Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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Página 340
... individual , which , while characteristic of non - fictional proper names , is unattainable by descriptions or predicates of any kind . The other is the uniqueness of precisely one individual , which is the most that predicates and ...
... individual , which , while characteristic of non - fictional proper names , is unattainable by descriptions or predicates of any kind . The other is the uniqueness of precisely one individual , which is the most that predicates and ...
Página 341
... individual that F's . For that reason , although it would make sense to point to an individual that F'd and ask ' Is ( 1 ) satisfied by that individual ? ' , it would make no sense whatever to ask ' Is that the individual that ( 1 ) is ...
... individual that F's . For that reason , although it would make sense to point to an individual that F'd and ask ' Is ( 1 ) satisfied by that individual ? ' , it would make no sense whatever to ask ' Is that the individual that ( 1 ) is ...
Página 581
... individual and simultaneously criticise the accepted practice but not the individual from an external standpoint , then in cases of type 3 it must be possible similarly to recognize the accepted social practice as binding on the individual ...
... individual and simultaneously criticise the accepted practice but not the individual from an external standpoint , then in cases of type 3 it must be possible similarly to recognize the accepted social practice as binding on the individual ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York