Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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Página 194
... feelings you may not express my feeling except under special conditions . You may , of course , express my feeling in so far as you share my feeling . But then you have not so much expressed my feeling as expressed yours which happens ...
... feelings you may not express my feeling except under special conditions . You may , of course , express my feeling in so far as you share my feeling . But then you have not so much expressed my feeling as expressed yours which happens ...
Página 200
... feeling is to say that one has expressed a feeling that is not genuine . Then the parallel seems to be : pre- tended reports take non - genuine , pretended facts as the object of the report , the latter non - genuine feelings as the ...
... feeling is to say that one has expressed a feeling that is not genuine . Then the parallel seems to be : pre- tended reports take non - genuine , pretended facts as the object of the report , the latter non - genuine feelings as the ...
Página 201
... feeling is the pretence to have the feeling in question . So that one could express a pretended feeling in the sense of expressing the pretence that one has the feeling . But here either ' expressing the pretence that one had the ...
... feeling is the pretence to have the feeling in question . So that one could express a pretended feeling in the sense of expressing the pretence that one has the feeling . But here either ' expressing the pretence that one had the ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York