Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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Página 125
... regard such quantification as invariably illegitimate , but on the contrary offers an account of it in terms of another object of Quinean obloquy , substitutional quantification . This account is to be found in 4.3 , ' Quantification ...
... regard such quantification as invariably illegitimate , but on the contrary offers an account of it in terms of another object of Quinean obloquy , substitutional quantification . This account is to be found in 4.3 , ' Quantification ...
Página 311
... regard them as really temporal . Directionless time is not time at all ' ( p . 43 ) . I agree with this , but it does need to be argued more fully ; especially since Mehlberg and others have taken up an entirely contrary position ; a ...
... regard them as really temporal . Directionless time is not time at all ' ( p . 43 ) . I agree with this , but it does need to be argued more fully ; especially since Mehlberg and others have taken up an entirely contrary position ; a ...
Página 399
... regard the behaviour in question as constituting a piece of unjust wrong done to me , in the one case because I regard myself as so superior to my neighbour that nothing he does can be regarded as an injury to me , in the other because I ...
... regard the behaviour in question as constituting a piece of unjust wrong done to me , in the one case because I regard myself as so superior to my neighbour that nothing he does can be regarded as an injury to me , in the other because I ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York