Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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Página 217
... idea of the tree at time t ' . On some readings of ' having ' and ' idea ' then it is at least odd , if not actually inconsistent , to talk of seeing x and having an idea of x at the same time . This is because there are some non ...
... idea of the tree at time t ' . On some readings of ' having ' and ' idea ' then it is at least odd , if not actually inconsistent , to talk of seeing x and having an idea of x at the same time . This is because there are some non ...
Página 293
... ideas ' and he has already argued ( II.xxxii.14 ) that so far as its truth is concerned it matters not whether an idea of a colour corresponds to a ' real colour , or only a peculiar texture ' . The critical commentary which Mabbot ...
... ideas ' and he has already argued ( II.xxxii.14 ) that so far as its truth is concerned it matters not whether an idea of a colour corresponds to a ' real colour , or only a peculiar texture ' . The critical commentary which Mabbot ...
Página 460
... ideas by sense and by imagination . How do we know that there are minds - one's own mind and other minds ? Certainly , Berkeley affirms , not by having an idea of a mind . Ideas are passive , whereas minds are active . Nevertheless ...
... ideas by sense and by imagination . How do we know that there are minds - one's own mind and other minds ? Certainly , Berkeley affirms , not by having an idea of a mind . Ideas are passive , whereas minds are active . Nevertheless ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York