Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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Página 69
the choosing - situation . Suppose that we did believe some be- nighted proposition contrary to ( a ) . That is , suppose we believed that some members of societies do not have any right to goods . If we did believe this , we would not ...
the choosing - situation . Suppose that we did believe some be- nighted proposition contrary to ( a ) . That is , suppose we believed that some members of societies do not have any right to goods . If we did believe this , we would not ...
Página 229
... suppose is true ; one such that we can conceive of , that is imagine or suppose , it and any other proposition which is entailed by the original proposition , being true . The latter clause is important for bringing out the sense of ...
... suppose is true ; one such that we can conceive of , that is imagine or suppose , it and any other proposition which is entailed by the original proposition , being true . The latter clause is important for bringing out the sense of ...
Página 235
... suppose that at any rate ( 4 ) and ( 5 ) are necessary propositions . ( 5 ) is necessary because it is not coherent to suppose that the individual picked out by both ' Cicero ' and ' Tully ' is not self- identical . As regards the ...
... suppose that at any rate ( 4 ) and ( 5 ) are necessary propositions . ( 5 ) is necessary because it is not coherent to suppose that the individual picked out by both ' Cicero ' and ' Tully ' is not self- identical . As regards the ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York