Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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Página 255
... kind M1 and brain states of kind B1 , and having the form : M1 if , and only if , B1 . For example , suppose that pain of a certain kind ( M1 ) occurs if , and only if , the brain is simultaneously in a certain physical state ( B1 ) ...
... kind M1 and brain states of kind B1 , and having the form : M1 if , and only if , B1 . For example , suppose that pain of a certain kind ( M1 ) occurs if , and only if , the brain is simultaneously in a certain physical state ( B1 ) ...
Página 538
... kind an activity belongs is to know which language - game that activity exemplifies . Now , if this doctrine , once developed , is taken seriously , the grounds for uneasiness at the direction taken by the recent argument are made ...
... kind an activity belongs is to know which language - game that activity exemplifies . Now , if this doctrine , once developed , is taken seriously , the grounds for uneasiness at the direction taken by the recent argument are made ...
Página 542
... kind , namely games , we might treat it as a property of any grammatical kind : that is to say , as a ( partial ) definition of the notion of a grammatical kind . Treated in this way , the property would be not what makes games ...
... kind , namely games , we might treat it as a property of any grammatical kind : that is to say , as a ( partial ) definition of the notion of a grammatical kind . Treated in this way , the property would be not what makes games ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York