Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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... minds . 2. That there is an independently existing objective world separate from minds . 3. That the mind can come to know , or at least truly believe , some things about the objective and independent world . 4. That the mind comes to ...
... minds . 2. That there is an independently existing objective world separate from minds . 3. That the mind can come to know , or at least truly believe , some things about the objective and independent world . 4. That the mind comes to ...
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... mind , the doctrine is not committed to any particular account of the existing objective world . The sort of independence needed here is onto- logical independence . Whether or not the mind exists , the object- ive world exists . But ...
... mind , the doctrine is not committed to any particular account of the existing objective world . The sort of independence needed here is onto- logical independence . Whether or not the mind exists , the object- ive world exists . But ...
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... Mind ( S. Candlish ) 299 TOULMIN , S. Human Understanding , Vol . 1 ; General Introduction and Part I ( R. Harré ) ... Mind 283 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association 458 New Journal - Philosophy and Literature ...
... Mind ( S. Candlish ) 299 TOULMIN , S. Human Understanding , Vol . 1 ; General Introduction and Part I ( R. Harré ) ... Mind 283 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association 458 New Journal - Philosophy and Literature ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York