Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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Página 211
... things " , beyond our reach on the other side of the veil of perception.'2 Thus Jonathan Bennett . What exactly must ... things about the objective and independent world . 4. That the mind comes to know or truly believe some of those ...
... things " , beyond our reach on the other side of the veil of perception.'2 Thus Jonathan Bennett . What exactly must ... things about the objective and independent world . 4. That the mind comes to know or truly believe some of those ...
Página 312
... things ' would be seen in a state of flux and there would be no ' thing ' having any permanence . Under such ... things ' although perhaps still requiring the notion of location ? ( 3 ) From things to ' space ' . The author points out ...
... things ' would be seen in a state of flux and there would be no ' thing ' having any permanence . Under such ... things ' although perhaps still requiring the notion of location ? ( 3 ) From things to ' space ' . The author points out ...
Página 465
... things look or are seen as they are . But whilst it is wrong , he holds , to attempt to produce a causal answer to such a question as Why do red things normally look red ? he follows Hamlyn in denying an analytic connection ; though the ...
... things look or are seen as they are . But whilst it is wrong , he holds , to attempt to produce a causal answer to such a question as Why do red things normally look red ? he follows Hamlyn in denying an analytic connection ; though the ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York