Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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Página 484
... reason but not for the action for which q is a reason . The definition does not assume that of every pair of conflicting reasons one overrides the other . It may be that p & q is a reason both for doing A and for doing not - A or that ...
... reason but not for the action for which q is a reason . The definition does not assume that of every pair of conflicting reasons one overrides the other . It may be that p & q is a reason both for doing A and for doing not - A or that ...
Página 487
that he has a reason for not acting on certain reasons and that means that he believes that he may be justified in ... reason that p if and only if he does A because he believes that p is a reason for him to do A. A person refrains from ...
that he has a reason for not acting on certain reasons and that means that he believes that he may be justified in ... reason that p if and only if he does A because he believes that p is a reason for him to do A. A person refrains from ...
Página 492
... reason or for no reason . A person may take a decision even while believing that there is no reason for him to take a decision now . He may not believe that he has a reason to exclude other reasons from consideration and to bring his ...
... reason or for no reason . A person may take a decision even while believing that there is no reason for him to take a decision now . He may not believe that he has a reason to exclude other reasons from consideration and to bring his ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York