Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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Página 124
... seems unlikely that there are any hard and fast criteria for intentional identity , it seems to me equally unlikely that any neat analysis of ( 4 ) is available . Another problem Geach finds with the experimental analysis is that it ...
... seems unlikely that there are any hard and fast criteria for intentional identity , it seems to me equally unlikely that any neat analysis of ( 4 ) is available . Another problem Geach finds with the experimental analysis is that it ...
Página 414
... seems to mark a morally profound difference in the world between those things which possess it , and those which lack it , sentience alone also seems not to qualify a being to be a possessor of rights . This appears evident with lower ...
... seems to mark a morally profound difference in the world between those things which possess it , and those which lack it , sentience alone also seems not to qualify a being to be a possessor of rights . This appears evident with lower ...
Página 444
... seems implausible that ' snow is white ' should entail that it entails itself . It does entail itself , of course , but the colour of snow seems irrelevant to that fact of logic . Much in the same way , although the logical truth of the ...
... seems implausible that ' snow is white ' should entail that it entails itself . It does entail itself , of course , but the colour of snow seems irrelevant to that fact of logic . Much in the same way , although the logical truth of the ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York