Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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Página 50
... pain . Nor is it merely that I am psychologically certain that the child is in pain . For I may be psychologically certain about something and yet wrong . I am entitled and any other third person present in the manifest case is entitled ...
... pain . Nor is it merely that I am psychologically certain that the child is in pain . For I may be psychologically certain about something and yet wrong . I am entitled and any other third person present in the manifest case is entitled ...
Página 52
... pain - behaver . I have used the concept of pain to describe both cases . I cannot have obtained that concept by private ostensive definition of a type of item in my own ex- perience . I have picked up the concept of pain through and ...
... pain - behaver . I have used the concept of pain to describe both cases . I cannot have obtained that concept by private ostensive definition of a type of item in my own ex- perience . I have picked up the concept of pain through and ...
Página 56
... pain . And it makes sense to suppose that everyone sometimes has a pain he does not express . These suppositions make sense , even though there are in fact some people who neither have pains nor behave as though they had , some who ...
... pain . And it makes sense to suppose that everyone sometimes has a pain he does not express . These suppositions make sense , even though there are in fact some people who neither have pains nor behave as though they had , some who ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York