Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
No interior do livro
Resultados 1-3 de 77
Página 173
... particular cannot occupy two times at the same place . All this is obviously true and furthermore is true not only about space and time but about every pair of continua containing some occupant . Suppose there is an occupant which has ...
... particular cannot occupy two times at the same place . All this is obviously true and furthermore is true not only about space and time but about every pair of continua containing some occupant . Suppose there is an occupant which has ...
Página 356
... particular reidentification can get a foothold with these meagre resources : talk of numerical identity of sounds ( hence the notion of a persisting sound particular ) can be introduced naturally and plausibly . Moreover , important ...
... particular reidentification can get a foothold with these meagre resources : talk of numerical identity of sounds ( hence the notion of a persisting sound particular ) can be introduced naturally and plausibly . Moreover , important ...
Página 360
... ( particular ) s is plangent ' , the spatial component would seem to be entirely unmediated by the concept of an auditory particular . The connection between s and master - sound pitches at which it occurs seems to be transparently ...
... ( particular ) s is plangent ' , the spatial component would seem to be entirely unmediated by the concept of an auditory particular . The connection between s and master - sound pitches at which it occurs seems to be transparently ...
Outras edições - Ver tudo
Palavras e frases frequentes
accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York