Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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Página 239
... experience , it can be known that no subsequent experience will upset it . But if a proposition satis- fies ( b ) it need not therefore satisfy ( a ) , for it might be knowable only through having some experience . If a proposition ...
... experience , it can be known that no subsequent experience will upset it . But if a proposition satis- fies ( b ) it need not therefore satisfy ( a ) , for it might be knowable only through having some experience . If a proposition ...
Página 240
... experience , and with experience all our knowledge begins . " One could of course consider whether logically possible beings could know certain things in advance of experience . Before we did so , we would need to define ' experience ...
... experience , and with experience all our knowledge begins . " One could of course consider whether logically possible beings could know certain things in advance of experience . Before we did so , we would need to define ' experience ...
Página 467
... experiences in the crucial and problematic sense , then experience - reports , reporting the occurrence of such experiences , must be possible . But these experi- ence - reports will need to be more than what Hinton calls a ' perception ...
... experiences in the crucial and problematic sense , then experience - reports , reporting the occurrence of such experiences , must be possible . But these experi- ence - reports will need to be more than what Hinton calls a ' perception ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York