Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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Página 226
... truth and synonymy . For example , Quine considers the suggestion that an analytic propo- sition is one which ' can be turned into a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms ' , a logical truth being ' a statement which is true ...
... truth and synonymy . For example , Quine considers the suggestion that an analytic propo- sition is one which ' can be turned into a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms ' , a logical truth being ' a statement which is true ...
Página 614
... truths are provable . From these premises I can prove that you accept at least one truth knowable only by intuition . The fact that the proof presupposes the truth in question is immaterial . ' The Tortoise reflected again . ' Well , I ...
... truths are provable . From these premises I can prove that you accept at least one truth knowable only by intuition . The fact that the proof presupposes the truth in question is immaterial . ' The Tortoise reflected again . ' Well , I ...
Página 615
... truths of logic into conditional and unconditional . The conditional truths are the theorems , not because they are conditional in themselves but because our knowledge of their truth is conditional on our knowing that the axioms are ...
... truths of logic into conditional and unconditional . The conditional truths are the theorems , not because they are conditional in themselves but because our knowledge of their truth is conditional on our knowing that the axioms are ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York