Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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Página 234
... fact that it is sometimes not clear which , if any , expressions are referring expressions does not call into question the equally undoubted fact that it is often clear enough which expressions are referring expressions . As an example ...
... fact that it is sometimes not clear which , if any , expressions are referring expressions does not call into question the equally undoubted fact that it is often clear enough which expressions are referring expressions . As an example ...
Página 518
... fact count against the idea that it is possible for God timelessly to know this ? What God knows ( timelessly ) in these circumstances includes the fact that we are pleased that a certain event is over , but not that he is pleased that ...
... fact count against the idea that it is possible for God timelessly to know this ? What God knows ( timelessly ) in these circumstances includes the fact that we are pleased that a certain event is over , but not that he is pleased that ...
Página 580
... fact and value.3 In ( B ) Blumberg implies that Searle's aim had in fact been to derive a final and conclusive ' ought ' - statement from statements about socially - created obligations . Blumberg argues that ' the only sort of ...
... fact and value.3 In ( B ) Blumberg implies that Searle's aim had in fact been to derive a final and conclusive ' ought ' - statement from statements about socially - created obligations . Blumberg argues that ' the only sort of ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York