Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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Página 255
... laws , i.e. laws referring only to physical states or events . Thus , given a complete physiology , every brain event would ' follow recognized physical laws ' ( p . 51 ) , and no brain event would involve a ' departure from physical law ...
... laws , i.e. laws referring only to physical states or events . Thus , given a complete physiology , every brain event would ' follow recognized physical laws ' ( p . 51 ) , and no brain event would involve a ' departure from physical law ...
Página 256
... laws . He writes : ' research based on the assumption that the brain obeys only physicochemical laws has not yet suffered a damaging reverse ' ( p . 39 ) . If this were true , interactionist explanations would , of course , be ...
... laws . He writes : ' research based on the assumption that the brain obeys only physicochemical laws has not yet suffered a damaging reverse ' ( p . 39 ) . If this were true , interactionist explanations would , of course , be ...
Página 278
... laws of nature are statements about natural necessities . ( The most complete statement and defence of the argument is to be found in ' Kneale's Argument Revisited ' by George Molnar , Philosophical Review , 78 ( 1969 ) pp . 79-89 ...
... laws of nature are statements about natural necessities . ( The most complete statement and defence of the argument is to be found in ' Kneale's Argument Revisited ' by George Molnar , Philosophical Review , 78 ( 1969 ) pp . 79-89 ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York