, and to have established one in its place between Hungary and German Austria, would have been tantamount to a dissolution of the empire. However, in July, 1862, the Austrian government went so far as to propose to Prussia to join the Zollverein. Prussia rejected the proposal, and did so in a highly discourteous manner. But perhaps she was not without a reason. The French and Prussian treaty, if not concluded, was then at least in negotiation; and there is little doubt that it was in order to defeat this free-trading measure, as applied, at least, to the rest of Germany, that Austria made the offer. Probably the object of the latter power was to avail herself of the Zollvereinish disruption which she anticipated from the treaty, and to secure the participation of Southern Germany in a new league on the expiry of the Zollverein. At this moment, therefore, it seems likely that one of two courses will be taken. Either Prussia will overcome the opposition of the Southwestern members of the Zollverein and carry her French treaty as the basis of a renewal of that league a year hence; or the Zollverein will be broken up, and the more liberal members in the North will still adhere to Prussia, while the rest will form a Southern Zollverein jointly with Austria. We can see no third course. That Austria should fall in with the French treaty would be impossible; for that would involve a lowering by fifty per cent. of her already reduced tariffs. But should Bavaria, Wirtemberg, Baden, Nassau, and a few smaller States, finally refuse to accept the free-trading policy of Prussia and France, Austria would probably be ready to join them on the basis of the present Zollverein tariff. Such a result, however, we scarcely anticipate. We cannot pass from this part of the subject without noticing the bulky Blue Book of reports to the Foreign Office from the various Secretaries of Legation (formerly called Attachés) at the different courts, on the commercial affairs of the |